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A treatise upon the law of chattel morts

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A TREATISE DE MILES.

LAW OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES

AND

CONDITIONAL SALES

IN THE

STATE OF NEW YORK.

BY

DIX W. SMITH, LL. B.,

SECOND EDITION

 \mathbf{BY}

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Of the Albany Bar.

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PREFACE.

The subject of Chattel Mortgages occupies a prominent and important position in the jurisprudence of this State; there being more than one thousand reported cases involving this subject.

The aim of the writer has been to collate these cases, and lay before the student the principles involved in the more important of them; and to give the busy practitioner a book of ready reference to the law of chattel mortgages in this State.

It has not been thought best to go outside of the State for authorities, as such authorities are often in conflict with our own.

It is the hope of the author that this treatise will meet with the approval of the profession, and lighten the research of its busy members.

ELMIRA, N. Y., April 1, 1889.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.

More than six years have elapsed since the issue of the original edition of this work, and in order that its usefulness may be perpetuated to the profession, a supplement in the light of the numerous decisions of the courts and the amendments of the statutes concerning chattel mortgages has become a necessity.

The same general plan contained in the original edition has been followed as near as could be in the supplement. I have added to the authorities all the reported cases since the publication of the first edition, including the 145 N. Y., also all the statutes as amended to date, including the amendments of 1895.

Contracts of conditional sale are now frequently made to secure the payment of the purchase price of personal property, and are in many respects like a chattel mortgage. I have added all the statutes upon the subject of conditional sales of personal property, and have taken some care to define the rights of the parties under them.

ALBANY, July 8th, 1895.

P. C. DUGAN.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

THE INSTRUMENT.

	P	
I.	NATURE AND DEFINITION	I
2.	FORM AND REQUISITES:	3
3.	The Parties	5
4.	THE SUBJECT MATTER	7
5-	DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY	10
6.	EXECUTION AND DELIVERY	12

CHAPTER II.

ON THE FILING AND REFILING OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

I.	Where Filed	14
2.	How Filed	19
3.	Effect of Omission to File	20
4.	Where Refiled	27
5.	How Refiled	27
6.	When Refiled	30
7.	EFFECT OF OMISSION TO REFILE	32

CHAPTER III.

THE VALIDITY OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

		age
I.	Between the Parties	34
		36
3.	Change of Possession	39
4.	What Interests may be Mortgaged	40
5.	AGREEMENTS WHICH RENDER THE MORTGAGE VOID	42
6.	AGREEMENTS WHICH DO NOT INVALIDATE THE MORTGAGE	45
7.	OF MORTGAGES UPON FIXTURES	54
8.	How, and by whom the Validity may be Contested	59
	CHAPTER IV.	
0	F THE DISPOSITION AND SALE OF THE MORTGAGE PROPERTY.	ED
1.	Under Execution	62
2.	By the Mortgagor	66
-	By the Mortgagor's Agent	67
4.	By the Mortgagee	69
	CHAPTER V.	
	ASSIGNMENT.	
r.	Assignment	78
2.	PAYMENT	80
3.	Satisfaction	82
	REDEMPTION	83

CHAPTER VI.

OF MORTGAGES ON SHIPS AND VESSELS.

	Pa	age.
I.	Filing and Recording	85
2.	OF LIENS FOR REPAIRS AND SUPPLIES	90
3.	OF VALIDITY	9 9
4.	OF PRIORITY BETWEEN LIENS AND MORTGAGES	101
5.	OF BOTTOMRY AND RESPONDENTIA 102-	106

SUPPLEMENT.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

THE INSTRUMENT. Page. I. NATURE AND DEFINITION. 107 2. FORM AND REQUISITES. 109 3. THE PARTIES. 113 4. THE SUBJECT MATTER 114 5. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY 116 6. EXECUTION AND DELIVERY 118

CHAPTER II.

ON THE FILING AND REFILING OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

		,
ı.	Statutes	119
2.	WHERE FILED	127
3.	How Filed	129
4.	Effect of Omission to File	130
5.	Refiling	133

CHAPTER III.

THE VALIDITY OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES. 1. Between the Parties 2. Change of Possession. 3. What Interests may be Mortgaged	142
CHAPTER IV.	
OF THE DISPOSITION AND SALE OF THE MORTGAG PROPERTY.	ED
1. Under Execution. 2. By the Mortgagor 3. By the Mortgagee	145
CHAPTER V.	
CHAFTER V.	
ASSIGNMENT.	
1. ASSIGNMENT. 2. PAYMENT. 3. SATISFACTION 4. EVIDENCE	152 152
CHAPTER VI.	
CONTRACTS OF CONDITIONAL SALE OF PERSON PROPERTY.	
1. STATUTES	154 159

TABLE OF CASES.

Α.	1	PAGE.
Ackley v. Finch	7 Cow. 290	4
Act of Congress, Feb. 18, 1793	Section 1	86
Ætna Ins. Co. v. Aldrich	26 N. Y. 96	25
Albany Law Journal	3, page 480	104
Aldrich v. Ætna Co	8 Wall. 491	16
Alonson Sumner (The)	28 Fed. Rep. 670	94
Allen v. Newberry	21 How. 244	99
Anderson v. Hann	3 Weekly Dig. 367	43
Anderson v. Hunn	5 Hun, 79	60
Anderson v. Nicholas	5 Bosw. 130	68
Andrew v. Newcomb	32 N. Y. 417	41
Atlantic (The Brig)	1 Newb. 516	106
В.		
Baldwin v. The Bradish Johnson	3 Woods. 582	IOI
Ball v. Slafter	26 Hun, 355	15
Ballon v. Cunningham	4 Lans. 74	69
Baltes v. Dobin	67 Barb. 433	46
Bank of Rochester v. Jones	4 N. Y. 498	4
Bank of Utica v. Finch	3 Barb. Ch. 293	9
Banne v. Drew	4 Denio, 287	75
Bardwell v. Roberts	66 Barb. 433	4
Barrow v. Paxton	5 Johns. 258	3
Battle v. The Rochester City Bank	3 Comst. 88	71
Baxter v. Gilbert	12 Abb. Pr. 97	79
Beers v. Waterbury	8 Bosw. 396	28
Best v. Staple	61 N. Y. 71	23
Betsinger v. Schuyler	46 Hun, 353	1
Bishop v. Cook	13 Barb. 326	19
Bissell v. Pearce	28 N. Y. 252	24
Bogart v. The John Jay	17 How. (U. S.) 399	100
Booth v. Kehoe	71 N. Y. 341	23
Bouvier's Law Dict	page 471	105
Brackett v. Harvey	91 N. Y. 214	4
Bragelman v. Daue	69 N. Y. 69	2

	1	PAGE.
Braynard v. Hoppock	32 N. Y. 572	103
	2 E. D. Smith, 474	23
	68 N. Y. 336	72
	6 Johns. Ch. 139	22
	43 N. Y. 544	99
	3 Kern. 121	68
	8 Johns. 96	3
Brown v. Clapp	8 Bosw. 324	13
Brown v. Gutherie	110 N. Y. 442	9
	5 Weekly Dig. 485	9
	40 Barb. 28	65
	4 Barb. 491	6
	21 N. Y. St. Rep. 862	8
	13 Daly, 332	72
	3 Daly, 236	4
	22 N. Y. 535	80
	ı N. Y. 496	54
Button v. Rathbone, Sard & Co	43 Hun, 148	22
C.		
Camp v. Camp	2 Hill, 628	39
Campbell v. Birch	60 N. Y. 215	78
Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Da-		
	48 Hun, 509	22
	28 Hun, 25	10
	I E. D. Smith, 491	9
	16 Wall. 271	54
	28 How. 12	4
	52 N. Y. 138	33
	11 Wend. 106	73
Cavan v. Kelly	3 Alb. Law Jour. 373	61
Ceas v. Bramley	18 Hun, 187	4
Chadwick v. Lamb	29 How. 518	63
Chandler v. Bunn	Lalor's Sup. to Hill &	
C1 : C1 f	Denio, 167	17
	49 N. Y. 407	6
	31 Barb. 164	81
	3 Denio, 33	70
	18 Abb. New Cas. 334	24
	16 Hun, 458	42
	14 Weekly Dig. 428	40
	2 Bosw. 558	87
	72 N. Y. 133	3
	page 198	54
Conderman v. Smith	41 Barb. 404	8

Conkling v. Shelly. Constancia (The). Corning v. Askley. Craig v. Tappin. Cressey v. Sabre. Crandall v. Brown. Crawford v. Collons. Culver v. Sisson Cunningham v. Hall. Cutler v. The James Goold Co.	28 N. Y. 362	10 105 53 9 39 98 3 95
D.		
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments. Davenport v. McChesney. Decker v. Boice Delaware v. Ensign. De Smet (The). Despard v. Walbridge. Dikeman v. Puckhafer Dillingham v. Bolt. Divvor v. McLauchlin. Dix v. Van Wyck. Dodge v Potter Dolson v. Saxton. Dresser v. United F. Ins. Co Dudley v. Hawley. Duffus v. Bangs. Dunham v. Whitehead. Dunning v. Stearns. Dutcher v. Swartwood.	page 601. 86 N. Y. 242. 83 N. Y. 215. 12 Barb. 85. 10 Fed. Rep. 483. 15 N. Y. 374. 1 Abb. (N. S.) 32. 37 N. Y. 197. 2 Wend. 596. 2 Hill, 522. 18 Barb. 201. 5 Weekly Dig. 126. 45 Hun, 302. 39 N. Y. 441. 43 Hun, 52. 21 N. Y. 131. 9 Barb. 630. 15 Hun, 34.	79 71 80 60 101 2 5 26 67 61 10 44 50 68 2 45 10 40
E.		
Edgell v. Hart	9 N. Y. 216. 81 N. Y. 199. 94 U. S. 520. 21 Wall. 532.	4 25 95 95
Elder v. Rouse Ella B. (The) Ellsworth v. Phelps	40 Hun, 256	70 70 89 52
Ely v. Carnley Emily Souder (The) Emmons v. Wheeler Everett v. Coffin	19 N. Y. 498	20 101 98 68

F.		PAGE.
Fairbanks v. Bloomfield	5 Duer, 434	3
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hen-		
drickson	25 Barb. 484	21
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Long		
Beach Improvement Co	27 Hun, 89	7
Farrington v. Frankfort Bank	24 Barb. 554	33
Fellows v. Van Hyring	23 How. 230	34
Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co	9 Wend. 345	4
Fiero on Special Actions	page 409	72
Fitch v. Humphrey	1 Denio, 163	29
Folger v. Weber	16 Hun, 515	16
Ford v. Cobb	20 N. Y. 344	55
Ford v. Ransom	8 Abb. (N. S.) 416	73
Ford v. Williams	24 N. Y. 365	3 9
Fox v. Burns	12 Barb. 677	20
Fox v. Moyer	54 N. Y. 129	22
Fralick v. Betts	13 Hun, 632	99
Freeman v. Auld	44 N. Y. 57	78
Frost v. Mott	34 N. Y. 255	39
Frost v. Warren	42 N. Y. 204	5
Frost v. Willard	9 Barb. 440	45
Fuller v. Acker	1 Hill, 173	13
G.		
Galen v. Brown	22 Hun, 40	12
Gardner v. McEwen.	19 N. Y. 317	12
Gardiner v. Finly	19 Barb. 317	4
Gibson v. Warden	14 Wall. 244	47 4
Gildersleeve v. Landon	73 N. Y. 609	4 2I
Godard v. Gould	14 Barb. 662	
Gould v. Marsh	1 Hun, 566	57 78
Goulet v. Asseler	22 N. Y. 228	62
Graser v. Stellwagen	25 N. Y. 315	6
Green v. Armstrong	1 Denio, 550	8
Green v. Green	9 Cowen, 46	71
Gregory v. Thomas	20 Wend. 17	32
Griffin v. Allen (not reported), cited in		32
Clinton's Dig		-6
Griswold v. Sheldon		56
Only ord V. Onchaon IIII	4 21. 21 301	43
H.		
Hale v. Omaha Nat. Bank	49 N. Y. 634	8
Hale v. Sweet	40 N. Y. 103	64
Hall v. Ditson	55 How. 19	70
Hall v. Samson	19 How. 481	62

Halstead v. Swartz	46 How. 289	PAGE. 7 I
Hamill v. Gillespie	48 N. Y. 556	63
Hamilton v. Austin	36 Hun, 138	9
Hanford v. Artcher		-
Hangen v. Hachmeister	4 Hill, 271 53 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 533	39 61
Harmon on Chattel Mortgages		
Hart v. Sheldon	page 44	50
	34 Hun, 38	55
Hart v. Ten Eyck	2 Johns. Ch. 62	70
Hartley v. Tatham	I Keyes, 222	
Hathaway v. Brayman	42 N. Y. 322	64
Hathaway v. Howell	54 N. Y. 103	19
Hauselt v. Harrison	105 U. S. 401	40
Hawkins v. Giles	45 Hun, 318	25
Hawkins v. Kelly	1 Abb. (N. S.) 32	79
Hayman v. Jones	7 Hun, 238	21
Haynes v. Hart.	42 Barb. 58	71
Hendricks v. Robinson	2 Johns. Ch. 296	22
Hersee v. Porter	too N. Y. 403	65
Heye v. Bolles	33 How. 277	22
Hicks v. Williams	17 Barb. 523	16
Hill v. Beebe	13 N. Y. 556	54
Hills v. Miller	3 Paige, 254	12
Hinman v. Judson	12 Barb. 629	84
Hodges v. Tenn. Marine & Fire Ins. Co.	8 N. Y. 416	2
Horton v. Davis	26 N. Y. 495	34
Hotchkiss v. McVikar	12 Johns. 407	22
Howland v. Willett	3 Sandf. 608	5
Hoyt v. Thompson's Exr	19 N. Y. 224	36
Hull v. Carnley	11 N. Y. 501	62
Husted v. Ingraham	75 N. Y. 251	59
J.		
Jackson v. Kasseall	30 Hun, 231	r a
		53
Jaqueth v. Merritt	29 Hun, 584	33
	2 Abb. App. Dec. 445	100
Johnson v. Crofoot	53 Barb. 574	24
Johnson v. Hart	3 Johns. Cas. 322 77 N. Y. 628	78
		22
Jones v. Howell	3 Robt. 438	34
Jones on Chattel Mortgages	I	I
Jones on Chattel Mortgages	106	13
Jones on Chattel Mortgages	115	50
Josephine (The Steamboat)	39 N. Y. 19	100
Judson v. Easton	58 N. Y. 664	2

K.		PAGE.
Kane v. Cortesy	100 N. Y. 132	81
Kellar v. Paine		16
Kelly v. Cushing	48 Barb. 269	104
Kennedy v. The Nat. Union Bank	23 Hun, 497	6
Kent's Com	(2) 621	68
Kerr v. Dildine	6 N. Y. St. Rep. 163	52
King v. Greenway	71 N. Y. 413	98
King v. Van Vleck	109 N. Y. 367	9
King v. Walbridge	48 Hun, 470	2
King v. Wilcomb	7 Barb. 263	9
Kinsey v. Bailey	9 Hun, 452	55
Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Hill	3 Hun, 577	61
Kribbs v. Alford	45 Hun, 588	41
-		
L.		
Lambert v. Leland	2 Sweeney, 216	2
Langdon v. Buell	9 Wend. 80	2
Lattawanna (The)	21 Wall. 558	9 5
Lattimer v. Wheeler	30 Barb. 480	33
Laws of 1833	chap. 279, sec. 2	17
Laws of 1864	chap. 412	27
Laws of 1871	chap. 77	66
Laws of 1879	chap. 418	27
Laws of 1880	chap. 145	53
Laws of 1883	chap. 69	89
Leitch v. Hollister	4 N. Y. 211	45
Lewis v. Palmer	28 N. Y. 271	32
Livingston v. Sulzer	19 Hun, 380	58
Livor v. Orser	5 Duer, 501	64
Look v. Comstock	15 Wend. 241	40
Lord v. Yonkers Fuel Gas Co	99 N. Y. 551	7
Ludwig v. Kipp	20 Hun, 265	8
Lyman v. Bowe	66 How. 481	64
м.		
Mabbett v. White	12 N. Y. 454	6
Mack v. Phelan	92 N. Y. 25	
Maguire v. Card	21 How. (U. S.) 248	15 99
Manchester v. Tibbetts	19 N. Y. St. Rep. 299	6
Manning v. Monaghan	23 N. Y. 539	33
Manning v. Reilly	16 Weekly Dig. 428	33 43
Marsden v. Cornell	62 N. Y. 219	43 28
Marsden v. Vultee	8 Bosw. 129	43
Martin v. Rothschild	42 Hun, 410	
Matthews v. Sniffen.	10 Daly, 202	15 10
Marting A. Onmon		10

		AGE.
Mattison v. Baucus	1 N. Y. 295	64
Maxwell v. Inman	42 Hun, 267	4
McCaffrey v. Woodin	65 N. Y. 465	3
McCombs v. Becker	3 Hun, 342	48
McEntee v. Scott	2 Thompson & Cook, 284,	57
McFadden v. Van Buren	50 Hun, 361	
McLaughlin v. Lester	4 N. Y. St. Rep. 852	59
McLanghlan v. Wright	3 Wend. 348	67
McRea v. Cent. Nat. Bank of Troy	66 N. Y. 495	55
Meech v. Patchin	14 N. Y. 72	15
Messelback v. Norman	46 Hun, 416	13
Metropolitan Concert Co. v. Sperry	9 N. Y. St. Rep. 342	59
Michelson v. Fowler	27 Hun, 159	3
Mickles v. Dillaye	17 N. Y. 84	84
Miller v. Hart	32 Hun, 639	59
Miller v. Lockwood	32 N. Y. 293	9
Miner v. Judson	2 Hun, 441	2
Mittnacht v. Kelly	5 Abb. (N. S.) 442	11
Monnat v. Ibert.	33 Barb. 24	
Moore v. Simonds		9
	100 U. S. 145	100
Morgan v. Shinn	15 Wall. 105	100
Morewood v. Enequist	23 How. 491	95
Moses v. Walker	2 Hilton, 536	2
Murdock v. Gifford	18 N. Y. 28	59
Murphy v. Moore	23 Hun, 95	44
N.		
		_
Neer v. Oakley	18 N. Y. St. Rep. 374	6
Neidig v. Eifler	18 Abb. 353	2
Nelson v. Drake	14 Hun, 465	7
Nelson v. Neil	15 Hun, 383	16
Nelson v. Yates	37 Hun, 52	98
Nestell v. Hewitt		41
Newell v. Warner	44 Barb. 258	31
Niagara (The)	31 Fed. Rep. 163	99
Niagara Co. Nat. Bank v. Lord	33 Hun, 577	15
Nichols v. Iremonger	3 Hun, 609	61
Nichols v. Lyons		3
Nichols v. Mase		25
Nichols v. Mead		- J
Nixon v. Stanley		31
North-Western Ins. Co. v. Ferward		104
Noyes v. Wyckoff		2
110yos v. Wyckom	30 mm, 400,	2

О.		PAGE.
Ober v. Gallagher	93 U. S. 199	54
Olcott v. Tioga R. R. Co	27 N. Y. 546	70
Osborn v. Alexander	40 Hun, 328	28
Otis v. Sill	8 Barb. 102	8
P.		
Pancoast v. The American Heating		
and Power Co	66 How. 49	21
Parish v. Wheeler	22 N. Y, 494	73
Parker Mills v. Jacot	8 Bosw. 161	100
Parshall v. Eggert	54 N. Y. 18	1
Patchin v. Pierce	12 Wend. 61	70
Patterson v. Gillies	64 Barb. 563	15
Peoples' Ferry Co. v. Beers	20 How. (U. S.) 402	95
Phœnix Mills v. Miller	4 N. Y. St. Rep. 787	54
Pioneer	30 Fed. Rep. 206 (U. S.	
	Dist. Ct. N. Y.)	96
Poole v. Kermit	59 N. Y. 554	100
Porter v. Parmley	52 N. Y. 185	1
Potter v. Cromwell	40 N. Y. 287	54
Potts v. Hart	99 N. Y. 168	40
I Powell on Mortgages	3	3
Powers v. Elias	1 N. Y. St. Rep. 248	64
Powers v. Freeman	2 Lans. 127	17
Pratt v. Stiles	17 How. 211	84
Preston v. Southwick	42 Hun, 293	5
Q.		
-	.O. II	
Quinn & Nolan Brewing Co. v. Hart	48 Hun, 395	40
${f R}.$		
Ray v. Birdseye	5 Denio, 619	33
3 Revised Statutes	978, chapter 73	86
Revised Statutes (U. S.)	secs. 4192-4194	86
Revised Statutes (U. S.)	secs. 4192, 4382	106
Revised Statutes (U. S.)	sec. 5052	86
Reynolds v. Ellis	103 N. Y. 122	8
Rice v. Dewey	54 Barb. 455	47
Rich v. Milk	20 Barb. 616	
Rickerson v. Raeder	4 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 60.	81
Riley v. Sexton	32 Hun, 249	11
Rinchey v. Stryker	26 How. 75	60
Ripley v. Larmouth	56 Barb, 21	9
Roach v. Chapman	22 How. 129	95
Roberts v. Chenango Mut. Ins. Co	3 Hill, 501	12

	r	AGE.
Roberts v. Jackson	I Wend. 478	12
Robertson v. United Ins. Co	2 Johns. Cas. 250	104
Rodman v. Hendricks	1 Sandf. 32	62
Rumsey's Practice	(2) 99	5
Russell v. Butterfield	21 Wend. 300	72
Russell v. Winne.	37 N. Y. 593	10
Rust v. Hauslet	46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24	23
S.		
Saltus v. Everett	20 Wend. 267	68
Sanger v. Eastwood	19 Wend. 514	21
Scott v. Delahunt	65 N. Y. 128	97
Schafer v. Reilly	50 N. Y. 61	80
Schoenrock v. Farley	49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 302	3
Sheldon v. Edwards	35 N. Y. 279	35
Sheppard v. Earles	13 Hun, 651	75
Shuart v. Taylor	7 How. 251	7
Shuler v. Boutwell	8 Weekly Dig. 442	26
Shutter v. Ward	16 Weekly Dig. 69	33
Siedenback v. Riley	111 N. Y. 560	39
Simis v. Harvey	21 N. Y. St. Rep. 955	
Simis v. Hodge	50 Hun, 412	52
Simmons v. Osgoodby	16 Weekly Dig. 428	40
Simon v. Schmidt	41 Hun, 318	83
Sisson v. Hibbard	75 N. Y. 542	55
Skinner v. Dayton	19 Johns. 513	7
Smith v. Acker	23 Wend. 653	21
Smith v. Beattie	31 N. Y. 542	3
Smith v. Cooper	22 Hun, 11	29
Smith v. Kerr	3 N. Y. 144	7
Smith v. Post	1 Hnn, 518	6
Smith v. Taber	46 Hun, 313	8
Southard v. Benner	72 N. Y. 428	15
Spencer v. Blackman	6 Wend. 167	68
Sperry v. Baldwin	46 Hun, 120	40
Steele v. Benham	84 N. Y. 634	31
Steffin v. Steffin	4 Civ. Pro. Rep. 187	25
Steward v. Cole	4 Abb. App. Cas. 302	50
Steward v. Cole	43 Hun, 164	32
Stewart v. Platt	68 N. Y. 629	22
Stewart v. Slater	6 Duer, 96	17
Stimson v. Wrigley	86 N. Y. 332	2
Stockham v. Allard	2 Hun, 67	40
Stoddard v. Denison	38 How. 296	29
Production A. Demison	JO 110W. 290	2

Sullivan v. Miller		F	AGE.
Sullivan v. Toole	Sullivan v. Miller	106 N. Y. 641	22
Talman v. Hawkhurst.	Sullivan v. Toole		47
T. Talman v. Hawkhurst. 4 Duer, 221. 6 Talman v. Smith 39 Barb. 390. 69 Tarbel v. Bradley 7 Abb. N. C. 286 67 Taylor v. Walter. 34 How. 385 44 Thomas v. Bacon. 34 Hun, 88 7 Thomas Fletcher (The). 24 Fed. Rep. 375. 96 Thomas on Mortgages. page 453 74 Thomas on Mortgages. page 490. 60 Thompson v. Blanchard. 4 Comst. 303 4 Thompson v. Van Vechten. 27 N. Y. 568 32 Thurber v. Mintburn. 62 How. 27 II Tiffany v. Warren. 24 How. 293 33 Tifft v. Barton. 4 Denio, 171 66 Tifft v. Horton. 53 N. Y. 377 56 Tyler v. Strang. 21 Barb. 198 3 Tyson v. Post. 108 N. Y. 221 58 Vu. Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478 101 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580 4 Van Hozer v. Cory 34 Barb. 12 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis 42 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9		_	
Talman v. Hawkhurst. 4 Duer, 221. 6 Talman v. Smith 39 Barb 390. 69 Tarbel v. Bradley 7 Abb. N. C. 286 67 Taylor v. Walter. 34 How. 385 44 Thomas v. Bacon. 34 Hun, 88. 7 Thomas Fletcher (The) 24 Fed. Rep. 375. 96 Thomas on Mortgages. page 453. 74 Thomas on Mortgages. page 490. 60 Thompson v. Blanchard. 4 Comst. 303 4 Thompson v. Van Vechten. 27 N. Y. 568 32 Thirber v. Mintburn. 62 How. 27. 11 Tiffany v. Warren. 24 How. 293 33 Tifft v. Barton. 4 Denio, 171 66 Tifft v. Horton. 53 N. Y. 377. 56 Tyler v. Strang. 21 Barb. 198. 3 Tyson v. Post. 108 N. Y. 221. 58 U. Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478. 101 V. Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580. 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378. 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282. 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537. 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wai		24131 331111111111111111111111111111111	
Talman v. Smith. 39 Barb. 390. 69 Tarbel v. Bradley. 7 Abb. N. C. 286 67 Taylor v. Walter. 34 How. 385 44 Thomas v. Bacon. 34 Hun, 88. 7 Thomas Fletcher (The). 24 Fed. Rep. 375. 96 Thomas on Mortgages. page 453. 74 Thomas on Mortgages. page 490. 60 Thompson v. Blanchard. 4 Comst. 303 4 Thompson v. Van Vechten. 27 N. Y. 568 32 Thirber v. Mintburn. 62 How. 27. 11 Tiffany v. Warren. 24 How. 293 33 Tifft v. Barton. 4 Denio, 171 66 Tifft v. Horton. 53 N. Y. 377 56 Tyler v. Strang. 21 Barb. 198 3 Tyson v. Post. 108 N. Y. 221 58 U. Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478. 101 V. Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580. 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378. 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170.	T.		
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Tarbel v. Bradley. 7 Abb. N. C. 286 67 Taylor v. Walter. 34 How. 385 44 Thomas v. Bacon. 34 Hun, 88. 7 Thomas Fletcher (The). 24 Fed. Rep. 375. 96 Thomas on Mortgages. page 453. 74 Thomas on Mortgages. page 453. 74 Thomas on Mortgages. page 490. 60 Thompson v. Blanchard. 4 Comst. 303 4 Thompson v. Van Vechten. 27 N. Y. 568 32 Thurber v. Mintburn. 62 How. 27. 11 Tiffany v. Warren. 24 How. 293 33 Tifft v. Barton. 4 Denio, 171. 66 Tifft v. Horton. 53 N. Y. 377. 56 Tyler v. Strang. 21 Barb. 198 3 Tyson v. Post. 108 N. Y. 221. 58 U. Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478. 101 V. Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580. 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 Van Hozer v. Golinis. 48 N. Y. 282 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Talman v. Smith	39 Barb. 390	69
Taylor v. Walter. 34 How. 385. 44 Thomas v. Bacon. 34 Hun, 88. 7 Thomas Fletcher (The). 24 Fed. Rep. 375. 96 Thomas on Mortgages. page 453. 74 Thomas on Mortgages. page 459. 60 Thompson v. Blanchard. 4 Comst. 303. 4 Thompson v. Van Vechten. 27 N. Y. 568. 32 Thurber v. Mintburn. 62 How. 27. 11 Tiffany v. Warren. 24 How. 293. 33 Tifft v. Barton. 4 Denio, 171. 66 Tifft v. Horton. 53 N. Y. 377. 56 Tyler v. Strang. 21 Barb. 198. 3 Tyson v. Post. 108 N. Y. 221. 58 U. Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478. 101 V. Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544. 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239. 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580. 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 Voorhees v. McGinnis 48 N. Y. 282. 54 W Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537. 60 Wat's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Wesoett v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Tarbel v. Bradlev		
Thomas v. Bacon. 34 Hun, 88. 7 Thomas Fletcher (The) 24 Fed. Rep. 375. 96 Thomas on Mortgages. page 453. 74 Thomas on Mortgages. page 490. 60 Thompson v. Blanchard. 4 Comst. 303. 4 Thompson v. Van Vechten. 27 N. Y. 568. 32 Thurber v. Mintburn. 62 How. 27. 11 Tiffany v. Warren. 24 How. 293. 33 Tifft v. Barton. 4 Denio, 171. 66 Tifft v. Horton. 53 N. Y. 377. 56 Tyler v. Strang. 21 Barb. 198. 3 Tyson v. Post. 108 N. Y. 221. 58 U. Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478. 101 V. Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544. 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239. 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580. 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378. 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282. 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537. 66 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden. 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Taylor v. Walter		
Thomas Fletcher (The). 24 Fed. Rep. 375. 96 Thomas on Mortgages. page 453. 74 Thomas on Mortgages. page 490. 60 Thompson v. Blanchard. 4 Comst. 303 4 Thompson v. Van Vechten. 27 N. Y. 568 32 Thurber v. Mintburn. 62 How. 27. 11 Tiffany v. Warren. 24 How. 293 33 Tifft v. Barton. 4 Denio, 171. 66 Tifft v. Horton. 53 N. Y. 377. 56 Tyler v. Strang. 21 Barb. 198. 3 Tyson v. Post. 108 N. Y. 221. 58 U. Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478. 101 V. Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580. 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378. 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282. 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537. 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Wesoett v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9			
Thomas on Mortgages page 453 74 Thomas on Mortgages page 490 60 Thompson v. Blanchard 4 Comst. 303 4 Thompson v. Van Vechten 27 N. Y. 568 32 Thurber v. Mintburn 62 How. 27 11 Tiffany v. Warren 24 How. 293 33 Tifft v. Barton 4 Denio, 171 66 Tifft v. Horton 53 N. Y. 377 56 Tyler v. Strang 21 Barb. 198 3 Tyson v. Post 108 N. Y. 221 58 U. Unadilla (The) 8 Ben. 478 101 V. Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff 17 N. Y. 580 4 Van Hozer v. Cory 34 Barb. 12 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis 48 N. Y. 282 54 W. Wade v. Rusher 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170 10 Wait's Law and Pr (1) 131 4 Walker v. Henry 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Wesver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107 9			٠.
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Thompson v. Van Vechten. 27 N. Y. 568 32 Thurber v. Mintburn. 62 How. 27. 11 Tiffany v. Warren. 24 How. 293 33 Tifft v. Barton. 4 Denio, 171 66 Tifft v. Horton. 53 N. Y. 377 56 Tyler v. Strang. 21 Barb. 198 3 Tyson v. Post. 108 N. Y. 221 58 U. Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478 101 V. Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun. 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282 54 W. Wade v. Rusher 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170 10 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131 4 Walker v. Henry 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9			
Thurber v. Mintburn. 62 How. 27. 11 Tiffany v. Warren. 24 How. 293 33 Tifft v. Barton. 4 Denio, 171 66 Tifft v. Horton. 53 N. Y. 377 56 Tyler v. Strang. 21 Barb. 198 3 Tyson v. Post. 108 N. Y. 221 58 U. Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478 101 V. Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282 54 W. Wade v. Rusher 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	•	_	
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Tyson v. Post 108 N. Y. 221. 58 U. Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478. 101 V. Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9			56
U. Unadilla (The)			3
Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478. 101	Tyson v. Post	108 N. Y. 221	58
Unadilla (The). 8 Ben. 478. 101			
Van Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282 54 W Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107. 9			
Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282 54 W. Wade v. Rusher 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195 19 Wait's Law and Pr (1) 131 4 Walker v. Henry 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107 9			
Van Brunt v. Applegate 44 N. Y. 544 6 Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282 54 W. Wade v. Rusher 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195 19 Wait's Law and Pr (1) 131 4 Walker v. Henry 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107 9		8 Ben. 478	101
Van Doren v. Balty. 11 Hun, 239 71 Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden. 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The)	8 Ben. 478	101
Van Heusen v. Radcliff. 17 N. Y. 580. 4 Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378. 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282. 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537. 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses. (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses. (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses. (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden. 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The)	·	101
Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378. 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282. 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537. 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The)	·	
Van Hozer v. Cory. 34 Barb. 12. 40 2 Ves. Jr. 378. 3 Voorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282. 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537. 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The)	'44 N. Y. 544	6
Woorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195 19 Wait's Law and Pr (1) 131 4 Walker v. Henry 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty	'44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239	6 71
Woorhees v. McGinnis. 48 N. Y. 282 54 W. Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195 19 Wait's Law and Pr (1) 131 4 Walker v. Henry 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff	44 N. Y. 544	6 71 4
Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden. 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff	44 N. Y. 544	6 71 4 40
Wade v. Rusher. 4 Bosw. 537 60 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff Van Hozer v. Cory.	144 N. Y. 544	6 71 4 40 3
Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff Van Hozer v. Cory.	144 N. Y. 544	6 71 4 40 3
Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 168. 5 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory Voorhees v. McGinnis.	144 N. Y. 544	6 71 4 40 3
Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 170. 10 Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory Voorhees v. McGinnis. W.	44 N. Y. 544	6 71 4 40 3 54
Wait's Actions and Defenses (2) 195. 19 Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden. 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory Voorhees v. McGinnis. W. Wade v. Rusher.	44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239 17 N. Y. 580 34 Barb. 12. 2 Ves. Jr. 378 48 N. Y. 282 4 Bosw. 537	6 71 4 40 3 54
Wait's Law and Pr. (1) 131. 4 Walker v. Henry. 85 N. Y. 134. 28 Walker v. Snediker. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 9 Warner v. Jaffray. 96 N. Y. 248. 38 Weaver v. Barden. 49 N. Y. 286. 33 Wescott v. Gunn. 4 Duer, 107. 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory Voorhees v. McGinnis W. Wade v. Rusher Wait's Actions and Defenses	44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239 17 N. Y. 580 34 Barb. 12. 2 Ves. Jr. 378 48 N. Y. 282 4 Bosw. 537 (2) 168.	6 71 4 40 3 54
Walker v. Henry 85 N. Y. 134 28 Walker v. Snediker 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory Voorhees v. McGinnis W. Wade v. Rusher Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses	44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239 17 N. Y. 580 34 Barb. 12. 2 Ves. Jr. 378 48 N. Y. 282 4 Bosw. 537 (2) 168. (2) 170.	6 71 4 40 3 54
Walker v. Snediker 1 Hoff. Ch. 145 9 Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff Van Hozer v. Cory Voorhees v. McGinnis W. Wade v. Rusher Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses	44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239 17 N. Y. 580 34 Barb. 12. 2 Ves. Jr. 378 48 N. Y. 282 4 Bosw. 537 (2) 168. (2) 170. (2) 195.	6 71 4 40 3 54 60 5
Warner v. Jaffray 96 N. Y. 248 38 Weaver v. Barden 49 N. Y. 286 33 Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107 9	Unadilla (The) Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory Voorhees v. McGinnis W. Wade v. Rusher Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Law and Pr	44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239 17 N. Y. 580 34 Barb. 12. 2 Ves. Jr. 378 48 N. Y. 282 4 Bosw. 537 (2) 168. (2) 170. (2) 195. (1) 131.	6 71 4 40 3 54 60 5 10 19 4
Weaver v. Barden	Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty. Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory. Voorhees v. McGinnis. W. Wade v. Rusher Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Law and Pr. Walker v. Henry.	44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239 17 N. Y. 580 34 Barb. 12. 2 Ves. Jr. 378 48 N. Y. 282 4 Bosw. 537 (2) 168. (2) 170. (2) 195. (1) 131. 85 N. Y. 134.	6 71 4 40 3 54 60 5 10 19 4 28
Wescott v. Gunn 4 Duer, 107 9	Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty. Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory. Voorhees v. McGinnis. W. Wade v. Rusher Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Law and Pr. Walker v. Henry. Walker v. Snediker.	44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239 17 N. Y. 580 34 Barb. 12. 2 Ves. Jr. 378 48 N. Y. 282 4 Bosw. 537 (2) 168. (2) 170. (2) 195. (1) 131. 85 N. Y. 134. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145.	6 71 4 40 3 54 60 5 10 19 4 28 9
	Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty. Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory. Voorhees v. McGinnis. W. Wade v. Rusher Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Law and Pr. Walker v. Henry Walker v. Snediker. Warner v. Jaffray	44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239 17 N. Y. 580 34 Barb. 12. 2 Ves. Jr. 378 48 N. Y. 282 4 Bosw. 537 (2) 168. (2) 170. (2) 195. (1) 131. 85 N. Y. 134 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 96 N. Y. 248.	6 71 4 40 3 54 60 5 10 19 4 28 9 38
7 OSC V. Clary 2	Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty. Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory. Voorhees v. McGinnis. W. Wade v. Rusher Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Law and Pr. Walker v. Henry. Walker v. Snediker. Warner v. Jaffray Weaver v. Barden	44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239 17 N. Y. 580 34 Barb. 12. 2 Ves. Jr. 378 48 N. Y. 282 4 Bosw. 537 (2) 168. (2) 170. (2) 195. (1) 131. 85 N. Y. 134. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 96 N. Y. 248 49 N. Y. 286	6 71 4 40 3 54 60 5 10 4 28 9 38 33
	Van Brunt v. Applegate Van Doren v. Balty. Van Heusen v. Radcliff. Van Hozer v. Cory. Voorhees v. McGinnis. W. Wade v. Rusher Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Actions and Defenses Wait's Law and Pr. Walker v. Henry Walker v. Snediker. Warner v. Jaffray Weaver v. Barden Wescott v. Gunn.	44 N. Y. 544 11 Hun, 239 17 N. Y. 580 34 Barb. 12. 2 Ves. Jr. 378 48 N. Y. 282 4 Bosw. 537 (2) 168. (2) 170. (2) 195. (1) 131. 85 N. Y. 134. 1 Hoff. Ch. 145. 96 N. Y. 248 49 N. Y. 286 4 Duer, 107.	6 71 4 40 3 54 60 5 10 4 28 9 38 33 9

Whistler (The)	30 Fed. Rep. 199 (Dist. Ct. E. D. of N. Y.)	4G €. 97
White v. Cole	24 Wend. 117	64
Whited v. Hamilton	15 Hun, 275	47
White's Bank v. Smith	7 Wall. 646	16
Williams v. Merle	11 Wend. 80	68
Williams v. Shelly	37 N. Y. 375	33
Williamson v. Brown	15 N. Y. 354	53
Williman v. Neher	20 Barb. 37	8
Willis v. Obrien	3 Jones & Spencer, 537	5
Williston v Jones	6 Duer, 507	43
Wilson v. Lawrence	82 N. Y. 409	95
Wintermute v. Light	46 Barb. 282	11
Wood v. Lester	29 Barb. 145	11
Wood v. Lowry	17 Wend. 492	39
Wood v. Robinson	22 N. Y. 567	33
Woodbridge v. Nelson	6 Weekly Dig. 248	2
Wooster v. Sherwood	25 N. Y. 286	26
Wray v. Fedderke	11 Jones & Spencer, 338	23
У.		
Yates v. Olmstead	56 N. Y. 632	46
Yenni v. McNamee		25
Young v. The Orphans		95
Toung v. The Orphanst	2 (1111. 29	93
Z.		
Zimmer v. Wheeler	41 Hun, 638	2 [
Zoeller v. Riley	100 N. Y. 103	34

SUPPLEMENT.

TABLE OF CASES.

A.

]	Page.
Ackerman v. Hunsicker	85 N. Y. 47	116
Allen v. Heine	47 St. Rep. 763	136
Anderson v. Hun	5 Hun, 79	143
Austin v. Dye	46 N. Y. 500	162

ъ.		
D. II		age.
Ballard v. Burgett	40 N. Y. 314	162
Bank of Rochester v. Jones	4 N. Y. 497	109
Barry v. Colville	129 N. Y. 302	153
Baumann v. Cornez.	29 St. Rep. 320	112
Baumann v. Libetta	52 St. Rep. 492	127
Beardsley v. Hotchkiss	96 N. Y. 201	114
Bissel v. Pearce	28 N. Y. 252	146
Blake v. Corbett	120 N. Y. 327	107
Booher v. Stewart	75 Hun, 214.,	137
Boon v. Moss	70 N. Y. 465	164
Brackett v. Barney	28 N. Y. 340	118
Brackett v. Harvey	91 N. Y. 214	111
Brady v. Cassidy	145 N. Y. 171	118
Bragelman v. Daue	69 N. Y. 69	108
Brewer v. Ford	59 Hun, 17	160
Briggs v. Oliver	68 N. Y. 336	148
Broadhead v. Smith	55 Hun, 499	117
Brownell v. Hawkins	4 Barb. 491	118
Bulger v. Rosa	119 N. Y. 459	114
Button v. Rathbone, Sard & Co	126 N. Y. 187	129
C.		
Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Walker		163
Casserlee v. Witherbee	119 N. Y. 523	108
Chandler v. Bunn	Hill & Denio Sup. 167	128
Chapin v. Shafer	49 N. Y. 407	114
Chouteau v. Suydam	21 N. Y. 179	118
Coats v. Donnell	94 N. Y. 177	115
Cole v. Mann	62 N. Y. 1	161
Colville v. Miles	127 N. Y. 159	141
Conkling v. Shelley	28 N. Y. 360	141
Cook v. Bennett	60 Hun, 8	140
Culver v. Sisson	3 N. Y. 264	109
_	_	
D.	•	
Deeley v. Dwight		114
Deeley v. Dwight Despard v. Walbridge	15 N. Y. 374	114
Deeley v. Dwight	15 N. Y. 374	
Deeley v. Dwight Despard v. Walbridge	15 N. Y. 374	
Deeley v. Dwight Despard v. Walbridge Domestic Sewing Machine Co. v.	51 St. Rep. 219	108

TABLE OF CASES.

E.

	Page.
Elder v. Rouse Empire State Type Founding Co.	
Grant	
English v. Hanford	
Ensign v. Ensign	
F.	
Flannery v. Tassel	· -
Ford v. Williams	
Frear v. Sweet	
French v. Powers	·
Frost v. Warren	42 N. Y. 204 112
G.	6
Galen v. Brown	22 N. Y. 39 138
Gardner v. McEwen	
Geery v. Geery	
Gibson v. Ferris	
Gloson v. Politis	30 ot. Rep. 603 134
H.	
Hamill v. Gillespie	48 N. Y. 556 108
Hangen v. Hachemeister	
Hathaway v. Brayman	
Hawver v. Bell	
Herder v. Walther	
Herring v. Hoppock	
Hill v. Beebe	13 N. Y. 556 133
Hills v. White	
Hinks v. Field	
Horn v. Keteltas	46 N. Y. 605 153
Hutchings v. Munger	41 N. Y. 155 163
Hyer v. Sutton	59 Hun, 40 112
77	٧.
K.	7.6 N V 2.6
Karst v. Gane	136 N. Y. 316 128
Kennedy v. Stroble	
Kenny v. Planer & Machan	
Kimball v. Farmers & Mechan	
Bank	
Kings Co. Bank v. Courtney	
Kitchen v. Lowery	
Knapp v. Gregory	37 37
Kribbs v. Alford	120 N. Y. 519 139

L. Page. Langdon v. Buel..... 9 Wend. 80..... 151 Lawton v. Sager..... 11 Barb. 349...... 118 Leadbetter v. Leadbetter..... 125 N. Y. 290 108 M. Mack v. Phelan..... 92 N. Y. 25. Manchester v. Tibbetts...... 121 N. Y. 219...... 127 Mandeville v. Avery. 124 N. Y. 376...... 135 Matthews v. Sniffen..... 10 Daly, 200..... 116 Maurer v. Wolff...... ... 50 St. Rep. 634..... 160 McCaffrey v. Woodin 65 N. Y. 459..... McCormick v. Venable..... 34 St. Rep. 717...... 133 McFadden v. Allen..... 134 N. Y. 489..... 142 McIlhargy v. Chambers...... 117 N. Y. 532..... 118 McRea v. Central National Bank..... 66 N. Y. 489..... 142 Merritt v. Bartholick...... 36 N. Y. 44..... Miller v. Lockwood...... 32 N. Y. 293...... 141 Moore v. Prentiss Tool & Supply Co.. 133 N. Y. 144..... 136 Munoz v. Wilson...... 151 N. Nestell v. Hewitt...... 19 Abb. N. C. 282..... 109 Nichols v. Mead..... 2 Lans. 222..... 138 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mooney.... 108 N. Y. 126..... 109 O. O'Rourke v. Hadcock..... 114 N. Y. 541..... 161 Ostrander v. Weber...... 114 N. Y. 101...... 148 Owen v. Evans..... 151 P. People v. E. Remington & Sons..... 59 Hun, 282...... 107 Platt v. Stewart...... 101 U. S. 737.. 127 Potts v. Hart...... 99 N. Y. 168...... 135 Powers v. Elias...... 1 St. Rep. 250..... 145

Prentiss Tool & Supply Co. v Schirmer, 136 N. Y. 305 161 Preston v. Southwick 115 N. Y. 150...... 132 Purdy v. Coar..... 109 N. Y. 448..... 152

INDEE OF CAUSES.	AAII.	
Reynolds v. Ellis	478	
S.		
Sisson v. Hibbard. 75 N. Y. Shafer v. Riley. 50 N. Y. Sherman v. Slayback 34 St. Re Southard v. Benner. 72 N. Y. Spaulding v. Keyes. 125 N. Y. Stanley v. National Union Bank 115 N. Y. Steele v. Benham 84 N. Y. Stephens v. Perrine 143 N. Y. Sterling v. Rogers 25 Wend Steward v. Cole 43 Hun,	567 138 542 142 61 151 ep. 383 150 426 129 113 136 7. 122 137 634 138 476 131 658 149 164 133 7. 641 143	
T.		
Third Nat'l Bank v. Shields 55 Hun, Tremaine v. Mortimer et al 128 N. Y		
w.		
Whitaker v. Brown 8 Wend. Willis v. O'Brien 3 J. & S. Wisner v. Acumpaugh 71 N. Y. Woodworth v. Hodgson 56 Hun,	537 112	

TABLE OF CASES.

xxiii



THE LAW

OF

CHATTEL MORTGAGES

IN THE

STATE OF NEW YORK.

CHAPTER I.

THE INSTRUMENT.

I. Nature and definition.

II. Form and requisites.

III. The parties.

IV. The subject matter.

V. Description of property.

VI. Execution and delivery.

I. NATURE AND DEFINITION.

A chattel mortgage has been defined as an instrument whereby the owner of personal property transfers the title to such property to another, as security for the payment of a debt or obligation, subject to be defeated upon payment of the debt or obligation.

Jones on Chattel Mortgages, 1. Porter v. Parmley, 52 N. Y. 185. Betsinger v. Schuyler, 46 Hun, 353. Nichols v. Mead, 2 Lans. 222. Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18. The legal title is vested in the mortgagee, and becomes absolute in law upon default.

Bragelman v. Daue, 69 N. Y. 69.
Neidig v. Eifler, 18 Abb. 353.
Stoddard v. Denison, 38 How. 296.
Moses v. Walker, 2 Hilt. 536.
Miner v. Judson, 2 Hun, 441.
Porter v. Parmley, 52 N. Y. 185.
Judson v. Easton, 58 N. Y. 664.
Noyes v. Wyckoff, 30 Hun, 466.
Langdon v. Buell, 9 Wend. 80.
Stewart v. Slater, 6 Duer, 96.
Lambert v. Leland, 2 Sweeny, 216.
Woodbridge v. Nelson, 6 Week. Dig. 248.
Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18.
Duffus v. Bangs, 43 Hun, 52.
King v. Walbridge, 48 Hun, 470.

Such legal title is extinguished by the payment of the debt by the mortgagor, and such payment operates as a waiver of the forfeiture.

West v. Crary, 47 N. Y. 423.

A chattel mortgage differs, in its structure and effect, entirely from a mortgage upon real estate. A real estate mortgage is only a lien, and conveys no title; a chattel mortgage transfers the title at once, subject to a defeasance by the performance of the condition annexed.

Noyes v. Wyckoff, 30 Hun, 466.

A bill of sale of chattels, absolute in its terms, becomes a mortgage upon proof by parol that it was made to secure a debt. Such evidence being always admissible for this purpose.

Despard v. Walbridge, 15 N. Y. 374. Hodges v. Tenn. Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 8 N. Y. 416 Smith v. Beattie, 31 N. Y. 542.

Coe v. Cassidy, 72 N. Y. 133.

Michelson v. Fowler, 27 Hun, 159.

Tyler v. Strang, 21 Barb. 198.

Schoenrock v. Farley, 49 Supr. Ct. Rep. 302.

Stoddard v. Denison, 38 How. 296.

Nichols v. Lyons, 14 N. Y. St. Rep. 549; s. C., 47 Hun, 636.

The instrument, however, must contain an express promise to pay or a distinct acknowledgment of an existing debt, or an action will not lie.

Culver v. Sisson, 3 N. Y. 264.

Whether an instrument be in itself a chattel mortgage or not, is a question of law.

Fairbanks v. Bloomfield, 5 Duer, 434.

A mortgage of goods is a pledge, and more; for it is an absolute pledge to become an absolute interest if not redeemed at the specified time. After the condition is forfeited, the mortgagee has an absolute interest in the property, whereas a pawnee has but a special property in the goods, to detain them for his security.

Brown v. Bennet, 8 Johns. 96. Citing Barrow v. Paxton, 5 Johns. 258. 2 Ves. Jr. 378. 1 Powell on Mortgages, 3.

II. FORM AND REQUISITES.

No particular form is necessary to constitute a chattel mortgage. The simple statement that a creditor is to have a lien, and that on default he may take possession and sell, and apply the proceeds upon the lien is sufficient.

McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 465.

Any form of words by which the title is transferred as security for a debt, or obligation of any kind, to be defeated by the payment of the debt or the performance of the oblition is sufficient.

Bunacleugh v. Poolman, 3 Daly, 236.

A chattel mortgage may be valid although made by parol. But in such case delivery of the mortgaged property should accompany the parol contract.

Bank of Rochester v. Jones, 4 N. Y. 498. Ackley v. Finch, 7 Cow. 290. Ferguson v. Union Furnace Co., 9 Wend. 345. Bardwell v. Roberts, 66 Barb. 433. Ceas v. Bramley, 18 Hun, 187.

A mortgage is void as to creditors, which provides for a substitution of other property, to take the place of the property described in the mortgage.

> Carpenter v. Simmons, 28 How. 12. Edgell v. Hart, 9 N. Y. 216. Gardner v. McEwen, 19 N. Y. 123. See Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214.

But it would be valid as to the property described in the mortgage, although containing such a provision.

Gardner v. McEwen, supra. Van Heusen v. Radcliff, 17 N. Y. 580.

A chattel mortgage need not be acknowledged in order to require the town clerk to file it.

Maxwell v. Inman, 42 Hun, 267.

A chattel mortgage need not be under seal.

Gibson v. Warden, 14 Wall. 244. 1 Wait's Law and Pr. 131. Thompson v. Blanchard, 4 N. Y. 303. If a chattel mortgage is acknowledged, proved, or certified in the manner prescribed by law for taking and certifying the acknowledgment or proof of the conveyance of real property, it thereupon becomes evidence, as if it was a conveyance of real property, and would not need to be proved otherwise than such a conveyance.

2 Rumsey's Practice, 99, citing Code Civ. Pro., § 937.

A chattel mortgage should specify a time of payment, otherwise it is due immediately.

Dikeman v. Puckhafer, t Abb. (N. S.) 32. Howland v. Willett, 3 Sandf. 608.

If a greater sum than is really due is expressed in the mortgage, that mere fact does not render it fraudulent in law.

Frost v. Warren, 42 N. Y. 204.

A chattel mortgage may be payable in instalments.

Willis v. O'Brien, 3 Jones & Spencer, 537.

If the instrument be in the form of a bill of sale, it will be construed as a chattel mortgage, if that was the agreement at the time of its execution.

Preston v. Southwick, 42 Hun, 293.

III. THE PARTIES.

All persons who are legally competent to make a contract, may also make a chattel mortgage.

2 Wait's Actions and Defenses. 168.

A man may make a valid chattel mortgage to his wife.

Smith v. Post, I Hun, 518. Manchester v. Tibbetts, 19 N. Y. St. Rep. 299.

A married woman may give a chattel mortgage.

Talman v. Hawkhurst, 4 Duer, 221.

A chattel mortgage may be executed by an agent, who is authorized for that purpose; his authority may be either verbal or written, or by subsequent ratification.

Brownell v. Hawkins, 4 Barb. 491.

An infant may make a chattel mortgage, and such mortgage will be voidable only and not void.

> Hanyen v. Hachmeister, 49 Supr. Ct. Rep. 34. Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407.

A member of a firm may make a chattel mortgage in the firm name, covering the partnership property, to secure a firm debt, without the knowledge or consent of his partners.

Stewart v. Slater, 6 Duer, 96.

Mablett v. White, 12 N. Y. 454.

Graser v. Stellwagen, 25 N. Y. 315.

Van Brunt v. Applegate, 44 N. Y. 544.

Kennedy v. The National Union Bank, 23 Hun, 497.

Neer v. Oakley, 18 N. Y. St. Rep. 374.

One partner may make a valid mortgage of firm property in his own name, if the mortgage be ratified by the other partners.

Kennedy v. The National Union Bank, supra.

The acquiescence of the other partners whether given

at the time or subsequently, will place its validity beyond question.

Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 513. Smith v. Ker, 3 N. Y. 144.

One tenant in common may make a valid chattel mortgage of his individual interest.

Shuart v. Taylor, 7 How. 251. Thomas v. Bacon, 34 Hun, 88.

A joint stock company can make a valid chattel mortgage.

Nelson v. Drake, 14 Hun, 465.

Any corporation founded under the General Manufacturing Law of 1848, can make a valid chattel mortgage.

Lord v. Yonkers Fuel Gas Co., 99 N. Y. 551.

Two or more persons may take one mortgage to secure separate and distinct debts, and the fraudulent intent of one, will not affect the rights of the other. The mortgage will be void as to one, and good as to the other.

Under such form of mortgage each would hold the property independently of the other, in proportion to the debt secured.

Smith v. Post, supra.

IV. SUBJECT MATTER.

A chattel mortgage requires a subject in existence, and an ownership and control in the mortgagor, and it can have no validity where neither the property, nor the agent for its production, is in the possession of the mortgagor.

Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Long Beach Improvement Co., 27 Hun, 89.

A potential existence is sufficient, but the underlying principle in all these cases is, that the right to the property when it shall come into actual existence, is a present vested right.

Betsinger v. Schuyler, 46 Hun, 352.

No principle known to the law will allow a valid chattel mortgage on property not in existence, either actual or potential.

Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Long Beach Improvement Co., supra. Citing
Gardner v. McEwan, 19 N. Y. 123.
Edgell v. Hart, 9 N. Y. 213.
Otis v. Sill, 8 Barb. 102.
Williman v. Neher, 20 Barb. 37.
Conderman v. Smith, 41 Barb. 404.
McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 460.
Brunswick Balke-Collender Co. v. Stevenson, 21 N. Y. St. Rep. 862.

But as between the parties, a chattel mortgage upon property to be acquired in the future is valid.

Ludwig v. Kipp, 20 Hun, 265. Hale v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 634. Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y. 122.

Crops to be raised are an exception to the general rule, that title to property not in existence cannot be affected so as to vest the title when it comes into being. In the case of crops to be sown, it vests potentially from the time of the executory bargain, and actually as soon as the subject arises.

Green v. Armstrong, 1 Den. 550. Smith v. Taber, 46 Hun, 316. Betsinger v. Schuyler, 46 Hun, 352.

Growing grass may be mortgaged when owned by a tenant.

Green v. Armstrong, supra.

Wool upon the sheep's back is the subject of chattel mortgage.

Cressey v. Sabre, 17 Hun, 122.

The owner of a dairy may make a valid mortgage of the future products of such dairy, provided that at the time of the execution of the mortgage, the mortgagor is the owner of the dairy.

Betsinger v. Schuyler, 46 Hun, 353.

Nursery stock, consisting of trees, plants and shrubs, planted by a tenant for the purpose of commerce, may be mortgaged.

King v. Wilcomb, 7 Barb. 263. Hamilton v. Austin, 36 Hun, 138. Duffus v. Bangs, 43 Hun, 53.

A life insurance policy may be the subject of a chattel mortgage.

King v. Van Vleck, 109 N. Y. 367.

May be given to secure future advances.

Wescott v. Gunn, 4 Duer, 107.
Fairbanks v. Bloomfield, 5 Duer, 440.
Bank of Utica v. Finch, 3 Barb. Ch. 293.
Monnat v. Ibert, 33 Barb. 24.
Ripley v. Larmouth, 56 Barb. 21.
Miller v. Lockwood, 32 N. Y. 293.
Brown v. Keifer, 5 Week. Dig 485.
Carpenter v. Blote, 1 E. D. Smith, 491.
Craig v. Tappin, 2 Sandf. Ch. 78.
Walker v. Snediker, 1 Hoff. Ch. 145.
Brown v. Guthrie, 110 N. Y. 442.

A chattel mortgage may also be a continuing security to cover both present and future indebtedness.

Brown v. Keifer, 71 N. Y. 610.

It may be stated generally that every kind of personal property may be mortgaged, even if it is exempt from levy and sale under execution.

2 Wait's Actions and Defenses, 170.

V. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.

The general rule as to description is, that any description will suffice that will enable third persons to identify the property, aided by inquiries and evidence.

Matthews v. Sniffen, 10 Daly, 202. Conkling v. Shelley, 28 N. Y. 362. Russell v. Winne, 37 N. Y. 593.

Oral evidence is competent to identify the articles described in the mortgage.

Dodge v. Potter, 18 Barb. 201. Caring v. Richmond, 28 Hun, 25.

Oral evidence may also be given to fix the quantity of goods covered by the mortgage when the quantity is not stated.

Dunning v. Stearns, 9 Barb. 630.

Where the description is *erroneous*, oral evidence may be given to correct it.

Dodge v. Potter, supra.

A portion of a description which is false or inconsistent with the rest of the description, may be rejected, if the remainder of the description is sufficient to pass the property.

Dodge v. Potter, supra.

A chattel mortgage conveying "all personal property whatever," owned by the mortgagor, and also "all growing crops of all kinds," is too indefinite, and cannot be said to give notice of the lien to execution creditors.

Riley v. Sexton, 32 Hun, 249. Citing Wood v. Lester, 29 Barb. 145. Wintermute v. Light, 46 Barb. 282.

A general description covering all the goods in a store, and stock in trade, was held sufficient.

Conkling v. Shelley, 28 N. Y. 362. Russell v. Winne, supra.

A description covering the stock in trade, and merchandise, and also, all "the increase and decrease thereof," was held to be wholly void.

Mittnacht v. Kelly, 5 Abb. (N. S.) 442. But see Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214.

A mortgage of real estate used as a sugar refinery, which specified "and also all the machinery and effects in the said sugar refinery," was held sufficient to cover the sugar in stock on the premises.

Thurber v. Mintburn, 62 How. 27.

A mortgage of the "ashes in the ashery now in the possession of" (the mortgagor) is a sufficient description.

Dunning v. Stearns, 9 Barb. 630.

A general clause after a specific enumeration of articles will extend the mortgage over the property embraced in the general term, if the intent is clear from the language used so to do.

Russell v. Winne, 37 N. Y. 593.

Where a schedule is annexed to a mortgage, and is referred to in it, it becomes a part of the mortgage, and both papers are to be construed together.

> Edgell v. Hart, 9 N. Y. 215. Citing Roberts v. Chenango Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Hill, 501. Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige, 254.

Where there is a conflict between the mortgage and the schedule, the former must govern.

Matthews v. Sniffen, 10 Daly, 202.

A lease in which the lessee mortgages all his property upon the premises, to the mortgagor as security for the rent, and which provided for an inventory of said property thereafter to be made and annexed, is valid although no inventory was ever annexed thereto.

Van Heusen v. Radcliff, 17 N. Y. 580.

Where a mortgage was made of "II M feet of pine lumber now in the shop of the mortgagor," there was only about one-fifth of that quantity there at the time of the execution of the mortgage, oral evidence was admitted to show that the balance had been purchased by the mortgagor and not yet delivered.

Galen v. Brown, 22 N. Y. 40.

VI. EXECUTION AND DELIVERY.

The question of delivery is one of fact for the jury, and it is always competent to show that it was never delivered, or that it was delivered as an escrow, or that the mortgagee obtained possession of it by fraud.

Roberts v. Jackson, 1 Wend. 478.

A delivery and acceptance are essential to constitute a valid mortgage. Without these there is only an attempt to make a mortgage.

Jones on Chattel Mortgages, 106.

There must be some act showing that the grantor intends that it shall take effect. That act is delivery to the grantee, actual or presumed. Merely to sign, seal and acknowledge a writing, and then to keep it in one's possession conveys no title.

Messelback v. Norman, 46 Hun, 416.

The date recited in a chattel mortgage is only *prima facie* evidence of the time of its execution, and the true date may be shown by oral evidence.

Fuller v. Acker, 1 Hill, 173.

If a mortgage be made to several creditors, the refusal of one to accept it, does not impair the mortgage as to those who have accepted it.

Brown v. Clapp, 8 Bosw. 324.

May be executed by an agent duly authorized for that purpose.

Brownell v. Hawkins, 4 Barb. 491.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE FILING AND RE-FILING OF CHATTEL MORT-GAGES.

I. Where filed.

II. How filed.

III. Effect of omission to file.

IV. Where re-filed.

V. How re-filed.

VI. When re-filed.

VII. Effect of omission to re-file.

I. WHERE FILED.

The statute of 1833, chapter 279, provides as follows: SECTION I. "Every mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage, of goods and chattels hereafter made, which shall not be accompanied by an immediate delivery and be followed by an actual and continued change of possession of the things mortgaged, shall be absolutely void as against creditors of the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage, or a true copy thereof, shall be filed as directed in the succeeding section of this act."

§ 2. "The instruments mentioned in the preceding section, shall be filed in the several towns and cities of this State where the mortgagor therein, if a resident of this State, shall reside at the time of the execution thereof; and if not a resident, then in the city or town where the property so mortgaged shall be at the time of the execution of such instrument. In the city of New York, such instrument shall be filed in the office of the register of said city. In the several cities of this State, other than the city of New York, and in the several towns of this State in which a county clerk's office is kept, in such office; and in each of the other towns of this State, in the office of the town clerk thereof; and such register and clerks are hereby required to file all

such instruments aforesaid presented, to them respectively for that purpose, and to endorse thereon the time of receiving the same, and shall deposit the same in their respective offices, to be kept there for the inspection of all persons interested."

The object of the statute making the filing of chattel mortgages necessary to preserve the lien as to creditors, is the same as the registry acts respecting mortgages of real estate, viz.,—to prevent imposition upon subsequent purchasers and mortgagees, and to prevent them from being misled by the possession and apparent absolute ownership of the mortgagor

Meech v. Patchin, 14 N. Y. 72. Patterson v. Gillies, 64 Barb. 563. Mack v. Phelan, 92 N. Y. 25.

The invalidity of a chattel mortgage as against creditors, because it has not been filed, is not based on the ground of fraud; and it is not deemed fraudulent by reason of the omission to file, but the purpose of the statute is to furnish means of notice of the lien, and the consequence of the omission is in the nature of a penalty for such neglect.

Niagara Co. Nat. Bank v. Lord, 33 Hun, 557. Citing Ball v. Slafter, 26 Hun, 355. Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 428.

In the city of New York, the proper place to file a mortgage of personal property is the register's office. In all the other cities of the State, and in the towns of the State in which a county clerk's office is kept, the instrument must be filed in such county clerk's office; and in each of the other towns of the State in the office of the town clerks thereof.

Martin v. Rothschild, 6 N. Y. St. Rep. 76; s. c., 42 Hun, 410.

It was enacted by the Laws of 1864, chapter 412, that every person having a lien by chattel mortgage on any boat navigating the canals of this State, is required to file the same in the office of the auditor of the canal department, and if not so filed should be void against creditors.

Keller v. Paine, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 330; s. c., 107N. Y. 83; see chapter 69, Laws of 1883.

By an act of Congress passed July 29, 1850, it is provided that every mortgage of any vessel of the United States shall be recorded in the office of the collector of customs where such vessel is registered or enrolled.

The courts of the United States have held that the statute gives validity to a mortgage, otherwise free from objection, whatever may be the laws of the State where it is executed, or where the mortgagee or mortgagor may reside.

Such mortgage need not be again filed in the clerk's office as required by our statute.

Folger v. Weber, 16 Hun, 515. Citing White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall. 646. Aldrich v. Ætna Co., 8 Wall. 491.

A mortgage given by a joint stock company, must be filed in the town clerk's office of the town where the principal office of the company is located, and its business principally carried on.

Nelson v. Neil, 15 Hun, 383.

The instrument must be filed in the clerk's office of the town in which the mortgagor resided at the time of its execution, whether the mortgagor be a resident of that town or not, at the time of the filing.

Hicks v. Williams, 17 Barb. 523.

The fact of the place of residence controls the place of filing, not the recital of it in the instrument. That is of no

importance, and might for the matter of the security be omitted altogether.

Chandler v. Bunn, Lalor's Supplement to Hill and Denio, 167.

The subsequent removal of the mortgagor into the town where it is filed will not remedy the defect; the language of the statute is clear.

Powers v. Freeman, 2 Lans. 127.

If the mortgagor be a non-resident, the mortgage must be filed in the city or town where the property so mortgaged shall be at the time of the execution of such instrument.

Laws of 1833, chapter 279, section 2.

A mortgage made by joint mortgagors as partners, residing in different towns, must be filed in each of the towns in which the mortgagors reside.

Stewart v. Platt, 101 U. S. 731.

In that case, the mortgagors resided in Westchester county, and were lessees of a hotel in the city of New York. They made a mortgage of the furniture of the hotel which was filed in the office of the register of deeds for the city and county of New York, but was not filed in the towns where the mortgagors respectively resided, as required by our statute.

It was held that the mortgage was not properly filed.

Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The contention of learned counsel for the appellants is that the firm was the mortgagor; that its residence or domicile was in the city of New York; and that the manifest object of the statute was met by filing the several mortgages in the city where the firm carried on its business. The question thus presented is within a very narrow com-

pass, and is not free from difficulty. Its solution depends upon the meaning of the word reside, employed in the statute; it is to be regretted that we are not guided by some direct controlling adjudication in the courts of New York construing the statute under examination, but no such decision has been brought to our attention. With some hesitation we have reached the conclusion that a chattel mortgage executed by a firm upon firm property, is void under the New York statute as against creditors, subsequent purchasers, and mortgagees in good faith, unless filed in the city or town where the individual members of the firm severally reside. The statute upon its face furnishes persuasive evidence that its framers intended to make a sharp distinction between the place where the property might be at the time of the execution of the mortgage, and the place of the mortgagor's residence. If he be a non-resident of the State of New York, the mortgage may be filed in the town or city where the property shall be at the time of the execution of the mortgage. If he be a resident, then his residence, not the actual situs of the property, governs. If these instruments be executed by several resident mortgagors, the statute would seem to require that the mortgage be filed in the towns or cities where the mortgagors at the time respectively reside."

The removal of a mortgagor from the town or county in which he resided when the mortgage was executed, and the taking of the mortgaged property with him, does not necessitate the filing of it again in the town or county to which he has removed.

Hicks v. Williams, 17 Barb. 523.

Chattel mortgages upon property in the town of Flatbush, Kings county, should be filed in the office of the clerk of that town, and not in the office of the register of Kings county, notwithstanding Laws of 1852, chapter 83, requiring the register of Kings county to do like acts required to be done by the register in the city of New York.

Martin v. Rothschild, 42 Hun, 410.

II. How Filed.

As to the manner of filing a chattel mortgage, the mortgage is not bound to do any thing more than to deliver the mortgage at the proper office, and to the proper officer, or to any person of proper age who has charge of the office.

2 Wait's Actions and Defenses, 195.

A delivery of a chattel mortage to the clerk while absent from his office, and an endorsement made thereon, that it is then and there filed, is not a filing. It is not filed in reality until it is deposited in the clerk's office.

Hathaway v. Howell, 54 N. Y. 103.

The statute contains no directions as to the *time* in which a chattel mortgage should be filed, and in the absence of such provision, the courts have no power to supply the deficiency, or to declare a mortgage void because of its not having been filed at the time it was executed.

Hicks v. Williams, 17 Barb. 523.

It should be filed as soon as practicable after the mortgage is executed. Delay in filing only subjects the mortgagee to the rights of intervening creditors and *bona fide* purchasers.

Parshall v. Eggert, 52 Barb. 537. Hicks v. Williams, 17 Barb. 523. Wescott v. Gunn, 4 Duer, 107.

Where the office of town clerk being vacant, a person who has charge of the office received a chattel mortgage brought to the office, filed it, endorsed it, and placed it among the chattel mortgages on file, held, that this was a valid filing within the meaning of the statute.

Bishop v. Cook, 13 Barb. 326.

An error of the clerk in filing the mortgage does not invalidate it. It is good as against subsequent purchasers. The remedy of the purchaser is against the clerk.

Dikeman v. Puckhafer, 1 Daly, 489.

It is the duty of the register to index a chattel mortgage duly filed with him, and his omission to do so cannot prejudice the lien of a mortgagee who has done all required of him to make the mortgage valid.

Dikeman v. Puckhafer, supra.

The filing by a clerk in the store of the town clerk, in charge of the town clerk's office is a sufficient filing.

Dodge v. Potter, 18 Barb. 201.

The original mortgage need not be filed. A copy is sufficient under the statute. It must be a true copy. But a trifling mistake will not vitiate upon the principle that the law will not regard trifles; but the object of the statute must be regarded, and any attempt at compliance not attaining such object will be held a nullity.

Ely v. Carnley, 19 N. Y. 498.

After a mortgage has been filed, the advantage of such filing may be lost, by taking it from the file of the clerk's office. Such removal will suspend its validity during the time it is off the file.

Swift v. Hart, 12 Barb. 531. Fox v. Burns, 12 Barb. 677.

III. EFFECT OF OMISSION TO FILE.

The omission to file a chattel mortgage does not vitiate the mortgagee's right against a mortgagee or purchaser with knowledge; and such unfiled mortgage is good as against all subsequent incumbrancers with knowledge of its existence, except a judgment creditor.

> Zimmer v. Wheeler, 2 N. Y. St. Rep. 325; S. C., 41 Hun, 638. Citing

> Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hendrickson, 25 Barb. 484.

Gildersleeve v. Landon, 73 N. Y. 609.

The statute does not render a chattel mortgage absolutely void for the omission to file, but simply declares it void as to judgment creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith. As to other persons it is valid without filing.

Hayman v. Jones, 7 Hun, 238.

If a purchaser has notice of an unfiled mortgage at the time of purchase, that notice stands in the place of filing, and his purchase is subject to the lien of the mortgage.

Mack v. Phelan, 92 N. Y. 25.

The omission to file a chattel mortgage as required by the statute, makes the security void per se, but it is only void as against judgment creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith. A purchaser with notice cannot claim to be a purchaser in good faith within the statute.

Sanger v. Eastwood, 19 Wend. 514.

The omission to file does not affect its validity as between the parties, and a delay in filing it only renders it void as against an intervening purchaser in good faith, or an intervening creditor by execution.

> Wescott v. Gunn, 4 Duer, 107. Smith v. Acker, 23 Wend. 653. Hayman v. Jones, 7 Hun, 238. Pancoast v. The American Heating and Power Co., 66 How. 49.

It has been the settled law of this State since the decision in the case of *Thompson* v. *Van Vechten*, 27 N. Y. 568, that a mortgage not filed, of a chattel not delivered, is void as to a creditor at large whose claim accrues while the default in filing continues, though such creditor is not in a position to raise the question until he has obtained judgment or process against the property.

Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Damon, 16 N. Y. St. Rep. 133; s. c., 48 Hun, 509.

The subsequent delivery of the property and foreclosure of the mortgage, could not affect the rights of creditors which had already attached.

Ibid.

A chattel mortgage is valid although not filed as against a general creditor.

Button v. Rathbone, Sard & Co., 43 Hun, 148.

A creditor, to take advantage of the omission to file, is he who has a judgment and proceeds upon that, and procures an attachment or execution.

Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 296.
Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 139.
Fox v. Mayer, 54 N. Y. 129.
Heye v. Bolles, 33 How. 277.
Hotchkiss v. McVickar, 12 Johns. 407.
Stewart v. Beale, 68 N. Y. 629.
Kennedy v. Nat. Union Bank., 23 Hun, 496.
Niagara Co. Nat. Bank v. Lord, 33 Hun, 557.
Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Damon, 16 N. Y.
St. Rep. 133; s. c., 48 Hun, 509.
Jones v. Graham, 77 N. Y. 628.
Sullivan v. Miller, 106 N. Y. 641.

The fact that the creditor had knowledge of the mortgage makes no difference, as under the statute, the instrument is as to him void, unless the same is filed.

Best v. Staple, 61 N. Y. 71.

A second mortgagee who has personal knowledge of the existence of a prior chattel mortgage, is not entitled to priority over it, although the second mortgage is first filed.

Zimmer v, Wheeler, 2 N. Y. St. Rep. 325; s. c., 41 Hun, 638.

In case of two chattel mortgages executed by the same person upon the same property, but to different persons, dated the same day and filed the same moment, where it was the agreement and intention of the parties, that one should have a preference over the other as a lien, that agreement must be sustained, and effect must be given to it, and the intention of the parties.

Wray v. Fedderke, 11 Jones & Spencer, 338.

An unfiled mortgage on property subsequently brought by the mortgagor into a firm, of which he has become a member, as his portion of the capital, is not invalid as to the other partners by reason of its non-filing. The property comes into the concern impressed with the lien of the mortgage.

Rust v. Hauslet, 46 Supr. Ct. Rep. 24.

Leases for years of real estate, and assignments thereof by way of mortgage, are not within the acts relating to the recording or filing of chattel mortgages. Such leases are chattels real, and not mere chattels.

Breese v. Bauge, 2 E. D. Smith, 474. Booth v. Kehoe, 71 N. Y. 341.

An assignee for the benefit of creditors is not a purchaser in good faith within the meaning of the statute, and cannot take advantage of an omission to file a chattel mortgage. The statute does not say that such failure makes the mortgage fraudulent as to creditors, but simply that as to them it shall be void. And the act of 1858 giving an assignee for the benefit of creditors the right to invalidate a transfer of property, extends only to defects based upon fraud or fraudulent intent.

Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424. Ball v. Slafter, 26 Hun, 355.

The power of an assignee for the benefit of creditors, executor, administrator, receiver, or other trustee, to impeach fraudulent acts of the assignor, testator, etc., conferred by chapter 314 of the Laws of 1858, does not enable him to set aside a chattel mortgage, merely upon the ground that it was not duly filed; for the omission, although it avoids the mortgage as to creditors, does not make it within the meaning of the statute a fraudulent act. The purpose of the statute (1858) is to confer power to treat as void, etc., only acts done, and transfers made with fraudulent intent.

Chrisfield v. Bogardus, 18 Abb. N. C. 334.

The lien of a chattel mortgage duly filed, is superior to one created subsequently by the mortgagor for the *expense* of keeping the mortgaged property:

Bissell v. Pearce, 28 N. Y 252.

A provision in a lease, by which a lien is given upon products from the property leased, as security for the rent, is in effect a chattel mortgage, and must be filed. (Follett, J., dissenting.)

Betsinger v. Schuyler, 46 Hun, 352. Citing Johnson v. Crofoot, 53 Barb. 574.

Yenni v. McNamee, 45 N. Y. 615. Steffin v. Steffin, 4 Civ. Pro. Rep. 187. McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459. Thomas v. Bacon, 34 Hun, 88. Hawkins v. Giles, 45 Hun, 318.

These cases holding that if said mortgage is not filed it is invalid as against the persons described in section three of the act of 1833.

A provision in a lease by which it is agreed that the lesso is to have a lien upon the growing crops, must be filed to be valid against mortgagees in good faith.

Duffus v. Bangs, 43 Hun, 53.

A farm lease upon shares which provides that the lessor shall have a lien upon all crops sown on the premises, as security for the performance of the *covenants* under the lease, must be filed.

Thomas v. Bacon, 34 Hun, 88.

A clause in a lease of real estate which provides that the lessor shall have "a a lien as security for all the rent," etc., upon all goods, wares and merchandise, and all other personal property which are, or may be on the premises demised, held, that such lien might be enforced, and a sale had thereunder the same as under a chattel mortgage, and that the same must be filed, and that if not filed, it was void as against creditors.

Reynolds v. Ellis, 34 Hun, 47; s. c., 103 N. Y. 122.

The omission to file a chattel mortgage, executed by a corporation in another State. does not affect its validity.

The statutes requiring the filing of such mortgages have no extra territorial force.

> Nichols v. Mase, 25 Hun, 640. Citing Ætna Ins. Co. v. Aldrich, 26 N. Y. 96. Egerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 199.

A mortgagee of chattels cannot obtain a lien upon other similar chattels, as against a subsequent purchaser thereof, through a verbal arrangement between himself and his mortgagor, to consider them substituted in the place of those described in the mortgage. He must pursue the statute respecting the filing literally.

Powers v. Freeman, 2 Lans. 127.

A chattel mortgage, valid in other respects, is not invalid as against one purchasing of the mortgagor with knowledge of its existence, although not filed.

Gildersleeve v. Landon, 73 N. Y. 609.

A purchaser, who purchases property within the year, covered by a chattel mortgage, although having constructive notice of the mortgage, by reason of its being filed, can convey good title to a purchaser after the expiration of the year, such person being a subsequent purchaser.

Wooster v. Sherwood, 25 N. Y. 286. Dillingham v. Bolt, 37 N. Y. 197.

A chattel mortgage on file contained a clause referring to the conditions of another instrument, and provided that upon default in the performance of those conditions, the mortgage debt should become due and payable at once.

This second instrument was not filed. It was held, however, that the mortgage was valid, and was duly filed.

Shuler v. Boutwell, 8 Week. Dig. 442.

OF THE REFILING OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

IV. WHERE REFILED.

Section three of the act of 1833, as amended by chapter 501 of the Laws of 1873, and further amended by chapter 418 of the Laws of 1879, reads as follows: "Every mortgage filed in pursuance of this act shall cease to be valid as against the creditors of the person making the same, or against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in good faith, after the expiration of one year from the filing thereof, unless within thirty days next preceding the expiration of each and every term of one year after the filing of such mortgage, a true copy of such mortgage, together with a statement exhibiting the interest of the mortgagee in the property thereby claimed by him, by virtue thereof, shall be again filed in the office of the clerk or register aforesaid, in the town or city where the mortgagor shall then reside. If the mortgagor shall then be a resident of this State, and if not such resident, then in the office of the clerk or register of the town or city where the property so mortgaged, was at the time of the execution of such mortgage."

The mortgage must be refiled if the mortgagor is a resident of the State, in the clerk's office of the town or city where he shall then reside. If not such resident, then in the office of the clerk or register of the town or city where the mortgaged property was at the time of the execution of the mortgage.

Laws of 1879, chapter 418.

V. How Refiled.

The object of the refiling is merely to extend and continue in operation the effect of the first filing, as to the amount remaining unpaid for another year, and to make

known to all interested the state of the property, and the incumbrance upon it from year to year.

Dillingham v. Bolt, 37 N. Y. 200. Marsden v. Cornell, 62 N. Y. 219.

The statement of the mortgagee's interest required by the statute upon the refiling of a chattel mortgage, must be made by the mortgagee in person, or by his attorney. A statement made by the mortgagor, or by third persons, is not sufficient.

Osborn v. Alexander, 40 Hun, 328.

Under the provisions of the statute, a statement is sufficient which annexes and refers to another document filed with it, if the two papers read together in connection with the original mortgage, disclose the intent of the mortgagee intelligibly. Thus, on refiling a chattel mortgage which was given to secure certain notes, and also certain outstanding liabilities, the statement annexed was, that the *unpaid notes* constituted the amount of the mortgagee's interest, and made no reference to the outstanding liabilities.

The statement was held good as to the notes, but not good as to outstanding liabilities.

Beers v. Waterbury, 8 Bosw. 396.

The filing of a new mortgage in place of the old one, and filing it within the time prescribed, is not sufficient, for this is not a declaration by the mortgagee of his interest.

Osborn v. Alexander, 40 Hun, 323.

But such filing of a new mortgage does not affect the lien of the mortgage, nor render it invalid, except that the mortgagee takes the risk of a levy upon an execution, after the first mortgage ceased to be a lien, and before the new one was filed.

Walker v. Henry, 85 N. Y. 134.

The filing of a true copy, without the filing of the statement of the mortgagee's interest, is not sufficient. There must be both a copy and a statement.

Marsden v. Cornell, 62 N. Y. 219.

A clerical error in the copy of a chattel mortgage and the accompanying statement of the amount claimed, by which the amount is overstated \$100, is fatal.

Ely v. Carnley, 19 N. Y. 496.

The mortgagor, with the concurrence of the mortgagee, made at the expiration of the year, the following endorsement, and filed the same: "This chattel mortgage is hereby renewed for one year from this date. As witness my hand and seal.

Sworn to," etc.

The effect of this act by the mortgagor was to create a new mortgage, and such statement was held good as against an execution creditor.

Smith v. Cooper, 22 Hun, 11.

Where a chattel mortgage has been duly filed in the proper clerk's office, and within the time specified in the statute, the *original* mortgage, with an endorsement thereon, exhibiting the mortgagee's interest in the property, is refiled in said office such refiling is equivalent to filing a true *copy* as required by the statute, and a sufficient compliance with it.

Stockham v. Allard, 2 Hun, 67. Citing Dillingham v. Bolt, 37 N. Y. 197. Fitch v. Humphrey, 1 Den. 163. Patterson v. Gillies, 64 Barb. 563. Powers v. Freeman, 2 Lans. 127.

In the absence of fraud, it is not essential to the validity of the mortgage and the preservation of the lien, that the statement should be definite and accurate even to the smallest amount. If it is made in good faith, with reasonable care, and is substantially correct and accurate, it is sufficient. Thus: a statement in these words, "The above is a true copy of a chattel mortgage on file at , on which the whole, or nearly the whole amount is unpaid, and due April 1, 1870," was held a compliance with the statute, and sufficiently definite.

Patterson v. Gillies, supra.

An understatement of the amount due, does not affect the validity of the mortgage as to the amount which is stated.

Beers v. Waterbury, 8 Bosw. 346.

A statement upon refiling is sufficient, although it failed to give a credit of \$2 upon a debt of several hundred dollars.

Patterson v. Gillies, supra.

A statement that "somewhere about the sum of \$60 as near as can be ascertained," remained unpaid upon the mortgage, was accepted as sufficiently accurate.

Dillingham v. Bolt, supra.

VI. WHEN REFILED.

The statute provides that every mortgage shall cease to be valid against creditors, subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless within thirty days next preceding the expiration of each and every term of one year after the filing of such mortgage, a true copy of such mortgage and statement shall be filed, etc.

Laws of 1879, chapter 418.

A refiling before the commencement of the thirty days would be as nugatory as one after the expiration of that time.

Newell v. Warner, 44 Barb. 258.

A refiling of a chattel mortgage after the expiration of the year, restores and revives the lien, and is valid as against creditors and purchasers.

Nixon v. Stanley, 33 Hun, 248. Citing Swift v. Hart, 12 Barb. 530.

And overruling in effect

Newell v. Warner, supra.

A mortgagee of chattels, to uphold his title as against the creditors of the mortgagor, if the property remain in the possession of the mortgagor, must refile his mortgage within the year as required by the provisions of the act, although default has been made in the payment.

Ely v. Carnley, 19 N. Y. 496. Porter v. Parmly, 52 N. Y. 187. Steele v. Benham, 84 N. Y. 634.

So the second year, and each successive year, it must be accompanied with a statement of just the amount still unpaid, so that it may appear what has been paid, if any thing, or whether the debt has increased by the interest upon it. It is a fraud if this be not stated truly.

Marsden v. Cornell, 62 N. Y. 219.

No subsequent refiling after the first, seems to be necessary under the statute of 1864, to keep a chattel mortgage a continuing security upon a canal boat.

If the last day of refiling falls on Sunday, the mortgage must be refiled on or before the Saturday preceding.

Newell v. Warner, supra.

VII. EFFECTS OF OMISSION TO REFILE.

The statute provides, that unless refiled a mortgage shall cease to be valid against creditors, subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, etc. A chattel mortgage, however, is valid as against the mortgagor although not refiled.

Steward v. Cole, 4 N. Y. St. Rep. 429; s. C., 43 Hun, 164. Hayman v. Jones, 3 Week. Dig. 230; s. C., 7 Hun, 238.

The omission to refile at the end of the year, the statement and mortgage, renders the mortgage invalid as against creditors.

Marsden v. Cornell, 62 N. Y. 215. Steele v. Benham, 84 N. Y. 634.

But the failure to refile, does not render it invalid as against a receiver appointed in supplementary proceedings, for the reason that the receiver stands in the place of the mortgagor.

Steward v. Cole, supra.

A purchaser, with actual knowledge of the existence of a chattel mortgage, cannot take advantage of its not having been legally renewed.

Thompson v. Van Vechten, 6 Bosw. 375. Gregory v. Thomas, 20 Wend. 17. Lewis v. Palmer, 28 N. Y. 271.

The omission to refile a chattel mortgage, pursuant to the third section of the act, does not render it invalid as against

purchasers or mortgagees intermediate the original filing and the omission to refile. The term subsequent in that section means after the time for refiling has elapsed.

> Meech v. Patchin, 14 N. Y. 71. Lattimer v. Wheeler, 30 Barb. 480. Wray v. Fedderke, 11 Jones & Spencer, 338. Manning v. Monaghan, 23 N. Y. 539. Thompson v. Van Vechten, 6 Bosw. 375. Shutter v. Ward, 16 N. Y. Week. Dig. 69. Jaqueth v. Merritt, 29 Hun, 584.

A chattel mortgage given for a pre-existing indebtedness, although valid as between the parties, does not constitute the mortgagee a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith, within the statute.

Tiffany v. Warren, 24 How. 293.

Zimmer v. Wheeler, 2 N. Y. St. Rep. 325; S. C., 41 Hun, 638.

Wood v. Robinson, 22 N. Y. 567.

Williams v. Shelly, 37 N. Y. 375.

Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286.

Cary v. White, 52 N. Y. 138.

Van Huesen v. Radcliff, 72 N. Y. 580.

Jones v. Graham, 77 N. Y. 628.

Farrington v. Frankford Bank, 24 Barb. 554.

Ray v. Birdseye, 5 Den. 619.

Osborn v. Alexander, 40 Hun, 325.

Betsinger v. Schuyler, 46 Hun, 352.

The filing of a chattel mortgage is notice to a subsequent mortgagee whose mortgage is filed before the expiration of the year, but a purchaser under a sale made under such second mortgage, after the expiration of the year, gets good title, and the first mortgage is of no validity as against him if the mortgage be not refiled.

Dillingham v. Bolt, 37 N. Y. 198. Marsden v. Cornell, 62 N. Y. 215.

Jaqueth v. Merritt, 29 Hun, 584. Zoeller v. Riley, 100 N. Y. 103.

Estoppel.— A party accepting a transfer of personal property expressly subject to a mortgage held by another, is estopped from claiming a prior lien upon the property, by virtue of a previous mortgage not properly renewed.

Jones v. Howell, 3 Robt. 438. See Horton v. Davis, 26 N. Y. 495.

CHAPTER III.

THE VALIDITY OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

- I. Between the parties.
- II. The controlling law as to validity.
- III. Change of possession.
- IV. What interests may be mortgaged.
- V. Agreements which render the mortgage void.
- VI. Agreements which do not invalidate the mortgage.
- VII. Of mortgages upon fixtures.
- VIII. How and by whom the validity may be contested.

I. BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

A chattel mortgage can have no force or effect, unless it be given to secure a valid debt. It must have a legal inception. A chattel mortgage given for money knowingly advanced for the purpose of compounding a felony is void. So a mortgage given under duress is void.

Fellows v. Van Hyring, 23 How. 230.

So a chattel mortgage will be void if given to secure a debt tainted with usury.

Thompson v. Van Vechten, 27 N. Y. 568.

A chattel mortgage is valid as between the parties to it, although never filed.

Zimmer v. Wheeler, 41 Hun, 638. Steward v. Cole, 43 Hun, 164.

So a chattel mortgage is valid, between the parties, which covers property to be acquired in the future.

Ludwig v. Kipp, 20 Hun, 265.

It is competent for parties to agree upon the sale and purchase of property, that the vendor shall retain a lien upon the property sold, as well as upon the article into which it shall be manufactured; and in such case a lien will attach upon the new article as soon as it comes into existence.

Dunning v. Stearns, 9 Barb. 630.

A chattel mortgage given to secure the present and future indebtedness of the mortgagor to the mortgagee, is valid as between the parties thereto, and when free from fraud, is valid as to creditors.

Brown v. Kiefer, 71 N. Y. 610.

As between mortgagor and mortgagee, personal chattels, which by being annexed to the freehold, would otherwise become a part of the realty, may by agreement, still be treated as personalty. And such arrangement will bind one claiming under the mortgagee. In equity, a merger never takes place contrary to the intention of the parties, or the requirements of justice.

Sheldon v. Edwards, 35 N. Y. 279.

The fraudulent acts of one mortgagee will not invalidate the mortgage, nor affect the rights of the other mortgagees.

Smith v. Post, 1 Hun, 518.

II. THE CONTROLLING LAW AS TO VALIDITY.

In this State it is held that where a contract in regard to personal property is made in another State, that the law of such State, as to its validity and effect, is to govern here, and if valid there, it is to be considered equally valid, and can be enforced here.

The principle is well settled, that a voluntary conveyance of personal property, good by the law of the place where it was made, passes title wherever the property may be situated.

Nichols v. Mase, 94 N. Y. 166. Citing Ætna Ins. Co. v. Aldrich, 26 N. Y. 96. Hoyt v. Thompson's Exr., 19 N. Y. 224. Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 203.

Though a transfer of personal property, valid by the law of the domicile, is valid everywhere as a general principle, there is to be excepted that territory in which it is situated, and where a different law has been set up, when it is necessary, for the purpose of justice, that the actual *situs* of the property be examined.

Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 204.

In that case the mortgagor and mortgagee were both residents of this State. The mortgagor removed to Lower Canada taking the mortgaged property with him. Afterward a regular dealer in horses there, sold the horses to one B., who immediately brought the property into this State. B. bought in good faith, in ignorance of the mortgage. Learning that there was a mortgage upon the team, to prevent their seizure he removed the team to Lower Canada, where they were sold to the defendant, who was a resident

of this State. But the property was not thereafter brought into this State. Plaintiff made a demand for the property, but defendant refused to deliver, and the plaintiff did not offer to reimburse defendant for the horses. Under the laws of Lower Canada, if an article of personal property. lost or stolen, be sold in a fair or market or at a public sale, or purchased from a trader dealing in similar articles, the owner cannot reclaim it without reimbursing to the purchaser, the price paid by him for the property. Folger, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It is plain that on no principle applicable to this case, could the sale of plaintiff's property by another, having no authority from him, and indeed to his wrong, be upheld save that it was authorized by the statute of Lower Canada; so that the question is one entirely of the comity to be shown by the courts of this State, to the enactments of another country. Those statutes not only enact the rule of market overt as it prevails in general in England, but carry it further, and make as in the city of London, every sale by a trader dealing in like articles as good as a sale at market overt. That rule does not obtain in this State. It has not been our policy to establish it. Our policy has been, and is, to protect the right of ownership, and to leave the buyer to take care that he gets good title.

"It would be to the contravention of that policy and to the inconvenience of our citizens, if we should give effect to these statutes of Lower Canada to the divesting of titles to movables lawfully acquired, and held by our general and statute law without the assent or intervention and against the will of the owner by our law. We doubt whether, in a case where after a title to property has been acquired by the law of the domicile of the vendor, and of the situs of the thing, and of the forum in which the parties stand, in a contest between citizens of the State of that forum, it has ever been adjudged, that such title has been divested by the surreptitious removal of the thing into another State, and a sale of it there under different laws."

The general rule that the voluntary transfer of personal

property, wherever situated, is to be governed by the law of the owner's domicile, always yields, when the law and the policy of the State where the property is actually located, have provided a different rule of transfer from that of the State where the owner lives.

> Warner v. Jaffray, 96 N. Y. 248. Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 199. Keller v. Paine, 107 N. Y. 89. Citing 4 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 457.

The liability of property to be attached and sold under legal process, issuing from the courts of the State in which the property is actually situated, must be determined by the law of that State, rather than that of the jurisdiction where the owner lives.

Keller v. Paine, supra.

In that case, F., a resident of Pennsylvania, executed to plaintiff in that State, an instrument in form an absolute bill of sale, but in fact given as a chattel mortgage, on a canal boat owned by him then lying in the Erie canal in the town of G. F., in this State. An agent of the mortgagee filed a copy of the mortgage in the town clerk's office of said town, and went on board the boat and assumed possession thereof. Defendant, however, had previously on the same day, as sheriff, levied upon the boat by virtue of an attachment against F, and subsequently sold it on execution. The parties were all residents of the State of Penn-In an action for conversion of the boat, held that both under the provisions of the Revised Statutes relating to chattel mortgages, and the act in relation to liens on canal boats, (chapter 412, Laws of 1864), the instrument was void by reason of the failure to properly file the same. and plaintiffs were not entitled to recover.

The provisions of the Revised Statutes, relative to chattel mortgages, have no application to a mortgage executed in a British province upon a British vessel. It is by the rules of the common law that the validity of such a mortgage must be determined.

Fairbanks v. Bloomfield, 5 Duer, 434.

III. CHANGE OF POSSESSION.

The change of possession where the mortgage is not filed, must be open, actual, and public; constructive or legal change is insufficient.

Otis v. Sill, 8 Barb. 102. Camp v. Camp, 2 Hill, 628. Hanford v. Artcher, 4 Hill, 271. Steele v. Benham, 84 N. Y. 634. Crandall v. Brown, 18 Hun, 461.

The presumption of fraud, in case there is no actual change of possession, is conclusive under the statute unless the mortgage is duly filed. That presumption, however, is one which may be repelled by evidence, where the condition of filing has been complied with.

Frost v. Mott, 34 N. Y. 255.

As against an *attaching* creditor, a chattel mortgage is absolutely void, unless it, or a true copy thereof, is filed in the proper office. Or unless there was an immediate delivery of the property to the mortgagee, followed by an actual and continued change of possession.

Siedenbach v. Riley (Ct. ot App.), 20 N. Y. St. Rep. 124; s. C., 111 N. Y. 560.

Whether there was an actual and continued change of possession, is a question for the jury.

Ibid. Ford v. Williams, 24 N. Y. 365. Wood v. Lowry, 17 Wend. 492. Stewart v. Slater, 6 Duer, 96. A chattel mortgage is absolutely void as to creditors, unless the same is filed, or the possession of the property is changed.

Clark v. Gilbert, 14 Week. Dig. 241.

Where a mortgagee takes actual possession and control of the property, a failure thereafter to refile the mortgage is not sufficient to defeat his title and possession of the property.

Simmons v. Osgoodby, 16 Week. Dig. 428.

So a temporary resumption of the possession by a mortgagor, is a badge of fraud, although open to explanation.

Look v. Comstock, 15 Wend. 241.

Possession taken by the mortgagee under a chattel mortgage, which is fraudulent against creditors, by reason of an agreement permitting the mortgagor to deal in the property for his own benefit is of no avail. The mortgage is still fraudulent as against creditors.

Dutcher v. Swartwood, 15 Hun, 34. Stimson v. Wrigley, 86 N. Y. 332. Sperry v. Baldwin, 46 Hun, 120. Quinn & Nolan Brewing Co. v. Hart, 48 Hun, 395. Hauselt v. Harrison, 105 U. S. 401, distinguished. Potts v. Hart, 99 N. Y. 168.

IV. WHAT INTERESTS MAY BE MORTGAGED.

In general it may be said that any property which is capable of absolute sale, may be mortgaged; but such property must have either an actual or potential existence, otherwise the mortgage will have no validity.

Van Hozer v. Cory, 34 Barb. 12. Gardner v. McEwen, 19 N. Y. 123. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. The Long Beach Improvement Co., 27 Hun, 89. A chattel mortgage, which, after enumerating the goods mortgaged, contained a clause in the following form, to-wit: "And also all other goods, chattels, etc., which may be substituted for any similar property now appertaining to the business of said firm, and belonging to said firm at said store and shop, and which may be added by way of purchase or exchange thereto, it being intended and declared that all the property, stock, tools and fixtures, which may at any time form part of, and belong to said business of said firm of T. & Co., at the premises aforesaid, whether the same be now in existence or hereafter created or acquired, shall be and is included in, covered and conveyed by the foregoing mortgage," is void as to creditors, on the ground that the mortgage could not cover the after-acquired property.

Carpenter v. Simmons, 28 How. 12.

A mortgage of the rights of a party of his interests in a lease of land, together with all the oil wells, machinery and structures thereon, and those to be placed thereon, if filed in the office of the proper town clerk, operates to give constructive notice of the lien created by the instrument, and such mortgage is valid, and is a lien upon wells subsequently put down by assignees of the lease.

Kribbs v. Alford, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 617; s. c., 45 Hun, 589.

A grant of crops to be thereafter sown by the owner upon his land is valid, and the title thereto passes as soon as the crops come into existence.

Nestell v. Hewitt, 19 Abb. N. C. 287. Andrew v. Newcomb, 32 N. Y. 417.

In the case of Andrew v. Newcomb, *supra*, Denio, C. J., said: "Crops to be raised, are an exception to the general rule, that the title to property not in existence cannot be affected, so as to vest the title when it comes into being. In

the case of crops to be sown, it vests potentially, from the time of the executory bargain and actually as soon as the subject arises."

A judgment debtor cannot make a valid mortgage after the appointment of a receiver, as the receiver is vested with all the title of the judgment debtor, and thereafter the judgment debtor has no interest which can be made the subject of a chattel mortgage.

Clark v. Gilbert, 10 Daly, 318.

A chattel mortgage, upon the merchandise and stock in trade of the mortgagor, expressed to include all "the increase and decrease thereof," is wholly void.

Mittnacht v. Kelly, 5 Abb. (N. S.) 442.

V. AGREEMENTS WHICH RENDER THE MORTGAGE VOID.

An agreement that a mortgagor may continue in possession and sell the goods for cash or on credit, and the accounts, when sales are made on credit, to be transferred to the mortgagee and applied on the debt, the accounts, however, only when they shall be collected; held to be fraudulent and void as to creditors, and for the reason that this agreement, as to the accounts, enabled the mortgagor to sell his entire stock on credit, and keep his other creditors at bay.

City Bank of Rochester v. Westbury, 16 Hun, 458.

A chattel mortgage is fraudulent and void as to creditors, where it was given with a tacit or express understanding and arrangement, that the mortgagor may sell and dispose of the mortgaged property, and apply the avails to his own use.

Such an agreement may be inferred from the fact that the mortgagor does, with the knowledge and assent of the mortgagee, so sell and dispose of the property and apply the avails.

Griswold v. Sheldon, 4 N. Y. 581. Edgell v. Hart, 9 N. Y. 213. Ford v. Williams, 13 N. Y. 577. Russell v. Winne, 37 N. Y. 595. Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214. Potts v. Hart, 99 N. Y. 168.

Sales made and the moneys used by the mortgagor, and with the knowledge and consent of the mortgagee, renders the mortgage void.

Williston v. Jones, 6 Duer, 507.

Where property embraced in a chattel mortgage, is left in the possession of the mortgagor, pursuant to an agreement between him and the mortgagee, made at the time, that he may go on with it and sell it so as to support his wife and children, the mortgage is, by reason of the agreement, fraudulent and void.

Marsden v. Vultee, 8 Bosw. 129.

A chattel mortgage given by a person in embarrassed circumstances, although given for value, will be fraudulent and void as against creditors, when it is made with the design to defraud creditors, and the mortgagee knows that fact.

Anderson v. Hann, 1 Week. Dig. 367.

To render a chattel mortgage void under the statute, it is only necessary that it should be designed to delay a single creditor for a single day, in the collection of his debts.

It is sufficient to vitiate the mortgage that such a design contaminated it, though mingled with other purposes.

Manning v. Reilly, 16 Week. Dig. 428.

Fraud on the part of the mortgagor does not affect the mortgagee unless he was a party or privy to it, and received the mortgage with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or had notice of the fraudulent intent of the mortgagor.

Murphy v. Moore, 23 Hun, 95.

If the mortgage be fraudulent, no subsequent act of the mortgagee can make it valid.

Dutcher v. Swartwood, 15 Hun, 34.

An agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee of chattels, that the former may retain possession and sell the goods, and pay the proceeds over to the mortgagee, will not render the mortgage fraudulent per se; under such an agreement the bona fides of the transaction become a question of fact for the jury.

Dolson v. Saxton, 5 Week. Dig. 126.

After default in the payment of a mortgage, the mortgagor cannot thereafter charge the property by a second mortgage. A subsequent mortgagee would take no interest in the property, and would have no right to redeem by offering to pay the first mortgage.

Taylor v. Walter, 34 How. 385.
Porter v. Parmley, 43 How. 445; s.c. 52 N. Y. 185.

Where at the time of the execution of a chattel mortgage upon a stock of merchandise, it is understood and agreed that the mortgagor may go on and sell the stock, and use the proceeds generally in his business, and the agreement is carried out by permitted sales, the transaction is fraudulent in law as against the creditors of the mortgagor.

Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424.

VI. AGREEMENTS WHICH DO NOT INVALIDATE THE MORT-GAGE.

A mortgage is not fraudulent in law, from the mere fact of its expressing a greater sum secured than the real amount of the debt, which the mortgager owes to the mortgagee.

A conveyance or assignment by a debtor of his personal property upon trust, to sell and pay his debts to one or more creditors, with a reservation to himself of any surplus there may be, is in effect a mortgage, and if made to a creditor, is valid.

Leitch v. Hollister, 4 N. Y. 211. Dunham v. Whitehead, 21 N. Y. 131. Brown v. Gutherie, 110 N. Y. 442.

The mere fact that a mortgagor is insolvent at the time of the execution of a mortgage, is not sufficient to vitiate it.

Manchester v. Tibbetts, 19 N. Y. St. Rep. 302.

A provision in a chattel mortgage, that the mortgagor may retain possession until the mortgagee deems himself insecure, is valid.

Frost v. Mott, 34 N. Y. 255.

If a mortgage cover unfinished articles of manufacture, and the mortgagor afterward adds labor and materials to them, the mortgage covers the finished articles, both as against the mortgagor and his creditors.

Dunning v. Stearns, 9 Barb. 630. Frost v. Willard, 9 Barb. 440.

A chattel mortgage covering property then owned by the mortgagor, and also property to be subsequently acquired by the mortgagor, does not render invalid a mortgage upon the property then owned by him.

Gardner v. McEwen, 19 N. Y. 123. Van Heusen v. Radcliff, 17 N. Y. 580. A chattel mortgage given by persons in possession of property, although not the owners, but with the knowledge and assent of the owners, is valid and binding upon such owners.

Hayman v. Jones, 3 Week. Dig. 230.

Where a mortgagor, after the delivery of the mortgage, gives his promissory note for the debt, the acceptance of such note by the mortgagee is not a waiver of the mortgage security.

A creditor has a right to take as many securities as his debtor is willing to give.

Wescott v. Gunn, 4 Duer, 107.

An agreement in a chattel mortgage that the mortgagor will keep the property insured, and assign the policy to the mortgagee as collateral security, and if he does not do so, that the mortgagee may insure and add to the mortgage, is valid.

Baltes v. Dobin, 67 Barb. 433.

A clause in a chattel mortgage, upon a stock of goods, which purports to extend the lien of the mortgage over after-acquired property, does not render the mortgage absolutely void; where there is no arrangement, permitting the mortgagor to deal with the goods mortgaged, and no knowledge of such dealing on the part of the mortgagee, and the absence of any intent to defraud creditors is affirmatively found.

Yates v. Olmstead, 56 N. Y. 632. This case is qualified by the case of Brackett v. Harvey, post.

A chattel mortgage is not rendered void as to creditors of the mortgagor, by a provision authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property, and apply the proceeds of sales toward the payment of the mortgage debt; nor does an authority to the mortgagor to sell on credit, taking good business

paper, which the mortgagee agrees to accept and apply on the debt, affect the validity of the mortgage. So also, permission to use a portion of the proceeds of sales to purchase other property does not vitiate the mortgage, where it is coupled with a condition that the property so purchased shall be brought in and subjected to the mortgage lien by a renewal of the mortgage.

Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214.

A chattel mortgage made the debt payable as follows: "The said principal sum and interest to be paid immediately after the expiration of five years from date, except in case default should be made in the performance of the conditions of a certain agreement this day executed by," etc. This agreement provided that the debt should be paid in monthly installments of \$50 each; held, that the mortgage was not invalidated by the failure to record or file the agreement referred to.

Shuler v. Boutwell, 18 Hun, 171.

A lease which provides that the landlord may have a lien upon the fixtures, etc., for any rent unpaid, is valid as between the parties, and the landlord may maintain an action against the mortgagor to recover the same, when taken from the premises by him.

Whited v. Hamilton, 15 Hun, 275.

Hop poles used in the raising of hops upon a farm, are covered by a mortgage of the land, whether they are upon the farm at the time of giving the mortgage, or are subsequently brought thereon.

Sullivan v. Toole, 26 Hun, 203. Citing Gardiner v. Finly, 19 Barb. 317. Rice v. Dewey, 54 Barb. 455.

In the case of *Hawkins* v. *Giles*, 45 Hun, 318, the defendant leased to one C. a farm and seven cows from April 1, 1883, to April 1, 1884, and agreed to furnish sufficient hay to keep the cows to grass in 1883. C. agreed to pay \$175 rent and "to feed out all the fodder on said farm that is raised on said farm, * * * and winter said stock (seven cows) through to grass in the spring of 1884 on hay."

In December, 1883, the plaintiff had an execution against C. under which about twenty-five tons of the hay grown upon the farm in 1883 was sold, the plaintiff becoming the purchaser. The defendant prevented the plaintiff from removing the hay, claiming that C. had left the farm without fully paying the rent; that the hay was required to keep the cows through to grass. *Held*, that the title to the hay was in C. (the tenant) and was subject to sale on the execution against him, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover its value from the defendant. Citing.

Johnson v. Crofoot, 53 Barb. 574. Steffin v. Steffin, 4 N. Y. Civ. Pro. Rep. 179. McCombs v. Becker, 3 Hun, 342.

An agreement in a lease of farm premises, that the title to personal property belonging to the lessee, shall vest in the lessor as security for the rent, is valid, and is enforceable against crops subsequently raised on the farm; a purchaser of such crops is chargeable with notice of the lessor's title when the lease is filed in the proper town clerk's office.

Smith v. Taber, 46 Hun, 313.

In this case, the lease in question was made February 18, 1885, and was filed in the town clerk's office with chattel mortgages July 24, 1885. In November or December, 1885, the defendant, T., purchased the buckwheat sown on the farm in June or July of 1885, of B., without actual notice of S.'s claim at the market value for cash paid at the time. The "lien clause" in the lease is as follows: "He (the tenant, B.) also agrees that all the personal property on said land, or

hereafter brought on, shall be and the same hereby is, bound to said S. (the landlord) for the faithful performance of all the covenants contained in this lease, and as collateral security for all the rent due and to become due for said land, and for any and all sums now and hereafter to be due or owing from said B. to said S.; and said B. also agrees that all said personal property and the crops raised and to be raised on said land, and the cows and all the increase thereof, shall be bound, and hereby are bound to said S. as collateral security for the faithful performance of all the covenants contained in this lease, and for the payment of said rent due and to become due and owing from said B. to S. for any cause whatever, and for this purpose said S. shall have the title to all the personal property of whatever kind raised, made, produced, kept, put or used upon said farm, and he shall have the right of possession thereof at any time, and such title and right of possession is vested in said S. as collateral security for the faithful performance of all the covenants contained in this lease, including the payment of rent due, and any and all sums of money owing to or to be hereafter due and owing from said B. to said S."

Hardin, P. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It must be assumed that the contract between the plaintiff and his lessee was valid whether viewed exclusively as a chattel mortgage, or as containing a 'lien clause' to enable the plaintiff to enforce the payment of the rent out of any property of the tenant in and upon the premises. Treating the filing of the lease containing the 'lien clause' and the security clause vesting the title to the property in the lessor, as equivalent to an actual notice to the defendant, then it must follow that the defendant is not a purchaser in good faith without notice; and hence he acquired only such rights as were possessed by his vendor, as between the vendor and the lessor. Here the defendant had constructive notice through the notice filed in the proper town clerk's office; here it was stipulated that it should vest in S. (the lessor) and as soon as it came into existence S. had the right to it as it was vested in him to the extent that it was needed to secure or pay his debt, and that stipulation was valid. The language is apt and broad enough to create a present lien as well as a present transfer of title to all property mentioned." Citing

McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459.
Hale v. The Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 634.
Andrew v. Newcomb, 32 N. Y. 417.
Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y. 122.
Stevens v. Watson, 4 Abb. App. Cas. 302.
Johnson v. Crofoot, 53 Barb. 576.
Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Long B. Imp. Co., 27
Hun, 91.
Conderman v. Smith, 41 Barb. 404.
Jones on Mortgages, 115.
Harmon on Chattel Mortgages, 44.
Hawkins v. Giles, 45 Hun, 318.
Dresser v. United F. Ins. Co., 45 Hun, 302.
Betsinger v. Schuyler, 46 Hun, 348.

In the case last cited, Betsinger v. Schuyler, a farm lease contained the following provision: "That the party of the second part shall and will during the continuance of the term, feed out upon said premises all hay, straw, cornstalks and fodder, that may be raised or produced on said premises or any part thereof, * * * that all the products of the farm herein demised, and of the live stock stipulated to be kept thereon, that shall be raised or made thereon in each year during the continuance of the term, shall be and remain the property of the party of the first part, * until the rent of such year shall have been fully paid; and that the party of the second part, * * right to sell or dispose of any such products, but shall hold and possess the same simply as the agent of the party of the first part. * * * and not otherwise, until such rent shall have been fully paid." Held (Follett, J., dissenting). that this provision was, in effect, a chattel mortgage; and that as the lease had not been filed in the town clerk's office, it was void as to subsequent mortgagees in good faith.

In the case of Brown v. Guthrie, 110 N. Y. 435, one M. and defendant entered into a contract by which it was agreed that, in consideration of M.'s executing to defendant his notes for \$2,400, secured by a chattel mortgage on all his goods and chattels, defendant would cancel certain notes held by him against M. amounting to \$980.78; loan him \$600 and pay debts of his to the amount of \$619.21, to such creditors as M. should thereafter designate. It was also agreed, M., as the agent of the plaintiff, should be allowed to sell at public auction the goods on credit, defendant to receive all cash payments and notes taken on such sale, retain out of the same the amount of M.'s notes, and pay over to him any surplus; defendant to be allowed \$200 for his services. As part of the same transaction, M. executed the notes and chattel mortgage, which, however, did not cover all his personal property, and defendant cancelled the notes held by him; the creditors of M., to whom the payment was to be made were also designated. Defendant subsequently advanced \$600 and paid the debts as agreed.

Plaintiff O'M., as sheriff, under an attachment in an action by plaintiff B. against M., levied on the mortgaged property. Defendant thereupon took and sold the same under his mortgage. In an action for an alleged conversion, the referee found that there was no fraud, in fact, as against M.'s creditors in the transaction. Held, that it was not fraudulent as matter of law, and the action was not maintainable; that said transaction could not be considered as a general assignment by an insolvent debtor, and so void because it reserved to him a possible surplus at the expense of unpaid creditors and a right to subsequently make preferences; as it had none of the elements of a trust, but was simply a transfer by chattel mortgage, the consideration for which was evidenced and settled by the outside agreement; that the provision for a sale on credit was made harmless by the stipulation that defendant should take the credits as cash.

The material and essential characteristic of a general assignment, is the presence of a trust, the assignee taking title,

not as absolute owner, but merely as trustee for the performance of trust duties.

A provision in a chattel mortgage, giving a mortgagor the privilege to sell the property mortgaged for cash, or on credit, the mortgagor to apply the proceeds of such sales upon the debt secured by said mortgage, and also giving to the mortgagor the right to replenish said stock, the stock so purchased to be applied upon said mortgage is not *per se* fraudulent as against the creditors of the mortgagor.

The relation in such case given to the mortgagor, and taken by him, is that of agency for the mortgagee, in making the sales, and may be so treated as against the creditors of the mortgagor.

Kerr v. Dildine, 6 N. Y. St. Rep. 163. Citing Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214. Simis v. Hodge, 21 N. Y. St. Rep. 955.

Where the mortgagor is given permission to sell the goods for cash and pay the proceeds over to the mortgagee, the funds become at once the funds of the mortgagee, and the law applies the same upon the mortgagee's indebtedness, whether the same is ever paid over to the mortgagee or not.

Smith v. Cooper, 27 Hun, 567. Ellsworth v. Phelps, 30 Hun, 646. Potts v. Hart, 99 N. Y. 168. Preston v. Southwick, 42 Hun, 293. Sperry v. Baldwin, 46 Hun, 120.

Where a mortgagor mixes articles covered by a mortgage with those subsequently acquired, so that they cannot be distinguished, such confusion of property does not render the mortgage invalid as to such articles as can be identified.

Caring v. Richmond, 28 Hun, 25.

Where an agreement is made that the mortgagor may sell mortgaged goods, and apply the proceeds, upon the mortgage, a subsequent judgment debtor is entitled to an accounting of such sales, and to have the amount applied to reduce the mortgage debt.

Ellsworth v. Phelps, supra.

A chattel mortgage duly filed, is valid as against a livery stable keeper, for the board of a horse, until after he shall serve the notice required by chapter 498, Laws of 1872.

Jackson v. Kasseall, 30 Hun, 231. See chapter 145, Laws of 1880. See Corning v. Ashley, 21 N. Y. St. Rep. 703.

A chattel mortgage is valid, which provides that the mortgagor of articles purchased, might manufacture such articles, and sell the same, and turn the proceeds over to the mortgagee.

Caring v. Richmond, 22 Hun, 369.

When a purchaser has knowledge of any fact sufficient to put him upon inquiry as to the existence of some right or title in conflict with that he is about to purchase, he is presumed, either to have made the inquiry and ascertained the extent of such prior right, or to have been guilty of a degree of negligence, equally fatal to his claim to be considered a bona fide purchaser. The presumption, however, is a mere inference of fact, and may be repelled by proof that the purchaser failed to discover the prior right, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence on his part.

Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354. Mack v. Phelan, 92 N. Y. 25.

Merger. — A chattel mortgage given as collateral security for the payment of a note, is not merged or extinguished, by a judgment entered upon said note. The debt is not yet satisfied.

The note may have been cancelled, but the debt was not; and until that is done, it seems that all collateral securities.

whether upon real or personal property, should be allowed to stand.

Butler v. Miller, 1 N. Y. 496. Hill v. Beebe, 13 N. Y. 556. Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271.

Nor does it affect the right of the indorsee to enforce the mortgage or deed of trust security, that the note has been merged in a judgment; so long as the judgment remains unsatisfied, the debt is unpaid and the principal remaining, the mortgage lien is not merged, but is transferred from the note to the judgment.

Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U. S. 199. Colebrooke on Collateral Securities, 198.

VII. OF MORTGAGES UPON FIXTURES.

Fixtures are articles which have an existence independent of a freehold and are afterward annexed to, and become a part of it.

Hamilton v. Austin, 36 Hun, 142.

There are several tests that will aid in the determination of the question as to what are fixtures. As to machinery, the tests to be applied are, whether the annexation of the property to the freehold is of a permanent character. Another is adaptability to the use of the freehold.

And yet another, is the intention of the party at the time of making the annexation.

Phœnix Mills v. Miller, 4 N. Y. St. Rep. 787; s. c., 42 Hun, 654. Citing
Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287.
Voorhees v. McGinnis, 48 N. Y. 282.

Mere intention to make an article a fixture, without annexation to the realty, will not make it one; but when such in-

tention does exist in the mind of the owner of the land and of the article, then the slightest affixing will make it a part of the freehold; such intention often becomes the controlling fact in determining the question whether in law, the article in dispute is, or is not, a fixture.

Hart v. Sheldon, 34 Hun, 38.

Between vendor and vendee, the mode of annexation is not the controlling test. The purpose of the annexation, and the intent with which it was made, is, in such cases, the most important consideration. The permanency of the attachment does not depend so much upon the degree of physical force with which the thing is attached, as upon the motive and intention of the party in attaching it. If the article is attached for temporary use, with the intention of removing it, a mortgagee cannot interfere with its removal by the mortgagor.

If it is placed there for the permanent improvement of the freehold, he may.

McRea v. Central Nat. Bank of Troy, 66 N. Y. 495.

The courts of this State accord great efficiency to a mortgagor's agreement, that articles which by attachment would become fixtures, shall remain chattels so as to give effect to a chattel mortgage of them, as against subsequent mortgagees and purchasers of the land. They even hold that a chattel mortgage executed in view that the chattels are about to be annexed to the realty, is sufficient evidence of the intention and agreement of the parties, that they are to retain their character as personal property.

> Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344. Sisson v. Hibbard, 75 N. Y. 542. Kinsey v. Bailey, 9 Hun, 452.

If a chattel mortgage be executed before the mortgage on the land, the mortgagee of the land having notice of the prior incumbrance, the act of the parties in treating the property as personal, would as between them, make it so.

Griffin v. Allen, not reported, but cited in Clinton's Digest.

Where an engine was built for a mill, and before it left the owner's shop, a mortgage was taken on it, with a stipulation that it might be removed at any time, it was held that the engine continued to be personal property, as against a previous mortgage of the land.

Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377.

In the case of *Tifft* v. *Horton*, plaintiff sold to B. an engine and boiler to be put up in an elevator owned by the latter. Notes were given for a portion of the purchasemoney, secured by a chattel mortgage upon the property sold, executed before delivery, which mortgage contained a clause stating that the engine and boiler should be and remain personal property until the notes were paid, notwithstanding the manner in which they should be placed in the elevator; and in case of failure to pay, plaintiff was authorized to enter the elevator and remove them. They were placed upon a foundation outside of the elevator and an engine house built over them. Upon foreclosure of mortgages upon the premises executed before this purchase, defendant became the purchaser.

The notes not being paid at maturity, plaintiff demanded the engine and boiler, and upon refusal of defendant to deliver, brought this action for conversion. It was stipulated between the parties that the sale on foreclosure should not, in any manner, change the legal rights of the plaintiff.

Held, that defendant acquired no lien on the property in question by virtue of the mortgage, and that plaintiff was entitled to recover.

If personal property, such as machinery already subject to a chattel mortgage, be affixed to the realty, with the assent of the mortgagee, it becomes a question whether the chattel mortgage lien is lost as against an existing mortgagee of the realty, or as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees of the realty, or creditors who subsequently obtain liens upon it. The intention and agreement of the parties has much to do with the determination of the question, whether chattels annexed to the realty retain their character as personal property.

Sheldon v. Edwards, 35 N. Y. 279. Potter v. Cromwell, 40 N. Y. 287.

In the case of Sisson v. Hibbard, supra, an engine and boiler were sold to one H., the vendors taking thereon a chattel mortgage to secure the purchase-price. At the time of the execution of the mortgage, it was mutually agreed that the mortgage should be valid, notwithstanding any annexation to the premises. Default having been made in the payment of the mortgage, H. re-transferred the engine and boiler to the vendors; but they permitted the same to remain on the premises. The premises were sold upon an execution against H.; it was held, that the engine and boiler remained personal property.

Machinery of a cotton mill, merely fastened to the floor by nails or screws, or held in position by cleats, to keep it in position is not a part of the realty, and would pass by a chattel mortgage.

> Godard v. Gould, 14 Barb. 662. McEntee v. Scott, 2 Thompson & Cook, 284.

A less stringent rule obtains between landlord and tenant than between grantor and grantee. The law presumes in the case of a tenant, that his interest is temporary only, and that he affixes only for his own enjoyment during his term. and not to enhance the value of the estate; hence it permits annexations made by him to be detached during his term, if done without injury to the freehold, and in agreement with known usages.

Livingston v. Sulzer, 19 Hun, 380. Tifft v. Horton, supra.

Where chattels are annexed to the real estate, with the intent that they shall not thereby become a part of the free-hold, as a general rule, such intent will control; to preserve their character as personalty, a concurrent intent on the part of a prior mortgagee of the real estate is not necessary, and neither a prior or a subsequent mortgagee of the land can claim as subject to the lien of his mortgage, chattels brought on or affixed to the land under an agreement between the owner of the fee and the owner of the chattels, that the character of the latter as personal property is not to be changed, and that they are subject to a right of the owner to remove them.

Tifft v. Horton, supra.

The owner of land may reimpress the character of personalty on chattels, which by annexation to the land have become fixtures, according to the ordinary rule, provided only that they have not been so incorporated, as to lose their identity; the reconversion does not interfere with the rights of creditors or third persons.

Tyson v. Post, 108 N. Y. 221.

But by agreement for the purpose of protecting the rights of vendors of personalty, or of creditors, chattels may retain their character as chattels, notwithstanding their annexation to the land in such a way, as in the absence of an agreement, would constitute them fixtures.

Ibid.

Chairs fastened to a floor, by iron screws 2½ inches in length, are not deprived of their character as personal prop-

erty as between the parties, and a mortgage given thereon to secure the manufacturer is valid.

Metropolitan Concert Co. v. Sperry, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 342; s. c., 44 Hun, 630. Citing Husted v. Ingraham, 75 N. Y. 251.

Looms in a woolen factory connected with the motive power by leather bands, and not otherwise annexed to the building, than by screws holding them to the floor, which keep them steady while working, and which could be removed without injury to the freehold, are chattels.

Murdock v. Gifford, 18 N. Y. 28.

The question of fixtures is generally one of intention.

McLaughlin v. Lester, 4 N. Y. St. Rep. 852; s. c., 42 Hun, 657.

A mortgage executed upon real estate, which premises were used as a flouring mill, and which covered, "appendages of every description now used in and about the same," *held*, that certain articles in the mill, viz.: weighing scales, scoops, mill picks, and a small hand cornsheller, were covered by the mortgage under the term *appendages*.

Miller v. Hart, 32 Hun, 639.

VIII. HOW AND BY WHOM THE VALIDITY MAY BE CONTESTED.

If an execution creditor desires to contest the validity of a mortgage, he may treat it as a nullity, and indemnify the sheriff and let the mortgagee bring an action against the sheriff for the value of the property, or to reclaim its possession, and in such action the mortgagee will succeed in case the mortgage is declared to be fraudulent. Rinchey v. Stryker (Ct. App.), 26 How. 75. Delaware v. Ensign, 21 Barb. 85. Frost v. Mott, 34 N. Y. 452.

An assignee in bankruptcy may assert the invalidity of a mortgage, and by reason of omission to file, or by reason of the mortgagor's being allowed to deal with it.

Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214.

An action to set aside a mortgage as fraudulent, may be maintained by a subsequent mortgagee of the same property, and in such an action, either legal or equitable relief may be given as the proofs on the trial, and the allegations in the complaint demand.

Anderson v. Hunn, 5 Hun, 79.

So also a partner, has such a lien on the partnership property, as entitles him to a judgment setting aside fraudulent sales or incumbrances made by his copartner.

Wade v. Rusher, 4 Bosw. 537.

A bona fide purchaser of mortgaged property, without notice of the lien, may also show its fraudulent character.

Thomas on Mortgages, 490.

A plaintiff in a judgment and execution, who purchases merely the interests of the defendants in the property, sold on the execution, is not estopped from questioning the validity of a prior chattel mortgage given by the defendants on such property.

Carpenter v. Simmons, 28 How. 12.

The general creditors of a mortgagor of chattels, have no right to assail a mortgage, or other conveyance of property made by him, as invalid, until they have secured a lien thereon by levy under a judgment and execution, or by some other method acquired a lcgal or equitable interest in the property.

> Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424. Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y. 123. Sullivan v. Miller, 106 N. Y. 641.

A creditor who seeks to impeach a chattel mortgage, upon the ground of the continuance in possession of the mortgagor, is bound to show he was a creditor during the time that the possession continued.

Williston v. Jones, 6 Duer, 504.

An action may be maintained to set aside a chattel mortgage as fraudulent, by an assignee for the benefit of creditors or other trustee.

Hangen v. Hachmeister, 53 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 533. Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424. Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y. 123.

A purchaser of property under an execution, may attack a previous usurious lien thereon.

Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Hill, 3 Hun, 577. Citing Cavan v. Kelly, 3 Alb. L. J. 373. Dix v. Van Wyck, 2 Hill, 522. Thompson v. Van Vetchen, 27 N. Y. 568.

Purchasers under an execution sale, may set up any defense to a lien prior to that under which the execution sale was had.

Nichols v. Iremonger, 3 Hun, 609.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE DISPOSITION AND SALE OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY.

I. Under execution.

III. By the mortgagor's agent.

II. By the mortgagor.

IV. By the mortgagee.

I. Under Execution.

It is well settled, that under our statutes, a mortgagor of goods has no property in them subject to levy and sale on execution, unless he has a right to the possession for a definite time; and that a mortgagor in possession of the chattels after forfeiture, and when the mortgagee may take possession at his pleasure, has no right which is subject to sale on execution. It is equally well settled that a mortgagor of chattels in possession with the right of possession for a definite period, has an interest which may be sold on execution.

Goulet v. Asseler, 22 N. Y. 228. Hall v. Samson, 19 How, 481. Rodman v. Hendricks, 1 Sandf. 32.

Where, by the terms of a chattel mortgage, the mortgagee has an immediate right of possession, the property cannot be levied upon and sold under an execution against the mortgagor. A mere chose in action, which, unless united to a right of possession for a definite period, can never be the subject of a levy and sale under execution.

Hull v. Carnley, 11 N. Y. 501.

A mortgage of personal property, in all cases, vests the legal title in the mortgagee, and when by the terms of the

mortgage, he has an immediate right to the possession, although the possession may not have been changed, he is, in law, the absolute owner; and it is merely as his bailee, and by his sufferance, that the mortgagor retains the possession.

The latter has no interest that is bound by or can be sold under execution.

Stewart v. Slater, 6 Duer, 96.

While personal property, covered by a chattel mortgage, remains in the possession of the mortgagor, and its conditions are unbroken, the mortgagor's interest is subject to levy and sale upon execution, and the purchaser obtains the same title as that of which the mortgagor was possessed.

Hamill v. Gillispie, 48 N. Y. 556.

Where a chattel mortgage contains a provision authorizing the mortgage at any time before default, if he should deem himself insecure, to take possession and sell, this gives the mortgagor the right of possession in the meantime, and until the mortgagee exercises such power, the right of possession remains in the mortgagor, and his right, title and interest, may be levied upon by virtue of an attachment; but if before judgment, in the attachment suit, the mortgagor exercises his right of taking possession, the possessory right of the mortgagor terminates, and the authority of the sheriff ends with the interest of the debtor. The property cannot be subsequently sold under an execution in the attachment suit.

Hall v. Samson, 35 N. Y. 274. Reversing 23 How. 84.
Rich v. Milk, 20 Barb. 616.
Chadwick v. Lamb, 29 How. 518.

The interest of a mortgagor in possession, under a chattel mortgage payable on demand, until such demand is made, is to be deemed an interest for a definite period, and, therefore, subject to a levy under execution against such mortgagor.

Livor v. Orser, 5 Duer, 501.
Hathaway v. Brayman, 42 N. Y. 322.
Lyman v. Bowe, 66 How. 481; s. c., 5 N. Y. Civ. Pro. Rep. 157.

The interest of a mortgagor of personal property, even before forfeiture, where he has not the right of possession for a definite period, is but a right of redemption merely, which is not the subject of levy and sale upon execution.

Mattison v. Baucus, 1 N. Y. 295.

The possessory right, before default, can be sold under attachment as well as under execution.

Fairbanks v. Bloomfield, 5 Duer, 434.

It is well settled, that after a mortgagee of chattels has taken possession of the mortgaged property, by virtue of a power in the mortgage, the mortgagor has no remaining interest in it which can be seized and sold under execution, although the mortgage debt is not due.

> Nichols v. Mead, 2 Lans. 223. Hale v. Sweet, 40 N. Y. 103. Porter v. Parmley, 52 N. Y. 188. Powers v. Elias, 1 N. Y. St. Rep. 248.

A sale by the sheriff of the entire property, without mentioning any mortgage, conveys a title subject to the mortgage, if the mortgage be a valid lien.

Porter v. Parmley, supra. White v. Cole, 24 Wend. 117.

Where one bids off property of a judgment debtor, at sheriff's sale, embraced in a chattel mortgage previously exe-

cuted by such debtor, the sale being subject to such mortgage, and subsequently purchases and takes an assignment of the mortgage, this will not operate as a payment of the mortgage, and if the mortgage has not been paid or foreclosed, nor any power contained in it exercised at the time of its transfer, it will be a valid, subsisting, unsatisfied mortgage, and no fraud can be imputed to the assignee in representing and claiming that it is unpaid.

Brown v. Rich, 40 Barb. 28.

Property in the possession of the mortgagor, even after default, may be levied upon and sold under a tax warrant.

Hersee v. Porter, 100 N. Y. 403.

In an action against a sheriff, for goods taken on execution, where the plaintiff claimed under a prior mortgage executed by the judgment debtor, *held*, that the sheriff might show the mortgage as usurious as a defense to the action.

Dix v. Van Wyck, 2 Hill, 572.

Upon default of the mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt, the mortgagee becomes the absolute owner of the mortgaged chattels, and in the absence of any special agreement changing the relation, the possession of the mortgagor after that time is that of mere naked bailee.

Hersee v. Porter, 100 N. Y. 408.

A sheriff taking possession of mortgaged chattels under execution, must sell the same in mass, and subject to the lien; the property cannot be sold and scattered all over the country in hostility to the lien of the mortgage.

Manning v. Monaghan, 23 N. Y. 545.

In this case, Comstock, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The property was dispersed in every direction as effectually beyond the plaintiff's reach, as if it had been thrown into the sea. It would seem too plain for discussion that all persons knowingly instrumental in the wrong, ought to be answerable for every wrong attended with loss and damage. The existence of a mortgage upon personal estate may not prevent creditors from seizing and selling it to satisfy their just demands. But an attempt to sell in contravention of the lien, is an attempt to do a wrong and inflict a loss."

"An actual injury may or may not result, according to the circumstances. If it does result, the logical consequence is, that an action will lie founded on the special facts." In this case the mortgage covered certain household furniture. A receiver was appointed under a judgment against the mortgagor, who caused the mortgaged goods to be sold at auction. The goods were bid off by different persons, in parcels, and scattered beyond the reach of the mortgagee.

Where personal property consisting of several articles is sold on fi. fa., subject to a chattel mortgage, the whole ought to be sold in one parcel.

Tifft v. Barton, 4 Denio, 171.

II. BY THE MORTGAGOR.

Section 571 of the Penal Code provides as follows:

"A person who, having theretofore executed a mortgage of personal property, or any instrument intended to operate as such, sells, assigns, exchanges, secrets or otherwise disposes of any part of the property, upon which the mortgage or other instrument is at the time a lien, with intent thereby to defraud the mortgagee, or a purchaser thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor."

3 Revised Statutes, 978, chapter 73. Laws of 1871, chapter 77. While mortgaged property remains in the possession of the mortgagor, and the condition of the mortgage is unbroken, he has an interest subject to his control and disposition.

He can sell and deliver such title as remains in him.

The purchaser will, in that case, take title subject to the lien of the mortgage, whether its existence was ascertained by the purchaser or not, or whether the mortgagor mentions or omitted to mention it.

Hamill v. Gillespie, 48 N. Y. 559.

Where a mortgagor causes the goods, subject to the chattel mortgage, to be sold before it becomes due, in parcels to various purchasers, and delivers them accordingly not subject to the mortgage, but in hostility to it, the auctioneer who makes the sale is liable in damages to the mortgagee.

Tarbel v. Bradley, 7 Abb. N. C. 286.

An agreement that the mortgagor may dispose of the goods for cash and bring the money to the mortgagee, the latter holding the title until such disposition shall be made, may possibly be sincere and without fraud. The law does not, therefore, condemn it absolutely, but submits the question of good faith to the jury.

Ford v. Williams, 24 N. Y. 365.

Where property is left with the mortgagor, and he disposes of it as his own, it is fraudulent.

Divver v. McLaughlin, 2 Wend. 596. McLachlan v. Wright, 3 Wend. 348.

III. By the Morgagor's Agent.

Where the mortgagor of chattels, in possession after default in the payment of the mortgage debt, fraudulently

delivered them to a third person for sale, representing that they were his property, and the third person as agent for the mortgagor, sells the chattels, such third person is liable to the mortgagee for the value thereof, notwithstanding he acted in good faith, believing that the chattels were the property of the mortgagor, and paid the proceeds of the sale which he made, over to the mortgagor, without reward for his services. The agent in a fraudulent disposition of the property of another — not being money or negotiable paper — is liable therefor to the owner, although he acted in good faith, without interest or reward, and in the belief that his principal is the owner.

He who intermeddles with personal property, not his own, must see to it that he is protected by the authority of one who is himself by ownership, or otherwise, clothed with the authority he attempts to confer.

Dudley v. Hawley, 39 N. Y. 441. Citing Anderson v. Nicholas, 5 Bosw. 130. Everett v. Coffin, 6 Wend. 609. Spencer v. Blackman, 6 Wend. 167. Williams v. Merle, 11 Wend. 80.

Whoever deals with an agent, constituted for a special purpose, deals at his peril, when the agent passes the precise limits of his power. If the owner loses his property, or if it is sold or pledged without his consent, by one who has a qualified possession of it for a specific purpose, the owner can follow and claim it in the hands of any person however innocent.

Wooster v. Sherwood, 25 N. Y. 287. Citing 2 Kent's Com. 621.
Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend. 267.
Brown-v. Peabody, 3 Kern. 121.

The purchaser of personal property, upon which there is a valid chattel mortgage, who consumes or sells a part of the property so that what remains does not produce sufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt, may be held personally liable for the deficiency.

Beers v. Waterbury, 8 Bosw. 296.

IV. BY THE MORTGAGEE.

Where a mortgagor of chattels is in default, the mortgagee has a right to take the property into his possession and dispose of it at his pleasure. And if, after forfeiture, the mortgagee sells the property to a third person with the consent of the mortgagor, this will be equivalent to a formal foreclosure of the equity of redemption.

Talman v. Smith, 39 Barb. 390.

Upon default in the payment of a chattel mortgage, the title to the mortgaged property becomes absolute in the mortgagee, and thereafter the mortgagor has only an equity of redemption in such property.

Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N. Y. 18. Judson v. Easton, 58 N. Y. 664. Bragelman v. Daue, 69 N. Y. 69. Noyes v. Wyckoff, 30 Hun, 466. Duffus v. Bangs, 43 Hun, 52. King v. Walbridge, 48 Hun, 470.

To bar such right of redemption, there must be a sale of the mortgaged property, of which the mortgagor has notice

A private sale, without notice, does not bar or foreclose the equity of redemption, notwithstanding the mortgage authorizes a private or public sale of the property.

Ballou v. Cunningham, 4 Lans. 74.

The cases of *Chamberlain* v. *Martin*, 43 Barb. 607, and *Huggins* v. *Fryer*, 1 Lans. 276, hold however, that under

such circumstances, where the mortgage contains what is known as the danger clause, that the mortgagee may take possession of such property before the debt falls due, and sell the same without making a demand for payment, and without giving personal notice of sale to the mortgagor, and that the right of redemption is cut off by such sale.

A mortgagee of chattels whose title has become absolute, is not bound to foreclose his mortgage; to extinguish the equity of redemption, he should do so.

Taylor v. Walter, 34 How. 385. Elder v. Rouse, 15 Wend. 218.

And such equity of redemption can be extinguished only by an action to foreclose, either legal or equitable, or by a sale under the power contained in the mortgage. Such sale must be a fair and *bona fide* sale.

Stoddard v. Denison, 38 How. 301. Porter v. Parmley, 52 N. Y. 187. Cutler v. The James Goold Co., 43 Hun, 516. King v. Van Vleck, 109 N. Y. 367.

The mortgagee may purchase the chattels at such sale.

Hall v. Ditson, 55 How. 19.
Olcott v. Tioga R. R. Co., 27 N. Y. 546.
Edminston v. Brucker, 40 Hun, 256. Citing
Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 62.
Charter v. Stevens, 3 Den. 33.
Patchin v. Pierce, 12 Wend. 61.
Hall v. Ditson, 55 How. 19.
King v. Walbridge, 48 Hun, 470.

Where a mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property, it will, if of sufficient value, be deemed a satisfaction of the debt until the equity is foreclosed.

Stoddard v. Denison, 38 How. 301.

Where the mortgagee sells under a chattel mortgage, property more than sufficient to pay the mortgage debt, bids the same in himself, and takes possession, claiming the property under this title, the mortgagor may elect to treat the entire sale as valid, and to regard the amount for which the property sold in excess of the indebtedness secured, as unpaid purchase money in the hands of the mortgagee.

Davenport v. McChesney, 86 N. Y. 242.

If the debt is payable in installments, and default be made in the payment of one installment only, the title of the mortgagee is as perfect as if default was made in the payment of the whole debt. To entitle the mortgagor to redeem, he must pay or tender the whole debt.

> Halstead v. Swartz, 46 How. 289. Willis v. O'Brien, 3 Jones & Spencer, 537.

The mortgagor, in such case, cannot recover the payments that he has made.

Haynes v. Hart, 42 Barb. 58. Citing Green v. Green, 9 Cow. 46. Battle v. The Rochester City Bank, 3 Comst. 88.

Where the mortgagee of the interest of one tenant in common of a chattel causes the whole chattel to be sold at public sale, by virtue of his mortgage, one who purchases and takes possession of the chattel at such sale, with notice of the rights of the other tenant in common, is liable to him in an action for the conversion for his interest therein.

Van Doren v. Balty, 11 Hun, 239.

Where a mortgage, given to secure the purchase-price, contains a clause that the property shall remain in the possession of the mortgagor until default, but on default, or in case the mortgagor shall attempt to remove or dispose of

the property, the mortgagee may take possession and sell it, upon the mortgagor's removing the property from the county, although the time for payment has not yet expired.

Russell v. Butterfield, 21 Wend. 300.

An action in equity lies to foreclose a chattel mortgage.

Briggs v. Oliver, 68 N. Y. 336.

And such right of action has not been taken away by the Code of Civil Procedure.

Fiero's Special Actions, 409. Code of Civil Procedure, section 1741.

Where one condition of a mortgage was, that if the mortgagor should at any time, before the date of payment, suffer any attachment, or other process, to be issued against him, that then the whole amount should become instantly due and payable; *held*, that when such process was issued, the mortgage became due and payable at once, and the mortgagee could take the property from the sheriff.

Bryan v. Smith, 13 Daly, 332.

Where a mortgagee of chattels, upon a public sale, makes reasonable and fair efforts to sell the property for a good price, and through the acts, statements and notices of the mortgagor at the time of the sale, the effect of which is to discourage bidding, and the same does not bring a full price, a court of equity will not set aside the sale on the application of the mortgagor.

Hall v. Ditson, 55 How. 19.

It is unnecessary that a chattel mortgage should state that non-payment should work a forfeiture. This is an incident of the relationship between the parties, and a mortgagor must pay or else his rights at law are terminated.

Bragelman v. Daue, 69 N. Y. 69.

But where the mortgagee, after forfeiture, receives payment of his debt, it is a waiver of the forfeiture, and his title to the property is extinguished.

West v. Crary, 47 N. Y. 423.

A purchaser on sale under a chattel mortgage, is not concluded by a subsequent adjudication, in an action against the mortgager and mortgage, to which he was not made a party, that the mortgage was fraudulently made.

Where the purchase was in good faith, the title of the purchaser is not affected by the fact that the mortgage was executed in pursuance of a conspiracy between the mortgagor and mortgagee, to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of the former.

Zoeller v. Riley, 100 N. Y. 102.

An injunction lies, at the suit of a mortgagor of chattels, with the reservation of possession for a certain time, to prevent the mortgagee from taking possession before the time limited.

Ford v. Ransom, 8 Abb. (N. S.) 416.

If, after sale, there remains a surplus, such surplus belongs to the mortgagor.

Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494.

If there be a deficiency, the mortgagee may maintain an action for such deficiency.

Case v. Boughton, 11 Wend. 106.

The remedy by sale, under the power in the mortgage, without resort to judicial proceedings, is in most cases a more speedy and effectual means of extinguishing the equity of redemption, and has to a great extent superseded a resort to an action of foreclosure; but the right to foreclose by action has not been taken away.

Briggs v. Oliver, 68 N. Y. 336.

There is no definite course of practice laid down in the cases, or by statute, and in the absence of any other guide, it would be safe to adopt the method of sale and of giving notice prescribed by statute for sales of goods and chattels upon execution. This would involve the fastening up of written or printed notices of the sale, in three public places of the town where such sale is to be had, specifying the time and place where the same is intended to be had, at least six days previous to such time. One of these notices should also be delivered to the mortgagor personally, or left at his place of residence. An advertisement of the notice in a newspaper may or may not be made, according to the special circumstances of each case; and it should be made, if, in the judgment of the mortgagee, the probability of a larger attendance and of better prices would render the incurring of the expense prudent or desirable for the interests of all concerned. In general, it may be remarked that in small towns, the posting of the notices will afford sufficient publicity, while in large cities, chattels of any considerable value, should not be sold without advertising the notice of sale in one of the public prints.

Thomas on Mortgages, 453.

One whose property is about to be sold by virtue of a chattel mortgage, may lawfully agree with another, that the latter shall bid a certain amount for the property, and if he becomes the purchaser, shall give the mortgagor an undivided interest therein for the benefit of the members of his family, on his paying an equal share of the purchase-money.

Such an agreement is neither a fraud upon creditors, nor against public policy.

Baime v. Drew, 4 Den. 287.

Upon a sale of property by virtue of a chattel mortgage, the proceeding is notice to the public, that the mortgagee is selling, not his own title to the property, but that which he has acquired through the mortgage, and no warranty of title of the property so sold, is to be implied against the mortgagee.

Sheppard v. Earles, 13 Hun, 651.

Article second, of title 2, of chapter 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides a simple, cheap and speedy method of foreclosing a chattel mortgage. It is much more simple than an equitable action, but the right to bring an action in equity is fully preserved in said article. The provisions of the article are as follows:

"§ 1737. An action may be maintained to foreclose a lien upon a chattel, for a sum of money in any case where such a lien exists at the commencement of the action. The action may be brought in any court of record, or not of record, which would have jurisdiction to render a judgment in an action founded upon a contract for a sum equal to the amount of the lien."

"§ 1738. Where the action is brought in the Supreme Court, a Superior City Court, the Marine Court of the city of New York, or a County Court, if the plaintiff is not in possession of the chattel, a warrant may be granted by the court, or a judge thereof, commanding the sheriff to seize the chattel, and safely keep it to abide the final judgment in the action. The provisions, of title third of chapter seventh, of this act apply to such a warrant, and to the proceedings to procure it and after it has been issued, as if it was a warrant of attachment, except as otherwise expressly prescribed in this article."

"§ 1739. In an action brought in a court specified in the last section, final judgment, in favor of the plaintiff must specify the amount of the lien, and direct a sale of the chattels to satisfy the same and the costs, if any, by a referee appointed thereby, or an officer designated therein, in like manner as where a sheriff sells personal property by virtue of an execution; and the application by him of the proceeds of the sale, less his fees and expenses, to the payment of the amount of the lien, and the costs of the action."

"It must also provide for the payment of the surplus to the owner of the chattel, and for the safe keeping of the surplus, if necessary, until it is claimed by him. If a defendant, upon whom the summons is personally served, is liable for the amount of the lien, or for any part thereof, it may also award payment accordingly."

"§ 1740. Where the action is brought in a court, other than one of those specified in the last section but one, if the plaintiff is not in possession of the chattel, a warrant, commanding the proper officer to seize the chattel, and, safely keep it to abide the judgment, may be issued, in like manner as a warrant of attachment may be issued in an action founded upon a contract, brought in the same court; and the provisions of law, applicable to a warrant of attachment, issued out of that court, apply to a warrant, issued as prescribed in this section, and to the proceedings to procure it, and after it has been issued; except as otherwise specified in the judgment."

"A judgment in favor of the plaintiff, in such an action, must correspond to a judgment, rendered as prescribed in the last section, except that it must direct the sale of the chattel by an officer to whom an execution, issued out of the court, may be directed; and the payment of the surplus, if its safe-keeping is necessary, to the county treasurer, for the benefit of the owner."

"§ 1741. This article does not affect any existing right or remedy to foreclose or satisfy a lien upon a chattel, without

action; and it does not apply to a case, where another mode of enforcing a lien upon a chattel is specially prescribed by law."

It is immaterial, since the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether the plaintiff names his action as equitable or legal. The court will grant him such relief as the allegations in the complaint and the proofs on the trial demand.

King v. Van Vleck, 109 N. Y. 363.

OF TAKING POSSESSION UNDER THE DANGER CLAUSE.

The danger clause is for the benefit of the mortgagee, and authorizes possession when there was default, or when in their judgment they deemed it best for the safety of their demand; and no proof is required to show that they so consider themselves unsafe, as the legal presumption would be that such was the fact, when possession was taken before it was due.

Smith v. Post, 1 Hun, 518.

In the case of Allen v. Vose, 34 Hun, 57, a chattel mortgage was given upon a growing crop of wheat and a mare, which provided, "that in case the said mortgagee shall at any time deem himself unsafe, it shall be lawful for him to take possession of the said property, and to sell the same at public or private sale, previous to the time above mentioned, for the payment of said debt, applying the proceeds upon the mortgage after deducting all expenses of sale and keeping said property." On July 17, the crop having proved to be a failure, the mortgagor sold his interest therein to the defendant for \$10, which was applied on the debt. The mortgage was given for \$100. The mare was worth not more than \$50. On July 18, the mortgagee took possession of, and sold the mare, under the above-mentioned clause. Held, that he had reasonable cause to deem himself unsafe, and was justified in acting as he did.

The right of the mortgagee to take possession of the mortgaged property under such a clause, considered by Haight, J., and the cases bearing thereon collated.

CHAPTER V.

I. Assignment.

III. Satisfaction.

II. Payment.

IV. Redemption.

ASSIGNMENT.

A chattel mortgage may be assigned, and if such assignment include the debt secured thereby, it passes all the mortgagee's interest in the mortgaged property. The debt is the principal thing, and the mortgage an incident only.

An assignment of the debt carries the mortgage, and an assignment of the mortgage without the debt, is a nullity.

Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80. Johnson v. Hart, 3 Johns. Cas. 322. Gould v. Marsh, 1 Hun, 566. Freeman v. Auld, 44 N. Y. 57. Bloomingdale v. Bowman, 21 N. Y. St. Rep. 247.

After default, the mortgagee is the legal owner, and can make a valid transfer of the property itself. If, therefore, the mortgagee should assign the mortgage, retaining the debt, his assignee would still acquire his rights in the mortgaged property.

Campbell v. Birch, 60 N. Y. 215.

The assignment of any particular claim, is considered an equitable assignment of all securities held by the assignor to assure it. Thus the assignment of a debt by whatever form of transfer, carries with it any bill or note by which it is secured, and the converse of the proposition is equally true, that the transfer by endorsement or assignment of a bill or note, carries with it all securities for its payment, whether a mortgage or otherwise.

Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 6or.

A transfer of a chattel mortgage, merely by way of collateral security for the payment of a debt, is a pledge thereof, and need not be recorded; and notwithstanding such pledge, the pledgor may afterward assign the mortgage to a third person, who may enforce it by a sale of the goods, subject, however, to the lien of the pledgee.

Hawkins v. Kelly, 1 Robt. 160; s. c., 1 Abb. (N. S.) 32.

The provisions of the statutes relative to the filing of chattel mortgages, do not apply to assignments of them.

The latter are not required to be filed, as against an execution creditor of the mortgagee. Although a mortgagor, after the mortgage had been assigned by the mortgagee to a third person, as security for a debt due from the mortgagee to such third person, conveys without the knowledge or consent of such third party, by bill of sale, the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, which bill of sale is put on record, and the assignment is not recorded, yet, the mortgage in point of law is not cancelled by giving the bill of sale, as against the assignee of the mortgage. The only title the mortgagee acquires in such case, is the equity of redemption.

Baxter v. Gilbert, 12 Abb. Pr. Rep. 97.

A bona fide purchaser, before maturity, of a promissory note, secured by a chattel mortgage, takes the mortgage as

he takes the note, free from any equities which existed in favor of third parties, while it was held by the mortgagee.

Gould v. Marsh, 1 Hun, 566. Citing Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall, 271.

But it is otherwise, where the mortgage is not given to secure a negotiable instrument, and generally an assignee will take the mortgage, subject to all the equities existing at the time of the assignment, in favor of the debtor against the assignor. The assignee takes the exact position of his vendor.

Hartley v. Tatham, 1 Keyes, 222. Bush v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. Schafer v. Reilly, 50 N. Y. 61. Gould v. Marsh, supra.

If the mortgagee had notice of a prior unrecorded mortgage, the assignee takes his place, and is chargeable with the notice which the mortgagee had.

Decker v. Boice, 83 N. Y. 215.

II. PAYMENT.

In general, the payment of the debt for the security of which a chattel mortgage is given, revests the title in the mortgagor, and operates as a discharge of the mortgage.

Thompson v. Van Vechten, 27 N. Y. 568.

Where a mortgagee of personal property, after forfeiture, receives payment of his debt, it is a waiver of the forfeiture, and the mortgagee's title is extinguished.

West v. Crary, 47 N. Y. 423. Porter v. Parmley, 52 N. Y. 188. The buyer of a chattel which was mortgaged, paid to the mortgagee part of the purchase money, with the understanding that he should relinquish his claim under the mortgage, and although the mortgagee gave no formal discharge, it was held that the mortgagee could not afterward enforce his claim against the chattel.

Rickerson v. Raeder, 4 Abb. Ct. of App. Dec. 60.

Where a chattel mortgage is given to secure the surety and endorser of the mortgagor's note, and such note, after being protested, is paid out of the proceeds of a new note made by the mortgagor and endorsed by the mortgagee for that express purpose, the mortgage is not discharged by the payment of the original note, but continues in force as a security to the mortgagee for the amount of the second note.

In such case, it is proper to show that the payment of the original note with the proceeds of the second, was not designed to extinguish the mortgage.

Gregory v. Thomas, 20 Wend. 17. Chapman v. Jenkins, 31 Barb. 164. Butler v. Miller, 1 N. Y. 500. Hill v. Beebe, 13 N. Y. 556.

But if a chattel mortgage be given to secure a debt, which by its terms extends the time of payment, a surety is by such act discharged.

Kane v. Cortesy, 100 N. Y. 132.

A mortgagee is not bound to foreclose his mortgage. He may take and retain the mortgaged property, and the mortgagee's taking and retaining possession in such case, constitutes payment of the mortgage debt.

Case v. Boughton, 11 Wend. 106.

So a conversion of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee to his own use, is a payment of the debt pro tanto.

Clark v. Griffith, 2 Bosw. 558.

If a purchaser at an execution sale, pay off a chattel mortgage thereon, it is extinguished, and he cannot enforce it against any other property than that which he purchases, although other property is embraced in the mortgage.

Brown v. Rich, 40 Barb. 28.

III. SATISFACTION.

Chapter 171 of the Laws of 1879 provides as follows:

"§ I. Whenever any mortgagor, or any person obtaining title to mortgaged property, shall present to any recorder, county or town clerk, in whose office a chattel mortgage executed by said mortgagor on such property may be filed, a certificate from the mortgagee therein named, or the holder or owner thereof, that such mortgage is paid or satisfied, it shall be the duty of such recorder, or either of the clerks above mentioned, to file such certificate in his office, and discharge such mortgage by writing in the book kept by such recorder or either of such clerks, and opposite the entry therein of such mortgage, the word 'discharged,' with the date thereof."

This certificate, it is believed, need not be acknowledged, in order to be filed.

Maxwell v. Inman, 42 Hun, 267.

Where the mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property, it will, if of sufficient value, be deemed a satisfaction of the debt, until the equity is foreclosed.

Stoddard v. Denison, 38 How. 296.

Where, upon a mortgage becoming due, the mortgagor, under an agreement with the mortgagee, delivered the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, who thereupon gave to the mortgagor, under such an agreement, a "satisfaction-piece" of the mortgage, which was filed; held, that an action to cancel such satisfaction so as to restore the mortgage to its priority over mortgages that had been subsequently given, but before the satisfaction * * * was proper, and could be maintained.

Lambert v. Leland, 2 Sweeny, 218.

III. REDEMPTION.

Until foreclosure and sale, either by action or under the power contained in the mortgage, the mortgagor has an equity of redemption.

Noyes v. Wyckoff, 30 Hun, 466. Duffus v. Bangs, 43 Hun, 52. King v. Walbridge, 48 Hun, 470. Cutler v. The James Goold Co., 43 Hun, 516. King v. Van Vleck, 109 N. Y. 367.

A mortgagor cannot debar himself of his right to redeem, by a written agreement made at the time of the execution of the mortgage, to give up all claim to the property upon default.

> Simon v. Schmidt, 41 Hun, 318. Buneclaugh v. Poolman, 3 Daly, 236.

The action to redeem need not be brought in equity. An action for money had and received is proper.

King v. Van Vleck, supra.

In an action for redemption of personal property, the plaintiff may recover the rents and profits, or what is the

same thing, for the use of it, during the time he is deprived of such use.

Pratt v. Stiles, 17 How. 211. Mickles v. Dillaye, 17 N. Y. 84. Cutler v. The James Goold Co., supra.

In that case, defendant sold a carriage to the plaintiff, taking in part payment, several notes payable monthly, and a chattel mortgage upon the carriage to secure their payment, which provided that defendants might take the property and sell the same at such time as they should see fit.

At a time when there was no default in the payment of any of the notes, defendants attempted to seize the carriage, when plaintiff tendered the amount due upon all the remaining notes, attaching as a condition that such notes should be returned to him. Held, that the plaintiff had a right to redeem, and that the fact that his notes were negotiable and not due, justified requiring their return as a condition of the tender, and that he could maintain an action for the redemption of the property, in which the court might award a judgment for its value, upon proof that it had subsequently been sold.

It may be stated generally, that a mortgagor must redeem within a reasonable time. What constitutes such reasonable time must be determined by a court of equity, or statute of limitations specially applicable to the case.

Pratt v. Stiles, 17 How. Pr. 211.

An attaching creditor may redeem as soon as his attachment or execution becomes a lien, and an execution creditor has the same right as soon as he has acquired a lien by levy of his execution.

Hinman v. Judson, 13 Barb. 629.

One to whom the mortgaged property is bequeathed by will can redeem.

King v. Van Vleck, 109 N. Y. 367.

The mortgagor, or those standing in his place, has the right to redeem.

Hinman v. Judson, supra.

CHAPTER VI.

OF MORTGAGES ON SHIPS AND VESSELS.

I. Filing and recording. IV. Of priority between liens and II. Of liens for repairs and supplies. mortgages.

III. Of validity. V. Of bottomry and respondentia.

I. FILING AND RECORDING.

The United States statute (Act of July 29, 1850) provides as follows:

"SECTION t. No bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance of any vessel of the United States shall be valid against any person other than the grantor or mortgagor, his heirs and devisees, and persons having actual notice thereof, unless such bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance, is recorded in the office of the collector of customs where such vessel is registered or enrolled. The lien by bottomry on any vessel created during her voyage by a loan of money or materials necessary to repair or enable her to prosecute a voyage, shall not, however, lose its priority, or be in any way affected by the provisions of this section.

"The collectors of the customs shall record all such bills of sale, mortgages, hypothecations or conveyances, and also all certificates for discharging and cancelling any such conveyances in books to be kept for that purpose in the order of their reception, noting in such books and also on the bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation or conveyance, the time when the same was received, and shall certify on the bill of sale, mortgage or hypothecation, or conveyance or certificate of discharge or cancellation, the number of the book and page where recorded; but no bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, conveyance or discharge of mortgage or other incumbrance of any vessel, shall be recorded, unless the same is duly acknowledged before a notary public or other officer authorized to take acknowledgment of deeds. The collectors of the customs shall keep an index of such records, inserting alphabetically the names of the vendor or mortgagor, and of the purchaser or mortgagee, and shall permit such index and books of records to be inspected during office hours, under such reasonable regulations as they may establish; and shall, when required, furnish to any person a certificate, setting forth the names of the owners of any. vessel registered or enrolled, the parts or proportions owned by each, if inserted in the register or enrollment, and also the material facts of any existing bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation or other incumbrance upon such vessel, recorded since the issuing of the last register or enrollment, namely, the date, amount of such incumbrance, and from and to whom or in whose favor made."

U. S. Revised Statutes, §§ 4192-4194.

Vessels of the United States, within the meaning of the above statute, are such as have been built in the United States and belong wholly to citizens of the United States, and have been registered as required by statute, or if coasting vessels, such as have been enrolled and licensed as such.

Act of Congress, February 18, 1793, § 1.

In the case of a coasting vessel, she must be both enrolled and licensed, to make her a vessel of the United States.

Best v. Staple, 61 N. Y. 71.

A canal boat, or scow, is not a vessel of the United States, within the meaning of the act relating to the recording of mortgages.

Hicks v. Williams, 17 Barb. 523.

It has been held in Massachusetts (5 Allen, 280) that a pleasure yacht is not within the recording act.

A mortgage of a registered vessel need not be recorded in pursuance of any State statute, in order to give the mortgage a preference over a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, if it be duly recorded according to the statute of the United States, in the office of the collector of the home port of the vessel.

The statute of the United States excludes all State legislation upon the subject, whether such legislation be prior or subsequent to the United States statute.

White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall. 646.

Aldrich v. Ætna Co., 8 Wall. 491. Reversing s. c., 26 N. Y. 92, and overruling in part

Thompson v. Van Vechten, 27 N. Y. 568.

Folger v. Weber, 16 Hun, 512.

Best v. Staple, 61 N. Y. 71.

"Previous to the act of 1850, providing for the recording of bills of sale, and mortgages of vessels, they were required to be filed by the law of many of the States, in the clerk's office or some place of public deposit in the town or city where the vendor or mortgagor resided, in order to protect the interest of the vendee, or mortgagee, against subsequent bona fide purchasers or mortgagees, and this

practice continued in many places after the passage of the act of 1850 for abundant caution, on account of a doubt as to the effect that would, or might be given to it, as a recording act from the very imperfect provisions of the law. There can be no doubt, however, but that the system of recording these instruments in the collector's office at the home port of the vessel form a much readier opportunity to persons dealing in this species of property to obtain a knowledge of the condition of the title, than by the former mode under the State law."

Nelson, J., in White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall. 646.

The New York State statute, chapter 412 of the Laws of 1864, provides:

- "Section 1. Hereafter, any person having any lien or incumbrance on any canal boat, steam tug, scow or other craft, navigating the canals of this State, by a chattel mortgage, shall file the same, or a true copy thereof, in the office of the auditor of the canal department.
- "§ 2. Hereafter, every mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage of any canal boat, steam tug, scow or other craft navigating the canals of this State, together with the appurtenances belonging thereto, and used in navigating such craft hereafter made, which shall not be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and followed by an actual and continued change of possession of the property mortgaged, shall be absolutely void as against the creditors of the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage or a true copy thereof shall be filed as directed in the previous section of this act.
- "§ 3. Every mortgage filed in pursuance of this act shall cease to be valid as against the creditors of the person making the same, or against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in good faith, after the expiration of one year from the filing thereof, unless within thirty days next preceding

the expiration of the said term of one year, a true copy of such mortgage, together with a statement exhibiting the interest of the mortgagee in the property thereby claimed by him by virtue thereof, shall be again filed as directed in the first section of this act."

A chattel mortgage on a canal boat not accompanied by an immediate delivery, and followed by an actual and continued change of possession, is absolutely void against creditors of the mortgagor, unless it be filed as provided by chapter 412, Laws of 1864, notwithstanding the fact that the mortgagor, mortgagee and attaching creditor are all non residents of the State.

Keller v. Paine, 107 N. Y. 83.

The office of auditor of the canal department was abolished by the statute of 1883, and the duties performed by such auditor were, by said act, to be thereafter performed by the comptroller.

Laws of 1883, chapter 69. See The Ella B., posi.

Under the New York statutes, if the vessel be engaged in canal navigation, the specifications of the debt must be filed in the office of the canal department.

The Ella B., 26 Fed. Rep. 111 (District Ct., N. Y., 1886).

Under the act of 1862 (chapter 482), the specifications as therein provided, must be filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which such debt shall have been contracted, except that when such debt shall have been contracted in either of the counties of New York, Kings or Queens, such specifications shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York.

II. OF LIENS FOR REPAIRS AND SUPPLIES.

Chapter 482 of the Laws of 1862 of this State provides as follows:

- "SECTION 1. Whenever a debt amounting to \$50 or upwards as to a sea going or ocean bound vessel, or amounting to \$15 as to any other vessel, shall be contracted by the master, owner, charterer, builder or consignee of any ship or vessel, or the agent of either of them within this State, for either of the following purposes:
- "First. On account of work done or materials furnished in this State for, or towards the building, repairing, fitting, furnishing or equipping such ship or vessel.
- "Second. For such provisions and stores furnished within this State as may be fit and proper for the use of such vessel at the time when the same were furnished.
- "Third. On account of the wharfage and expenses of keeping such vessel in port, including the expense incurred in employing persons to watch her.
- "Fourth. On account of loading or unloading, or for advances made for the purpose of procuring necessaries for such ship or vessel, or for the insurance thereof.
- "Fifth. Or whenever a debt, amounting to \$25 or upwards, shall be contracted, as aforesaid, within this State, on account of the towing or piloting such vessel, or on account of the insurance or premiums of insurance, of or on such vessel, or her freight, such debt shall be a lien upon such vessel, her tackle, apparel and furniture, and shall be preferred to all other liens thereon except mariners' wages.
- "§ 2. Such debt shall cease to be a lien at the expiration of six months after the said debt was contracted, unless at the time when said six months shall expire, such ship or vessel shall be absent from the port at which such debt was contracted, in which case the said lien shall continue until

the expiration of ten days after such ship or vessel shall next return to said port; and, in all cases, such debt shall cease to be a lien upon such ship or vessel, whenever such ship or vessel shall leave the port at which such debt was contracted, unless the person having such lien shall, within twelve days after such departure, cause to be drawn up and filed, specifications of such lien, which may consist either of a bill of particulars of the demand, or a copy of any written contract under which the work may be done, with a statement of the amount claimed to be due from such vessel, the correctness of which shall be sworn to by such person, his legal representatives, agents or assigns.

"§ 3. Such specifications shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which such debt shall have been contracted, except that when such debt shall have been contracted in either of the counties of New York, Kings or Queens, such specifications shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York."

The remaining provisions of said act, apply to the foreclosure of the lien, and the distribution of the proceeds.

Section 2 of the foregoing act was amended by chapter 273 of the Laws of 1885 as follows:

"§ 2. Such debt shall cease to be a lien at the expiration of twelve months after the said debt was contracted, unless at the time when said twelve months shall expire, such ship or vessel shall be absent from the port at which said debt was contracted, in which case the said lien shall continue until the expiration of thirty days after such ship or vessel shall next return to said port; and in all cases such debt shall cease to be a lien upon such ship or vessel, whenever such ship or vessel shall leave the port at which such debt was contracted, unless the person having such lien shall, within twelve days after such departure, cause to be drawn up and filed, specifications of such lien, which may consist either of a bill of particulars of the demand, or a copy of any written contract, under which the work may be done, with a

statement of the amount claimed to be due from such vessel, the correctness of which shall be sworn to by such person, his legal representatives, agents or assigns."

Section 2 of the act of 1862 was further amended by chapter 88 of the Laws of 1886 as follows:

"Such debt shall cease to be a lien at the expiration of twelve months, after the said debt was contracted, unless at the time when said twelve months shall expire, such ship or vessel shall be absent from the port at which said debt was contracted, in which case the said lien shall continue until the expiration of thirty days after such ship or vessel, shall next return to said port, and in all cases, such debt shall cease to be a lien upon such ship or vessel, unless the person having such lien shall, within thirty days after said debt is contracted, cause to be drawn up and filed, specifications of such lien, which may consist either of a bill of particulars of the demand, or a copy of any written contract, under which the work may be done, with a statement of the amount claimed to be due from such vessel, the correctness of which, shall be sworn to by such person, his legal representatives, agent, or assigns."

The seventh section of the act of 1862, was amended by chapter 422 of the Laws of 1863, as follows:

- "Section 1. Section seventh of chapter 482 of the Laws of 1862, is hereby amended by striking out of said section the word 'eleventh' and inserting in place thereof, the word 'twelfth.'
- "§ 2. The second section of the said chapter shall not apply to vessels navigating the western and northwestern lakes, or either, or any of them.
- "Any debt contracted by the master, owner, charterer, builder or consignee of any ship or vessel navigating such lakes, or either of them, or by the agent of such master, owner, charterer, builder or consignee, shall cease to be a lien at the expiration of six months after the first of January

next succeeding the time such debt shall have been contracted, unless during the six months such ship or vessel shall be absent from the port at which such debt was contracted, in which case the said lien shall continue until the expiration of ten days after such ship or vessel shall next return to said port. In all cases such debt shall cease to be a lien upon such ship or vessel unless the person having such debt, shall by the first Tuesday of February next succeeding the time such debt shall have been contracted, cause to be drawn up, verified and filed, specifications of such debt, in the form and comprising the statements prescribed by said chapter."

Sections 3 and 9 of the act of 1862, were amended by chapter 334 of the Laws of 1879, as follows:

"Such specifications shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which such debt shall have been contracted, except that when such debt shall have been contracted in either of the counties of New York, Kings or Queens then such specifications shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York; and it shall also be the duty of any and all parties or persons, their heirs, their legal representatives, agents or assigns, after the filing of such specifications in the county clerk's office as in said act provided, in case the vessel is built, used or fitted for the navigation of any of the canals or lakes of this State, to immediately thereafter file, or cause to be filed, a copy of said specifications in the office of the auditor of the canal department, duly certified by the county clerk, in whose office the original specifications shall have been filed.

"§ 9. The person applying for such warrant shall, within three days after the issuing thereof, cause a notice to be published once in each week, for four successive weeks, in some newspaper published in the county in which such vessel may then be, or if no newspaper be so published in such county, then in the nearest county in which a newspaper shall be so published, setting forth that such warrant has

been issued, the amount of the claim specified therein, the day when such warrant was issued, and that such vessel will be sold for the payment of the claims against her, unless the master, owner or consignee thereof, or some person interested therein, appear and discharge such warrant according to law, within thirty days from the first publication of such notice, and in case the vessel is built, used or fitted for the navigation of any of the canals or lakes of this State, shall also serve a copy of such notice, personally, at least ten days before the issuing of the order of sale mentioned in section fifteen of the act hereby amended, upon all persons who may have filed any claim or lien upon such ship or vessel by mortgage or otherwise, in the office of the auditor of the canal department, or the service of such notice may be made at least twenty days before the issuing of said order above mentioned, by leaving a copy of the same at their dwellinghouse in charge of some person of suitable age, or by depositing the same in the post-office properly folded and directed to such persons at their respective places of residence, and paying the postage thereon."

This act was further amended by chapter 216 of the Laws of 1885, which provides as follows:

- "SECTION 1. Section 2 of chapter 422 of the Laws of 1863 * * * is hereby amended as follows:
- "§ 2. The second section of said chapter shall not apply to vessels navigating the western and north-western lakes, or either or any of them, or the St. Lawrence river.
- "Any debts contracted by the master, owner, charterer, builder or consignee of any ship or vessel navigating such lakes, or either of them, or navigating said river or by the agents of such master, owner, charterer, builder or consignee, shall cease to be a lien at the expiration of six months after the first day of January next succeeding the time such debt shall have been contracted, unless during the said six months such ship or vessel shall be absent from the port at which such debt was contracted, in which case the

said lien shall continue until the expiration of ten days after such ship or vessel shall next return to said port. In all cases such debt shall cease to be a lien upon said ship or vessel unless the person having such debt, shall by the first Tuesday of February next succeeding the time such debt shall have been contracted, cause to be drawn up, verified and filed, specifications of such debt in the form and comprising the statements prescribed by said chapter."

In New York no lien is given for services, which are in no sense maritime, rendered after the close of navigation.

A mariner may also be a mechanic; but the fact that he works as such upon a vessel, while she is lying in port, does not give him a lien for his services.

The Alonson Sumner, 28 Fed. Rep. 670. (Dist. Ct. N. Y. 1886.)

The New York statute of 1862, chapter 482, so far as it attempts to give a remedy for the enforcement of maritime contracts, which is not according to the course of the common law, is unconstitutional and void. A contract for repairs done, or for supplies furnished to a vessel, either foreign or domestic, is a maritime contract, which courts of admiralty have jurisdiction; but where such work is done, or supplies furnished to a domestic vessel in her home port, no lien exists in the maritime law.

The Edith, 94 U.S. 520.

Under the maritime law, there is no lien upon a vessel for materials furnished and work done in repairing her at her home port.

The Edith, supra.
The Lattawanna, 21 Wall. 558.

The authorities are very clear that an agreement for the building and construction of a vessel is not maritime. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. (U. S.) 402. Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129. Morewood v. Enequist, 23 How. 491. Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532. Cunningham v. Hall, 1 Cliff. 46. Young v. The Orphans, 2 Cliff. 29.

A sailing vessel, in process of construction, was launched before it was completed, and thereafter the plaintiff contracted to furnish her with sails, as part of, and to complete the work of construction. She was then drawn out of the water and again put upon the ways, and while there her construction was completed and the sails furnished. *Held*, that the contract was not a maritime one; and that a lien upon the vessel for the price of the sails, perfected in accordance with the provisions of the act of 1862 (chapter 482, of Laws of 1862) was valid and enforceable.

Wilson v. Lawrence, 82 N. Y. 409.

In the case of Warner v. Miller, 13 Hun, 654, the plaintiff's intestate made repairs upon a canal boat, owned by the defendant, in pursuance of orders received from the captain of the boat. Subsequently the captain paid to the plaintiff, a portion of the bill and gave his note for the balance. The plaintiff, without returning the note, brought this action to recover of the defendant, the amount of the unpaid balance due for the repairs. The court said:

"The defendant was owner of the boat, and as such, was liable for repairs made upon her by direction of the captain. When it is shown, however, that the repairs were made on the credit of the captain alone, the owner is not liable; and taking the note of the captain for the amount of the repairs is sufficient evidence of that fact. The note, in such case, is not considered as payment of the debt, so as thereby to discharge the owner, but solely as evidence that the work was not done on the credit of the owner. The plaintiff cannot recover."

A steam dredge being within the definition of a vessel in the United States Revised Statutes, is subject to a maritime lien for supplies.

Pioneer, 30 Fed. Rep. 206. (U. S. Dist. Ct. N. Y.)

The home port of a vessel is made by the statute, at or nearest to which the owner usually resides. (U. S. Revised Statutes, § 4141.) The fact that a person has a continuous business place at another place than where he resides, at which he is found during office hours, will not constitute such place his residence in the statutory sense.

The Thomas Fletcher, 24 Fed. Rep. 375.

The departure of a domestic vessel in the regular course of her occupation, from Brooklyn to Long Beach, and upon her return making fast to the shore in Rockaway Inlet, is such a leaving of the port as to prevent the enforcing of a lien against her under the laws of the State of New York.

The Whistler, 30 Fed. Rep. 199. (Dist. Ct., E. D. of N. Y.)

If supplies are furnished in the home port, the duration and requirements of the lien depend upon the terms of the State statute.

The Ella B., 26 Fed. Rep. 111.

Where, after default in the payment of the sum secured by a chattel mortgage upon a canal boat, the owner, with the knowledge and consent of the mortgagee, continues in possession, running the boat as his own, he is authorized to keep her in repair, and can confer a right of lien thereon for repairs necessary to make her fit for navigation.

A shipwright, therefore, to whom the boat has been delivered by the owner, while it remains in his possession, has a lien thereon for necessary repairs, which lien is superior to that of the mortgage.

There is no distinction in this respect between a steamboat, or a vessel navigating the ocean, or navigable waters connected therewith, and a canal boat.

Scott v. Delahunt, 65 N. Y. 208.

In the case of The Phoenix Iron Co. v. The Vessels, 43 Hun, 429 (which was a proceeding instituted under chapter 482, of the Laws of 1862, providing for the collection of demands against ships and vessels), it was shown that between August, 1880, and October, 1884, the plaintiff sold and delivered, at Newburgh, N. Y., to the firm of Ward, Stanton & Co., shipbuilders at that place, iron work designed to be used by the said firm, in constructing two iron ferry boats for the Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. (a New Jersey corporation), under a contract entered into by the said firm, by which it agreed to build the vessels for a fixed sum. On November 15, 1884, the firm being unable to complete the vessels, conveyed them to the corporation in an extremely unfinished condition, and shortly thereafter made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. On November 21, 1884, the firm inclosed by letter, notes payable at a future time, for the iron work purchased of the plaintiff, although no credit was provided for by the agreement for its sale. These notes were accepted by the plaintiff in ignorance of the condition of the firm and of the change in the title to the vessels.

Held, that such acceptance did not deprive the plaintiff of the lien upon the vessels to which they were entitled by the act of 1862.

That the materials furnished by the plaintiff were a basis for a lien, although they were not actually put into the vessel at the time the action to enforce the lien was commenced. A canal boat is a vessel within the meaning of the act of 1862.

Crawford v. Collons, 45 Barb. 269. King v. Greenway, 71 N. Y. 413. Emmons v. Wheeler, 3 Hun, 545. Nelson v. Yates, 37 Hun, 52.

There is no lien for services rendered under the act of 1862, in raising a sunken canal boat.

Nelson v. Yates, supra.

One engaged in repairing and putting new machinery into a steam canal boat, is a builder within the meaning of the act providing for the collection of demands against ships and vessels, and a lien is created under said act, in favor of one furnishing materials to such builder for the work. Said act, so far as it creates and provides for liens upon boats constructed for, and navigating the canal, or the interior waters of the State, is not violative of the Constitution of the United States, but is valid.

King v. Greenway, 71 N. Y. 413.

Admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to contracts relating to a vessel wholly engaged in the internal commerce of a State, and no maritime lien or claim can be founded on such contract; and the United States courts are wholly without jurisdiction in such cases.

Fralick v. Betts, 13 Hun, 632. Citing Maguire v. Card, 21 How. (U. S.) 248. Allen v. Newberry, 21 How. 244. Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554.

When a domestic vessel is libelled for supplies furnished her, and is sold before the expiration of the thirty days within which the State laws require specifications to be filed, and no specifications are filed at any time, *held*, that the proceeds in court should be distributed according to the liens upon her at the time the libels were filed.

The Niagara, 31 Fed. Rep. 163.

III. OF VALIDITY.

In a suit in regard to the validity of a mortgage of a vessel, recorded in the office of a collector of customs, the mortgagee must show that the vessel was of such a character, or was owned in such a way, that she became a vessel of the United States; and if the vessel be employed in the coasting trade, he must show that she was both enrolled and licensed.

Best v. Staple, 61 N. Y. 71.

As between the parties, and as against persons having actual notice, a mortgage of a vessel is good without acknowledgment and record.

> Parker Mills v. Jacot, 8 Bosw. 161. Moore v. Simonds, 100 U. S. 145.

A bill of sale of a vessel, absolute in its terms, like such a bill of sale of any other chattels, may be shown by oral evidence to be only a mortgage.

Morgan v. Shinn, 15 Wall. 105.

Upon default in a mortgage of a ship, the legal title of the mortgagee becomes absolute, just as in the case of a mortgage of other personal property. To extinguish the equity of redemption, the mortgagor must resort either to a court of equity, or to statutory remedies for foreclosure.

Bogart v. The John Jay, 17 How. (U. S.) 399.

The only purpose of requiring a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be acknowledged, is to authenticate it for record.

Moore v. Simonds, 100 U. S. 147.

The mortgagor is not personally liable unless the mortgage contains a covenant on his part to pay the debt.

Jenkins v. Wheeler, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 445.

The act of 1862, providing for the collection of demands against vessels, so far as it gives a lien for supplies furnished to, or repairs made upon, a vessel engaged in foreign commerce is unconstitutional, as it infringes upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts.

Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554. In re The Steamboat Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19. Poole v. Kermit, 59 N. Y. 554.

"No mortgage of any vessel, or of any other goods or chattels, made as security for any debt, in good faith, and for a present consideration, and otherwise valid, and duly recorded pursuant to any statute of the United States, or of any State, shall be invalidated or affected by an assignment in bankruptcy."

U. S. Revised Statutes, § 5052.

IV. OF PRIORITY BETWEEN LIENS AND MORTGAGES.

Liens for advances made in a foreign port to pay for necessary repairs and supplies, have priority over existing mortgages to creditors at home; such advances being for the security and protection of the vessel, they are for the benefit of the mortgagees, as well as of the owners.

The Emily Souder, 17 Wall. 666.

A mortgage, although duly recorded, is inferior to any strictly maritime lien; it is also inferior to a valid bottomry bond.

Baldwin v. The Bradish Johnson, 3 Woods, 582. The De Smet, 10 Fed. Rep. 483.

The lien given by chapter 482, of the New York Laws of 1862, is enforceable in admiralty, and must prevail over the title of a purchaser of the vessel who has bought her without notice of the lien.

The Unadilla, 8 Ben. 478.

A lien for necessary repairs upon a canal boat is superior to the lien of a prior mortgage.

Scott v. Delahunt, 65 N. Y. 128.

The statute of 1862 provides that a debt for work done, or materials furnished, or for provisions and stores furnished to a ship, shall be a lien upon such vessel, and shall be preferred to all other liens thereon except mariners' wages.

This provision of said act is valid.

In re Josephine, 39 N. Y. 21. Nelson v. Yates, 37 Hun, 56.

V. OF BOTTOMRY AND RESPONDENTIA.

"A bottomry bond is a bond given for a loan of money, upon the security of a vessel and its accruing freight; its payment being dependent upon maritime risks, to be borne by the lender. The condition of the bond is the safety of the hypothecated vessel. The loan is on condition, that if the vessel hypothecated be lost by the perils of the sea, the lender shall not be repaid. It is for a specified voyage more ordinarily, but sometimes for a specified time; and as it

substitutes the risk of the adventure to the unconditional responsibility of a borrower, the rate of interest is universally (though not of necessity) such as would, without that risk, be usurious. The lender becomes to that amount an insurer."

Verplank, J., in White v. Cole, 25 Wend. 514.

"Bottomry is a contract by which the owner of a ship hypothecates or binds the ship as security for the repayment of money advanced for the use of the ship. It is defined by Marshall, to be a contract in the nature of a mortgage of a ship, on which the owner borrows money to enable him to fit out the ship, or to purchase a cargo for a voyage proposed, and he pledges the keel or bottom of the ship, pars pro toto, as a security for the repayment; and it is stipulated, if the ship should be lost in the course of the voyage, by any of the perils enumerated in the contract, the lender also shall lose his money; but if the ship should arrive in safety, then he shall receive back his principal and also the interest agreed upon, generally called marine interest."

2 Marshall Insurance, 733.

"An essential character of bottomry is, that the money lent is at the risk of the lender, during the voyage, and that the repayment thereof depends on the event of the successful termination of the voyage. It is the very essence of the contract, that the lender runs the risk of the voyage, and that both principal and interest be at hazard. If the vessel is lost, at the time the money becomes payable, the lender cannot recover either principal or interest, and where her arrival in safety entitles him to repayment, he is confined to the security of the ship, and cannot enforce his claim, personally, against the owner beyond the value of the pledged fund which may come into his hands. It is no bottomry, where the money is payable at all events; for the principal and extraordinary interest reserved is not put absolutely at hazard by the perils of the voyage. The lender

must run the maritime risk, to earn the maritime interest. If, by the terms of the contract, the owner binds himself, personally, to repay the loan, or there be collateral security for its absolute repayment, it is not a bottomry loan. Repayment does not depend upon the contingency of the safe arrival of the ship, but whether lost or not, it is to be made, and there is no risk taken."

Wright, J., in Braynard v. Hoppock, 32 N. Y. 572.

A bottomry bond is valid, although it includes the personal liability of the master. The master is personally liable on the bond, in such case, for the debt secured; but not unless the vessel arrives.

The master may bind the freight, as well as the vessel, in such a bond, by express stipulation; but in the absence of such a stipulation, the bond will create no lien upon the freight, directly. The master of a vessel has a lien on the cargo and freight, for advances made or liabilities incurred by him, in a foreign port, for the repairs and supplies of the vessel.

Kelly v. Cushing, 48 Barb. 269.

The fact that the bottomry bond not only pledges the ship, but, in terms, "grants, bargains, and sells" her, does not essentially vary its character or operation. It must still be considered a contract of bottomry.

Robertson v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 250.

A bottomry bond is entitled to priority to liens for supplies and repairs, where, prior to its execution, the owner of the vessel was notified to assent to the bond, or to raise the necessary funds by other means.

The Thomas Fletcher, 24 Fed. Rep. 375.

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Where an insurance company, which is authorized to loan upon bottomry, having already insured the vessel, and being unwilling to increase the risk, is applied to, for a loan upon bottomry, it may suspend an amount of the insurance, equal to the bottomry loan, and make such loan, without any violation of law.

North-western Ins. Co. v. Ferward, 36 N. Y. 139.

For discussion as to validity of bottomry bonds, see 3 Alb. Law Jour. 480.

RESPONDENTIA.

Respondentia is a loan of money, on maritime interest, on goods laden on board of a ship, upon the condition that if the goods be wholly lost in the course of the voyage, by any of the perils enumerated in the contract, the lender shall lose his money; if not, that the borrower shall pay him the sum borrowed, with the interest agreed upon.

The contract is called *respondentia*, because the money is lent mainly, or most frequently, on the personal responsibility of the borrower. It differs principally from bottomry, in the following circumstances: bottomry is a loan upon the ship; respondentia is a loan on the goods. The money is to be repaid to the lender, with maritime interest, upon the arrival of the ship in one case, and of the goods in the other. In most other respects the contracts are nearly the same, and are governed by the same principles. In the former, the ship and tackle, being hypothecated, are liable as well as the borrower; in the latter, the lender has, in gen eral, it is said, only the personal security of the borrower.

If any part of the goods arrive safely at the end of the voyage, the lender is entitled to have the proceeds applied to the payment of his debt. If the loan is made by the

master, and not by the owners of the goods, the necessity for the loan and for the hypothecation of the cargo must be clearly shown, or the owners of the goods, and, consequently, the goods themselves, will not be bound. The ship and freight are always to be first resorted to, to raise money for the necessity of the ship, or the prosecution of the voyage; and it seems that a bond upon the cargo is considered, by implication of law, a bond upon the ship and freight also, and that unless the ship be liable in law, the cargo cannot be held liable.

Bouvier's Law Dict., page 471. Citing The Constancia, 4 Notes of Cases, 285, 512, 518, 677. 10 Jur. 845. 2 W. Rob. Adm. 83-85. 14 Jur. 96. See 3 Mas. C. C. 255.

Respondentia is the loan of money upon merchandise laden on board a ship, the repayment whereof is made to depend upon the safe arrival of the merchandise at the destined port.

The Brig Atlantic, 1 Newb. 516 (1885).

A bottomry or respondentia bond must be recorded at the office of the collector of customs.

U. S. Revised Statutes, §§ 4192, 4382.

Evidence.— The record of a bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance of a vessel, belonging to a port or place within the United States, recorded in the office of the collector of customs, where the vessel is registered or enrolled, which was acknowledged or proved, before it was recorded, in like manner as a deed to be recorded within the State; or a transcript of such a record, duly certified by the collector; is evidence with the like effect as the original.

Code of Civil Procedure, § 945.

SUPPLEMENT.

SUPPLEMENT.

CHAPTER I.

THE INSTRUMENT.

I. Nature and definition.

IV. The subject matter.

II. Form and requisites.

V. Description of property.

III. The parties.

VI. Execution and delivery.

I. NATURE AND DEFINITION.

A chattel mortgage is an instrument of sale conveying the title Of personal property to the mortgagee with terms of defeasance, and if the terms of redemption are not complied with, then the title becomes absolute in the mortgagee. The nature of the agreement must be such that by the mere non-performance of the condition by the mortgagor the title will be transferred to the mortgagee by the force of the agreement. This test is decisive.

Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law Vol. 3 175. Blake v. Corbett, 120 N. Y. 327.

A chattel mortgage is more than a mere security, It is a conditional sale of chattels, and operates to transfer the legal title to the mortgagee, to be defeated only by full performance of the condition contained in the mortgage. Upon default, the legal title in the mortgagee becomes absolute.

People v. Remington & Sons, 59 Hun, 282; 36 St. Rep. 282; 12 N. Y. Supp. 824; affirmed in 126 N. Y. 654, without opinion.

Hamill v. Gillespie, 48 N. Y. 556.

Casserly v. Witherbee, 119 N. Y. 523.

Leadbetter v. Leadbetter, 125 N. Y. 290.

Tremaine v. Mortimer et al., 128 N. Y. 12.

Kimball v. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank, 138 N. Y. 500.

A bill of sale absolute on its face, transferring property to be held as security for the payment of a debt due the vendee, is, in character and effect a chattel mortgage, and is to be treated as such.

Woodworth v. Hodgson, 56 Hun, 236; 31 St. Rep. 66; 9 N. Y. Supp. 750.
Blake v. Corbett, 120 N. Y. 331.
Button v. Rathbone, Sard & Co., 126 N. Y. 187.

Parole evidence is admissible both in law and equity to show that a bill of sale absolute upon its face, was intended by the parties to operate as a mortgage only.

Despard v. Walbridge, 15 N. Y. 374. Horn v. Keteltas, 46 N. Y. 605. Ensign v. Ensign, 120 N. Y. 655. Barry v. Colville et al., 129 N. Y. 302.

Where upon a dissolution of a copartnership between B and D, B executed to D a bill of sale of his interest in the stock of goods and effects of the firm, and the parties signed an agreement by which D employed B as his agent to sell the goods, and retain the net profits for his services, D also agreed to sell the property to B at a time and for a sum specified, which B agreed to pay in installments; upon failure of B to pay the first installment D took possession of the goods; it was held that the instruments executed by the parties constituted a chattel mortgage from B to D.

Bragelman v. Daue, 69 N. Y. 69.

An assignment of a library of books to secure notes, the books to be held by the assignor a certain length of time, and conditioned to be null and void if during that period the indebtedness should be satisfied, contains all the essentials of a chattel mortgage.

Blake v. Corbett, 120 N. Y. 327.

A clause in a lease of land declaring that the lessor shall have a lien on future crops grown thereon is valid as a chattel mortgage between the parties.

Nestell v. Hewitt, 19 Abb. N. C. 282. McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459.

A chattel mortgage is distinguished from a pledge in this,— that whether the possession of the chattel is delivered to the mortgagee or not, the title passes to the mortgagee, subject to being defeated upon performance of the condition, and in case of a breach it becomes absolute at law in the mortgagee; while in the case of a pledge a special property only passes to the pledgee, and the general property remains in the pledgor.

Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 3, 176.

An action of debt will not lie upon a chattel mortgage to recover the sum of money secured thereby, unless the instrument contains an express agreement to pay the sum, or a distinct acknowledgment of an existing debt.

Culver v. Sisson, 3 N. Y. 264. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mooney, 108 N. Y. 126.

II. FORM AND REQUISITES.

No precise form of words is required to constitute a chattel mortgage.

Blake v. Corbett, 120 N. Y. 327.

A verbal agreement to give and accept security upon personal property is valid between the parties, although invalid as against creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith.

Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 3, 179. Bank of Rochester v. Jones, 4 N. Y. 497.

A chattel mortgage executed upon an agreement that the mortgagor may remain in possession and sell the property and use the avails in substantially the same manner as before the execution of the mortgage, is void as against the creditors of the mortgagor. And such an agreement outside of the mortgage and proved by parol is equally fatal to the instrument, as if it had been made a part thereof; and it may be inferred from the fact that the mortgagee permitted such sales to be made.

Mandeville v. Avery, 124 N. Y. 376.

Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424.

Hangen v. Hachemeister, 114 N. Y. 566.

Cook v. Bennett, 60 Hun, 8; 38 St. Rep. 632; 14

N. Y. Supp. 683.

A chattel mortgage is not *per se* void because of a provision contained in it allowing the mortgagor to sell the mortgaged property, but accounting to the mortgagee for the proceeds and applying them to the mortgage debt.

Ford v. Williams, 24 N. Y. 359. Conkling v. Shelly, 28 N. Y. 360. Miller v. Lockwood, 32 N. Y. 293. Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214. Preston v. Southwick et al., 115 N. Y. 150.

These cases went upon the ground that such sale and application of proceeds is the normal and proper purpose of a chattel mortgage, and within the precise boundaries of its lawful operation and effect. It does no more than to substitute the mortgager as the agent of the mortgagee to do

exactly what the latter has the right to do, and what is his privilege and his duty to accomplish. It devotes, as it should, the mortgaged property to the payment of the mortgage debt. And the further doctrine that under such a stipulation the proceeds realized by the agent are to be deemed realized by the principal, and as against an adverse lien, are to be applied on the mortgage debt even though not actually paid over (Conklin v. Shelley, supra), shows how impossible it is that any fraud, or injury to others, can be imputed to the agreement. If the mortgagor sells, and actually pays over the whole proceeds, nobody is harmed, for that only has happened which is the proper and lawful operation of the mortgage. If, on the other hand, such proceeds have not been paid over, the adverse lien is still unharmed, for, as against it, such proceeds are deemed paid over and applied in reduction of the mortgage debt, although as between mortgagor and mortgagee the debt remains, and is still unpaid.

This doctrine has received the approval of the Federal Court in the case of *Robinson* v. *Elliott*, 22 Wall. 524. The case of *Southard* v. *Benner*, 72 N. Y. 424, does not question this doctrine. In that case there was no agreement to sell for the benefit of the mortgagee, and apply the proceeds to the debt.

A permission to use a portion of the proceeds of sales to purchase other property does not vitiate the mortgage, where it is coupled with a condition that the property so purchased shall be brought in and subjected to the mortgage lien by a renewal of the mortgage.

> Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214. Hincks v. Fields, 37 St. Rep. 724; 14 N. Y. Supp. 248; affirmed without opinion in 129 N. Y. 633.

A chattel mortgage should in general contain a description of the debt or liability for which it is given. But if it is executed in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, and not for the purpose of defrauding any creditor of the mortgagor,

its validity is not affected by the fact that its condition misrepresents the obligation or liability intended to be secured by it.

Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 3, 181. Frost v. Warren, 42 N. Y. 204.

A chattel mortgage is presumed to have been executed at its date till the contrary is shown.

Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 3, 181.

A chattel mortgage may be payable in installments, and a default in the payment of one installment is such a default as vests the absolute title at once in the mortgagee, and the mortgagor has only left a right of redemption.

Willis v. O'Brien, 3 J. & S. 537. Leadbetter v. Leadbetter, 32 St. Rep. 893; affirmed in 125 N.Y. 294.

Even though the instrument is in the form of a bill of sale it will be construed as a chattel mortgage, if that was the agreement at the time of its execution.

Preston v. Southwick, 42 Hun, 291; 3 St. Rep. 750; affirmed in 115 N. Y. 139. Blake v. Corbett, 120 N. Y. 331.

It is not illegal to stipulate in a chattel mortgage that on failure to pay any installment the whole shall immediately become due and payable without demand.

Bauman v. Cornez, 29 St. Rep. 320; 8 N. Y. Supp. 480.

If the instrument authorizes the mortgagee to take possession if he deems himself unsafe, a seizure by him will, in the absence of proof, be assumed to be made upon that ground.

Hyer v. Sutton, 59 Hun, 40; 35 St. Rep. 174; 12 N. Y. Supp. 378. A clause in a chattel mortgage authorizing the mortgagee to take possession if he deems himself unsafe affords no protection if the taking be not upon the ground specified.

Ib.

The authorities seem to be to the effect that when a mortgagee assumes to take possession of the mortgaged property under the safety clause before default, he must show some ground for claiming that he deems himself insecure.

Hawver v. Bell et al., 19 N. Y. Supp. 612; 46 St. Rep. 447; affirmed in 141 N. Y. 140.

Where there is any evidence on that point, it becomes a question of fact for the jury whether he did feel insecure, or whether he made a pretence to secure payment before maturity of the mortgage.

Ib.

III. THE PARTIES.

Generally speaking, any person who owns chattels, and who is by law authorized to enter into other valid contracts in respect to his property, may execute a chattel mortgage.

Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 3, 182.

If one executes a mortgage upon chattels which belong to another, the latter's ratification will not affect the rights of one taking a mortgage from the true owner without knowledge of the fact of ratification.

Ib.

The case of a conditional vendee, who holds possession of the goods but is not to acquire any title until the price is fully paid, and who attempts to mortgage them before condition performed, is somewhat anomalous; but it is generally held that the original vendor's title overrides that of the mortgagee.

Ib.

A man may make a valid chattel mortgage to his wife and children.

Stanley v. National Union Bank, 115 N. Y. 122. Manchester v. Tibbetts, 121 N. Y. 219.

One partner may transfer the partnership effects directly to a creditor of the firm in payment of a firm debt without the knowledge or consent of his copartner.

Bulger v. Rosa, 119 N. Y. 459.

A chattel mortgage duly executed by an infant is voidable at his election, at any time before he arrives at full age, and within a reasonable time thereafter, but unless disaffirmed by the infant before or within a reasonable time after his arrival of age, it will be deemed ratified.

Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407. Beardsley et al. v. Hotchkiss, 96 N. Y. 201.

IV. SUBJECT MATTER.

A legal title to property not in existence, actually or potentially, cannot be transferred by way of mortgage.

Deeley et al. v. Dwight et al., 132 N. Y. 59.

A chattel mortgage cannot as a matter of law, be given future effect as a lien upon personal property which at the time of the delivery of the mortgage was not in existence, actually or potentially; the mortgage can only operate on property in actual existence at the time of the execution. While such a mortgage may, as between the parties, be regarded in equity as an executory agreement to give a lien when the property comes into existence, some further act thereafter is requisite to make it an actual and effectual lien as against creditors.

Crops which are the annual product of labor and of the cultivation of the earth have no actual or potential existence before a planting.

Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 519. Deeley v. Dwight, 132 N. Y. 59. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570.

In the case of Rochester Distilling Company v. Rasey, supra the lessee of a certain farm executed a chattel mortgage by its terms covering, among other things, all the potatoes and beans "which are now * * * planted or which are hereafter * * * planted during the next year." The greater part of the planting of potatoes and all that of the beans was done after the delivery of the mortgage. After the planting, the growing crops were levied upon and sold under an execution against the lessee; it was held that the title to the potatoes and beans obtained from the planting done after the execution and delivery of the mortgage were not affected by the mortgage, and the execution might be enforced as to them, as though no such mortgage had ever been given.

Nursery stock, consisting of trees, plants and shrubs, planted by a tenant for the purpose of commerce, is personal property and may be mortgaged.

Duffus v. Bangs et al., 122 N. Y. 423.

A mortgage given on chattels not in existence may be effectual in equity to give a lien between the parties, when the property comes into existence, and where there are no intervening rights of creditors or third persons.

Wisner v. Ocumpaugh, 71 N. Y. 113. Coats v. Donnell, 94 N. Y. 177. Rochester Dis. Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 571. A chattel mortgage may be given to secure future advances or liabilities.

Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N. Y. 47, and cases cited.

V. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY.

The mortgage should contain such a description of the property covered as will enable third persons clearly to identify the property, when aided by inquiries which the instrument itself indicates and directs.

Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 3, 180.

When articles mortgaged are numerous, it is not necessary to describe each article; a mortgage of all the property of a particular description in a certain place is sufficient.

Gardner v. McEwen, 19 N. Y. 123. Conkling v. Shelley, 28 N. Y. 360.

It is better practice, however, and safer, to specifically enumerate each article intended to be covered by the mortgage. In making a mortgage of personal property, a printed form was used, in which a blank space was left for the description of the mortgaged property to be written in, followed by the printed words, "And all other goods and chattels mentioned in the schedule hereunto annexed." Nothing was written in the blank space.

The schedule annexed contained a very particular description of ninety distinct soda water apparatuses, and concluded with the words, "All of the above apparatuses and all other manufacturing and dispensing apparatus owned by me, whether in my place or at my customers'." A soda water apparatus not in the possession of the mortgagor, and not specifically described in the schedule, although in the possession of a customer, was not embraced in the mortgage.

Matthews v. Sniffen, 10 Daly, 200.

Where the schedule is in conflict with the mortgage, the latter must control, as the annexing of the schedule neither limits nor enlarges the generality of the description in the mortgage, but is annexed for greater certainity and exactness in the description of the property, so that it may be easily identified.

Matthews v. Sniffen, 10 Daly, 200. Conkling v. Shelley, 28 N. Y. 361.

General words of description referring to a schedule are controlled by the latter, and the lien of the mortgage is limited to the articles named therein.

Broadhead v. Smith, 55 Hun, 499; 29 St. Rep. 817; 8 N. Y. Supp. 760.

In the *Broadhead case*, *supra*, the chattel mortgage described the property mortgaged as "all machinery, tools, implements, appliances and personal property, and all other goods and chattels mentioned in the schedules hereto annexed, and now in the buildings and on the premises," of the mortgagor. The schedule contained a very minute list of articles, and stated that it was an "inventory of personal property mentioned and referred to in the annexed mortgage." The mortgage did not, therefore, cover property not mentioned in the schedule.

Where a party who had carried on a manufacturing business executed a bill of sale of "the entire manufacturing stock on hand at foundry and store room" at prices specified. Portions of the property covered by the bill of sale were delivered and taken possession of by the vendees. Another portion was omitted from the inventory taken immediately after the execution of the bill of sale and was delivered to other parties, at the time of such execution, the articles so admitted had been sold to those parties. In an action to recover the contract price for the goods delivered the vendees in the bill of sale alleged a breach of the contract of sale in the failure to deliver the articles omitted from the inventory and that this was a condition precedent to a right of action. The plaintiff (vendor) thereupon amended his

complaint, setting up a waiver of the condition that all the goods were to be delivered. On the trial, plaintiff was permitted to prove, under objection and exception, that during the negotiation which resulted in the sale, it was spoken of and understood between the parties that plaintiff had sold or agreed to sell a portion of the goods included in the bill of sale, and that these sales were assented to and acquiesced in by the vendees. Plaintiff also gave evidence to the effect that the delivery of the goods mentioned in the inventory was received by the vendees as a fulfillment of the requirements of the bill of sale, and that they acquiesced in the partial delivery, only claiming damages for the omission to deliver all the goods. The evidence was properly received, and the vendor was entitled to recover the contract price for the goods delivered, deducting the vendee's damages resulting from a failure to deliver the balance.

Brady v. Cassidy et al., 145 N. Y. 171.

VI. EXECUTION AND DELIVERY.

There is no mortgage without a delivery of the instrument to the mortgagee, and an acceptance of it by him. The mere execution and filing of an instrument do not constitute delivery.

Wait's Actions and Defenses, 1894 ed., Vol. 8, 385.

A chattel mortgage may be executed by an agent duly authorized for that purpose.

Brownell v. Hawkins, 4 Barb. 491.

A delivery and acceptance are essential to constitute a valid mortgage, but the question of delivery is one of fact for the jury, and it is always competent to show that it was never delivered, or that it was delivered as an escrow, or that the mortgagee obtained possession of it by fraud.

Roberts v. Jackson, I Wend. 478. Lawton v. Sager, II Barb. 349. Brackett v. Barney, 28 N. Y. 340. Chouteau v. Suydam, 21 N. Y. 179. McIlhargy v. Chambers, II7 N. Y. 532.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE FILING AND REFILING OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

I. Statutes.

IV. Effect of omission to file.

II. Where filed.

V. Refiling.

III. How filed.

I. STATUTES.

Laws 1833, Chap. 279 — An Act Requiring Mortgages of Personal Property to be Filed in the Town Clerks' and other Offices.

Chattel mortgages void unless filed.— SECTION 1. Every mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage, of goods and chattels hereafter made, which shall not be accompanied by an immediate delivery and be followed by an actual and continued change of possession of the things mortgaged, shall be absolutely void as against the creditors of the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage, or a true copy thereof, shall be filed as directed in the succeeding section of this act.

How and where to be filed.— § 2. The instruments mentioned in the preceding section shall be filed in the several towns and cities of this State where the mortgagor therein, if a resident of this State, shall reside at the time of the execution thereof; and if not a resident, then in the city or town where the property so mortgaged shall be at the time of the execution of such instrument. In the city of New York such instrument shall be filed in the office of the register of said city. In the several cities of this State, other than the city of New York, and in the several towns of this State in which a county clerk's office is kept, in such office;

and in each of the other towns in this State, in the office of the town clerk thereof; and such register and clerks are hereby required to file all such instruments aforesaid presented, to them respectively for that purpose, and to endorse thereon the time of receiving the same, and shall deposit the same in their respective offices, to be kept there for the inspection of all persons interested.

When mortgage to cease to be valid; renewal.— § 3. Every mortgage filed in pursuance of this act shall cease to be valid as against the creditors of the person making the same, or against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in good faith, after the expiration of one year from the filing thereof, unless, within thirty days next preceding the expiration of each and every term of one year after the filing of such mortgage a statement describing such mortgage, stating the names of the parties, the time when and the place where filed, and exhibiting the interest of the mortgagee in the property thereby claimed by him by virtue thereof, shall be again filed in the office of the clerk or register aforesaid of the town or city where the mortgagor shall then reside, if he is then a resident of the town or city where the mortgage or a copy thereof was last filed; if not such resident, but a resident of the State, a true copy of such mortgage, together with such statement, shall be filed in the office of the clerk or register aforesaid of the town or city where he shall then reside, and if not a resident of the State then such statement shall be filed in the office of the clerk or register of the city where the property so mortgaged was at the time of the execution of such mortgage.

(Thus amended by chap. 354, Laws of 1895.)

A copy to be received in evidence.— § 4. A copy of any such original instrument, or of any copy thereof, so filed as aforesaid, including any statement made in pursuance of this act, certified by the clerk or register in whose office the same shall be filed, shall be received in evidence, but only of the fact that such instrument or copy, and statement, was received and filed according to the endorsement of the clerk or register thereon, and of no other fact, and in

all cases made in pursuance of this act upon such instrument or copy, shall be received in evidence only of the facts stated in such endorsement.

Mortgages to be numbered.— § 5. The register of the city and county of New York, and the clerk of the city and county of Albany, shall respectively number every such instrument or copy which shall be filed in their offices, and shall enter in books to be provided by them, alphabetically, the names of all the parties to such instrument, with the number endorsed thereon opposite to each name, which entry shall be repeated alphabetically under the name of every party thereto.

Fees.—§ 6. For services under this act the clerks and registers shall be entitled to receive the following fees: For filing each instrument or copy, six cents; for entering the same in a book as aforesaid, in the said cities of Albany and New York, six cents for every party to such instrument; for searching for each paper, six cents; and the like fees for certified copies of such instruments or copies as are allowed by law to clerks of counties for copies and certificates of records kept by them.

The last two sections are made applicable to the city of Rochester by chap. 282, Laws of 1848.

Laws 1849, Chap. 69 — An Act Requiring Chattel Mortgages to be Registered.

Mortgages to be registered.—SECTION 1. It shall be the duty of the clerks of the several towns and counties in this State, in whose offices chattel mortgages are by law required to be filed, to provide proper books, at the expense of their respective towns in which the names of all parties to every mortgage, or instrument intended to operate as a mortgage of goods and chattels, hereafter filed by them or either of them, shall be entered in alphabetical order, under the head of mortgagors and mortgagees, in each of such books respectively.

To be numbered.—§ 2. It shall be the duty of the said several clerks to number every such mortgage or copy so filed in said office, by endorsing the number on the back thereof, and to enter such number in a separate column in the books in which such mortgages shall be entered, opposite to the name of every party thereto, also the date, the amount secured thereby, when due, and the date of the filing of every such mortgage.

Fees.—§ 3. The said several clerks for services under this act, shall be entitled to receive therefor the following fees: For filing every such mortgage or copy, six cents; for entering the same in books as aforesaid, six cents.

LAWS 1858, CHAP. 247 — AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE REGISTRY OF LIENS AND INCUMBRANCES UPON BOATS AND CRAFTS NAVIGATING THE CANALS OF THIS STATE.

Liens to be registered in office of auditor.— Section I. Any person having any lien or incumbrance on any canal boat, steam tug, scow or other craft navigating the canals of this State, by a chattel mortgage duly filed, may make a statement in writing setting forth the nature of his claim, the time when the same arose, the manner in which it originated, and the amount of such lien or incumbrance; and may annex thereto an affidavit made by himself or his agent or attorney, that the said statement is correct, and the claim just and true, and file the same in the office of the auditor.

(The office of auditor of the canal department is abolished. The powers and duties of the office to be performed by the comptroller. See Laws 1883, chap. 69.)

Auditor's duty.—§ 2. It shall be the duty of the said auditor, on the receipt of the said statement, to file the same in his office, and to enter the substance in a book to be provided for that purpose, and the amount, if any, claimed to be due, which book shall always during office hours be open for the inspection of all persons desiring to examine the same.

Preference of liens.—§ 3. All claims and liens by chattel mortgage, a statement of which shall be filed as herein provided, shall from the time of such filing have preference and priority over all other claims and liens, in the same manner and to the like extent of claims and liens arising on chattel mortgages filed and entered in towns where the mortgagor resides, but shall not have any priority over existing liens and claims.

Fees for filing.—§ 4. The auditor shall charge for filing the said statement and making the entry thereof as herein provided, the sum of fifty cents, and he shall not be obliged to file or enter the same until such sum is paid.

Statement evidence.—§ 5. Any statement made and filed as herein provided, and copies thereof duly certified by the auditor in the manner required by law, may be read and used as evidence in all courts of justice.

LAWS 1864, CHAP. 412—AMENDING CHAP. 247 OF THE LAWS OF 1858.

Mortgages to be filed in Canal Department.—Section I. Hereafter, any person having any lien or incumbrance on any canal boat, steam tug, scow, or other craft navigating the canals of this State, by a chattel mortgage, shall file the same, or a true copy thereof, in the office of the auditor of the canal department.

(The office of auditor of the canal department is abolished. The powers and duties are to be performed by the comptroller.)

Mortgages not filed become void.—§ 2. Hereafter, every mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage of any canal boat, steam tug, scow or other craft navigating the canals of this State, together with the appurtenances belonging thereto and used in navigating such craft, hereafter made, which shall not be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and followed by an actual and continued change

of possession of the property mortgaged, shall be absolutely void as against the creditors of the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, unless the mortgage, or a true copy thereof, shall be filed as directed in the previous section of this act.

- § 3. Every mortgage filed and recorded in pursuance of this act shall be as valid as against the creditors of the person making the same, or against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in good faith, as long as the debt which such mortgage secures is enforceable. (Thus amended by Laws of 1894, chap. 724.)
- § 4. It shall be the duty of the comptroller, on the receipt of the mortgage, or an assignment thereof, to cause it to be numbered, the time of receiving the same to be indorsed thereon, and the substance thereto to be entered in a Book provided for that purpose. He shall also cause to be indexed the names of the parties to such instruments arranged alphabetically, with the number of the mortgage opposite to each name. He shall also index the name of each boat mortgaged, with the number of the mortgage opposite to each. The book in which such mortgages are recorded, and the index book, shall always, during office hours, be open for the inspection of all persons desiring to examine the same. (Thus amended by the Laws of 1894, chap. 724.)

When preferred liens.—§ 5. All claims and liens by chattel mortgage which shall be filed as herein provided, shall, from the time of such filing, have preference and priority over all other claims and liens, but shall not have any priority over existing claims and liens.

Certified copies—evidence.—§ 6. A copy of any such original instrument, or of any copy thereof, so filed as aforesaid, including any statement made in pursuance of this act, certified by the auditor or his deputy, may be read and used as evidence in all courts of justice, but only of the fact that such instrument or copy and statement was received and filed according to the endorsement of the register thereon, and of no other fact; and in all cases the original endorsement by

the clerk or register made in pursuance of this act upon such instrument and copy shall be received in evidence of the facts stated in such endorsement.

Fees of auditor.—§ 7. The auditor aforesaid shall designate a clerk, who shall act as register, and the auditor shall be entitled to receive the following fees for services under this act, for the use of the State; for filing each instrument or copy and entering the same in a book as aforesaid, twenty-five cents; for searching for each paper, twenty cents; and the like fees for certified copies of such instruments or copies as are allowed under existing laws to be charged by the auditor for copies and certificates of record kept in the canal department; and the said auditor shall not be obliged to file or enter, or cause to be filed or entered, any mortgage or copy thereof until the fee provided under this section is paid.

Change of names of boats and hailing places.—§ 8. The auditor aforesaid shall not grant permission to change the name or hailing places of any canal boat, steam tug, scow or other craft navigating the canals of this State upon which there is an existing lien or mortgage filed in the canal department, unless it shall be necessary 'to make the name or hailing place conform to the United States custom house regulations by reason of a change of name on the canal after having been registered at the custom house; and any boat, steam tug, scow or other craft found navigating the canals of this State the registered name or hailing place of which shall have been changed without the written permission of the auditor of the canal department, shall, upon due proof thereof, pay a fine not less than fifty nor more than three hundred dollars.

Laws of 1879, Chap. 171.—An Act to Provide for Discharging Chattel Mortgages.

How discharged of record.—SECTION 1. Whenever any mortgagor, or any person obtaining title to mortgaged property, shall present to any recorder, county or town clerk, in whose office a chattel mortgage executed by said mortgagor

on such property may be filed, a certificate from the mortgagee therein named, or the holder or owner thereof, that such mortgage is paid or satisfied, it shall be the duty of such recorder or either of the clerks above mentioned, to file such certificate in his office and discharge such mortgage, by writing in the book kept by such recorder or either of such clerks, and opposite the entry therein of such mortgage, the word "discharged" with the date thereof.

LAWS OF 1887, CHAP. 528.

Comptroller's duties transferred to superintendent of public works.—Section i. All the powers and duties of the comptroller in relation to the registry of boats navigating the canals of this State, and to the changing of the registered names of such boats, are hereby transferred to and made incumbent upon the Superintendent of public works.

Laws of 1868, Chap. 779.—An Act in Relation to Mortgages Executed by Railroad Companies.

Chattel mortgages.—Section 1. It shall not be necessary to file, as a chattel mortgage, any mortgage which has been, or shall hereafter be, executed by any railroad company upon real and personal property, and which has been, or shall be recorded as a mortgage of real estate in each county in or through which the railroad runs.

LAWS OF 1891, CHAP. 171.— AN ACT IN RELATION TO MORTGAGES.

SECTION I. It shall not be necessary to file, as a chattel mortgage, any mortgage which has been or shall hereafter be, executed by any telegraph, electric light or telephone company upon real and personal property, and which has been or shall be recorded as a mortgage on real estate in each county in or through which the mortgaged telegraph, electric light or telephone line therein described runs.

STATUTES OF FRAUDS, 2 R. S. 136.

§ 5. Every sale made by a vendor, of goods and chattels in his possession, or under his control, and every assignment of goods and chattels, by way of mortgage or security, or upon any condition whatever, unless the same be accompanied by an immediate delivery, and be followed by an actual and continued change of possession, of the things sold, mortgaged or assigned, shall be presumed to be fraudulent and void, as against the creditors of the vendor, or the creditors of the person making such an assignment, or subsequent purchasers in good faith; and shall be conclusive evidence of fraud, unless it shall be made to appear, on the part of the person claiming under such sale or assignment, that the same was made in good faith, and without any intent to defraud such creditors or purchasers. (R. S. [8th ed.], Vol. 4, p. 2591.)

This statute puts upon the vendee the burden of showing that the transfer to him was in good faith, and without any fraudulent intent.

Manchester v. Tibbetts, 121 N. Y. 221, 222.

II. WHERE FILED.

The actual place of residence of the mortgagor is the place where a chattel mortgage must be filed and creditors of the mortgagor, subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, may show that the place mentioned in the mortgage as his residence was not in fact such.

Baumann v. Libetta, 52 St. Rep. 492; 23 N. Y. Supp. 1; 3 Misc. 518.
Platt v. Stewart, 101 U. S. 737.

In the Platt case, Blatchford, J., in the course of his opinion says: "The statute had imposed a rigid and unbending condition, to wit; a filing in the place where the mortgagors actually reside, as a preliminary to the validity of the mortgage. Whether this condition is wise or not,

whether convenient or difficult of performance, is not for the courts to say. The statute exacts it and the courts must see that it is performed."

The recital of the residence in the mortgage seems to be of no importance, and might for the matter of security be omitted altogether.

Chandler v. Bunn, Hill & Denio, Sup. 167.

Such recital in the mortgage is nothing more than a declaration of a mortgagor as to his residence and is not evidence against his creditors and bona fide purchasers and mortgagees.

Baumann v. Libetta, *Supra*. Whitaker v. Brown, 8 Wend. 490. Flannery v. Tassel, 127 N. Y. 631.

The word "Creditors" in the provision of the act of 1833 (section 1, chap. 279), which provides that such a mortgage, unless filed as directed by the act, "shall be absolutely void as against the creditors of the mortgagor," includes creditors whose debts antedate the execution of the mortgage, as well as those whose debts were subsequently contracted.

A simple contract creditor is also as much within the protection of the statute as a creditor whose debt has been merged in a judgment.

Such a mortgage, therefore, is not valid as against an antecedent creditor, although it was filed before the creditor acquired a lien upon the property by judgment and execution. While said act does not in terms require an immediate filing of a chattel mortgage in order to make it valid, prompt and diligent action on the part of the mortgagee is required.

Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316.

The general creditors of the mortgagor of chattels have no right to assail a mortgage, as invalid, until they have secured a lien thereon by levy under a judgment and execution, or, by some other method, acquired a legal or equitable interest in the property.

Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 426. Geery v. Geery, 63 N. Y. 256. Sullivan v. Miller, 106 N. Y. 641. Button v. Rathbone, Sard & Co., 126 N. Y. 187. Kitchen v. Lowery, 127 N. Y. 60 Tremaine v. Mortimer et al., 128 N. Y. 1.

The statute declaring chattel mortgages absolutely void as to creditors of the mortgagor unless filed and refiled as prescribed, confers no title to the mortgaged property upon the creditors and they take no interest by virtue of the statute; its effect is simply that in the cases mentioned, as between the creditors and the mortgagor, the mortgage has no force and is to be treated as if it had never existed.

Tremaine v. Mortimer et al., 128 N. Y. 1.

That provision of the statute declaring such a mortgage void as against "subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith" does not apply to one who has taken a subsequent mortgage as security for a precedent debt or to a purchaser who has merely given credit for the purchase price of the property upon a precedent debt; when it does not appear that the debt was actually and absolutely released or extinguished by the transaction.

Button v. Rathbone, Sard & Co., 126 N. Y. 187.

III. How Filed.

To constitute a proper filing requires the act of the clerk or some person in charge of the office.

An unsuccessful attempt to file a chattel mortgage when the office is closed, or depositing the mortgage on the clerk's table in the office when no one is present, does not constitute a filing within the requirements of the statute.

Crounse v. Johnson, 65 Hun, 337; 47 St. Rep. 559; 20 N. Y. Supp. 177.

It is made the duty of the clerks of towns in whose offices chattel mortgages are required by the act to be filed, to provide proper books in which the names shall be entered in alphabetical order, of the parties to every mortgage, and also to indorse them on the back and to enter the number in a separate column in the books in which the mortgages shall be entered. Yet the failure of the clerk to do these things does not affect the rights of the mortgagee, as he has done all he can do when he delivers the mortgage to the clerk in the proper office to be filed, and he ought not to be held liable for the default of the clerk, a public officer, over whose acts he has no control.

Manhattan Co. v. Laimbeer, 108 N. Y. 590.

The statute requires prompt and diligent action on the part of the mortgagee in reference to the filing of the mortgage. A delay of six weeks in filing a chattel mortgage after its execution, in the absence of circumstances rendering the delay necessary, is not a compliance with the statute; and creditors of the mortgagor, whose debts antedate the mortgage and who obtain judgments after the mortgage is filed and issues execution thereon, is entitled to a preference over the mortgage.

Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316.

Where the mortgagee in obedience to a subpœna duces tecum removed a chattel mortgage from the files in the clerk's office the mortgage is not thereby invalidated, if the mortgagee intended to return it, and did not intend to remove it from the files.

Rogers v. Dwight, 71 Hun, 547.

IV. EFFECT OF OMISSION TO FILE.

A failure to file a chattel mortgage, where there is no change of possession of the mortgaged property, renders it void as to then existing creditors of the mortgagor, and the

mortgagee cannot thereafter acquire title to property by taking possession and selling the same under the mortgage and bidding it off on the sale, although the mortgage was given in good faith to secure an actual indebtedness.

Stephens v. Perrine, 143 N. Y. 476.

And such a mortgage is not valid as against an antecedent creditor, although it was filed before the creditor acquired a lien upon the property by judgment and execution.

Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316.

The case of *Stephens* v. *Perrine*, 143 N. Y. 476, was an action brought to set aside a chattel mortgage, and to recover the property covered by it or its value.

On the 25th of February, 1892, a certain firm gave a chattel mortgage on personal property owned by them, and then in their possession, to Mary J. Perrine, for the purpose of securing to her the payment of something over \$2,000.00, then loaned by her to the firm. The mortgage was not filed until March 30, 1892. The mortgaged property remained in the possession of the mortgagers until the 30th day of March, 1892, when the mortgagee took possession of it under her mortgage, and, after advertisement, the property was sold and the mortgagee became the purchaser as the highest bidder at the auction sale. The mortgage was made without any fraudulent intent on the part of the mortgagors, and it was received by the mortgagee to secure a valid indebtedness, and without any intent to defraud on her part.

Prior to and at the time of the execution of this mortgage the mortgagors were indebted to many other people, some of whom, subsequent to the date of the filing of the chattel mortgage and the taking possession of the property by the mortgagee, commenced separate actions against the mortgagors and recovered judgments therein subsequent to the sale of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee under her mortgage. Executions were issued and returned wholly unsatisfied. The court held that this mortgage was void as against those creditors who were such at the time it was executed, although at that time they had obtained no judgments in their favor and they stood in the condition of simple contract creditors. The failure to file the mortgage, there being no change of possession of the property mortgaged, rendered it void as against creditors then existing.

The simple contract creditor runs the risk of having his remedy to assail the mortgage defeated by a bona fide transfer of the property by the mortgagor to the mortgage in payment of the mortgage before he has obtained judgment and execution or any lien on the property.

Tremaine v. Mortimer, 128 N. Y. 1. Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316. Stephens v. Perrine, 143 N. Y. 481

A mere creditor at large, without some process for the collection or enforcement of his debt, is not in a position to question an unfiled chattel mortgage given by his debtor, which is otherwise valid.

Button v. Rathbone, Sard & Co., 126 N. Y. 187. Kitchen v. Lowery, 127 N. Y. 60. Tremaine v. Mortimer, 128 N. Y. 1.

Where a bill of sale is filed it is not invalidated by showing that a subsequent agreement between the parties giving it the effect of a chattel mortgage has not been filed.

Preston v. Southwick, 115 N. Y. 139.

A bill of sale of personal property by a seller who does not give immediate possession, for loans made and to be made, is void as against creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith, unless filed as a chattel mortgage.

The statute of frauds against bills of sale of personal property by a vendor of goods who does not give immediate possession, applies.

Kings County Bank v. Courtney, 69 Hun, 152; 53 St. Rep. 324; 23 N. Y. Supp. 542.

V. REFILING.

Failure to file a chattel mortgage within one year does not render it void as to a receiver in supplementary proceedings of the property of the mortgagor appointed upon a judgment recovered after the expiration of such year.

Steward v. Cole, 43 Hun, 164; 4 St. Rep. 428.

Where a chattel mortgage had not been refiled, but default having been made, the mortgagee took possession of the goods and thereafter the mortgagor made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, whatever rights the mortgagor may have had left, passed by the assignment, and that a purchaser at a sale under execution against him, issued on judgments obtained after the assignment, could not maintain an action for conversion against the mortgagee.

Tremaine v. Mortimer, 128 N. Y. 1.

Where the evidence is to the effect that the person who took a chattel mortgage had knowledge that a prior mortgage on the same goods was outstanding, although more than a year has elapsed since it was filed and it had not been refiled, his mortgage is subject to the previous mortgage, though it had not been refiled within a year, as required by law.

McCormick v. Venable, 12 N. Y. Supp. 152; 34 St. Rep. 717.

Mack v. Phelan, 92 N. Y. 25-26.

Hill v. Beebe, 13 N. Y. 556.

A chattel mortgage which has "ceased to be valid" as against purchasers and creditors, by failure to file a true copy of the chattel mortgage, together with the statement required by law within thirty days next preceding the expiration of the year, cannot be revived by filing the copy and statement after the expiration of the year.

Herder v. Walther, 9 N.Y. Supp. 926; 29 St. Rep. 410.

By the amendment of 1895, chap. 354, the statement to be filed must describe the mortgage, state the names of the parties, the time when and the place where filed; it must also exhibit the interest of the mortgagee in the property thereby claimed by him by virtue thereof. It must be filed in the office of the clerk or register of the town or city where the mortgager shall then reside, if he is then a resident of the town or city where the mortgage, or a copy thereof, was last filed. If not such resident, but a resident of the State, a true copy of such mortgage, together with such statement, shall be filed in the office of the clerk or register of the town or city where he shall then reside; and if not a resident of the State, then such statement shall be filed in the office of the clerk or register of the city where the property so mortgaged was at the time of the execution of such mortgage.

A chattel mortgage filed, but not renewed, is invalid against bona fide purchasers or creditors.

Gibson v. Ferris, 30 St. Rep. 663; 9 N. Y. Supp. 525.

A chattel mortgage executed by two or more persons, joint owners of the mortgaged property, in order to be kept alive as against creditors, subsequent purchasers, or mortgagees in good faith, must be refiled in all the towns in which the mortgagors reside.

Wait's Actions and Defenses, 1894, ed., Vol. 8, 399.

A chattel mortgage given for a pre-existing indebtedness does not constitute a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee in good faith.

Button v. Rathbone et al., 126 N. Y. 187.

CHAPTER III.

THE VALIDITY OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

- I. Between the parties.
- II. Change of possession.
- III. What interests may be mort- VI. Mortgages upon fixtures. gaged.
- IV. Agreements which render the mortgage void.
- V. Agreements which do not render the mortgage void.
- VII. How and by whom the validity may be contested.

I. BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

A verbal agreement to give and accept security upon personal property is valid between the parties.

Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 3, 179.

A chattel mortgage is fraudulent and void as to creditors, where it was given with a tacit or express understanding and arrangement that the mortgagor may sell and dispose of the mortgaged property and apply the avails to his own use. And such an agreement may be inferred from the fact that the mortgagor does, with the knowledge and assent of the mortgagee, sell and dispose of the property and apply the avails to his own use, or may be proved by parol.

> Potts v. Hart, 99 N. Y. 168. Hangen v. Hachemeister, 114 N. Y. 566. Mandeville v. Avery, 124 N. Y. 376.

An authority to the mortgagor to sell the mortgaged property and apply the proceeds of sales toward the payment of the mortgage debt, does not render a chattel mortgage void. Neither does a permission to use a portion of the proceeds of the sales to purchase other property, where it is coupled with a condition that the property so purchased shall be brought in and subjected to the mortgage lien, by a renewal of the mortgage.

> Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214. Preston v. Southwick, 115 N. Y. 150. Spaulding v. Keyes, 125 N. Y. 113.

One who is neither a creditor nor purchaser is not in a position to derive any benefit from the invalidity of a chattel mortgage given to secure an antecedent debt.

Allen v. Heine, 20 N. Y. Supp. 38; 47 St. Rep. 763.

Strictly speaking, upon the execution of a chattel mortgage, a conditional legal title to the property is vested in the mortgagee, which title is subject to defeasance by the performance of the conditions contained in the mortgage; and that title becomes absolute at law in the mortgagee upon default in the payment of the mortgage, and there is left in the mortgagor only an equity of redemption. While this is so technically and theoretically, yet practically, the substantial title remains in the mortgagor with all the incidents of a legal title, and he retains the use, control and benefit of the property, subject to the mortgage.

If the property is taken from his possession wrongfully during the time when, by the terms of the mortgage, he is entitled to retain possession thereof, he may maintain an action for the conversion against any wrongdoer—even against the mortgagee. He can sell it and convey a good title subject to the mortgage, to any purchaser, and it can be seized and sold by virtue of an execution against him.

Moore v. Prentiss Tool and Supply Co., 133 N. Y. 144.

An agreement to work a farm on shares which provides that the entire crop shall continue to belong to the owner of the farm until he is repaid his advances, is not in the nature of a chattel mortgage or conditional sale, but is a mere contract of hiring for the working of the farm to be compensated by a share in the crop. The entire crop belongs to the owner of the farm in such a case, until his advances are repaid, and the party who did the work has no interest or property therein which is capable of transfer by chattel mortgage.

Booher v. Stewart, 75 Hun, 214; 58 St. Rep. 666; 27 N. Y. Supp. 114.

A husband honestly indebted to his wife may give her a chattel mortgage to secure a debt, although he is at the time of executing it unable to pay all his debts in full; and when it is found that the mortgage was given with an honest intent, and not for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding creditors, it is valid.

Spaulding v. Keyes, 125 N. Y. 113. Stanley v. National Union Bank, 115 N. Y. 122. Manchester v. Tibbets, 121 N. Y. 219.

A chattel mortgage given to secure notes given and to be given is not affected by the fact that additional security was also taken for a subsequent note.

Burritt v. Sheffer, 37 St. Rep. 591; 13 N. Y. Supp. 849.

One. who has acquired title and possession of a chattel in payment of an antecedent debt is nevertheless entitled to challenge the validity of a prior invalid chattel mortgage.

Burton v. Sard et al., 118 N. Y. 666.

A chattel mortgage is not extinguished by a second chattel mortgage on the same property between the same parties to secure the debt mentioned in the first.

Hill v. Beebe, 13 N. Y. 556.

Chattel Matgage & se une accumodation molorser 88 Hun- 32

II. CHANGE OF POSSESSION.

To satisfy the provision of the statute declaring every chattel mortgage not accompanied by an immediate delivery and "followed by an actual and continued change of possession" of the mortgaged property to be void unless the mortgage is filed, and that a mortgage so filed shall cease to be valid as against creditors after one year unless refiled, constructive or legal change of possession is not sufficient; the possession by the mortgagee must be actual, open and public.

Steele v. Benham, 84 N. Y. 634.

Whether the mortgagor or mortgagee is in possession is a question for the jury.

Galen v. Brown, 22 N. Y. 39.

Hills v. White, 71 Hun, 511; 54 St. Rep. 909; 24

Supp. 1065.

Nichols v. Mead, 2 Lansing, 222-226, affirmed in

47 N. Y. 653.

Seidenbacher v. Riley, 111 N. Y. 567.

Stanley v. Bank, 115 N. Y. 136.

The law does not require a family to be broken up or a wife to separate from her husband to enable her to acquire and maintain possession of the property lawfully owned by her. Her possession must be such as the circumstances of the case permit and such as she is capable of taking and enjoying; and when she has done all that it is possible for her to do in this respect, it is a question of fact to be determined by a jury whether she was, in fact, in possession of the property or not.

Stanley v. Bank, supra.

A chattel mortgage, void as to the creditors of the mortgager, is always void and the mortgagee therein cannot acquire title to the property mentioned therein, by taking

possession and selling the same under the mortgage and bidding it off on the sale.

Stephens v. Perrine, 143 N. Y. 476.

III. WHAT INTERESTS MAY BE MORTGAGED.

Property not in existence, actually or potentially, cannot be transferred by way of chattel mortgage.

Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 524. Deeley v. Dwight, 132 N. Y. 59. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570.

Crops which are the annual product of labor and of the cultivation of the earth cannot be said to have either an actual or a potential existence before a planting.

Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, supra.

The last case cited seems to be in conflict with the case of Andrews v. Newcomb, 32 N. Y. 417.

In the Andrews case, at page 421, the court say:

"Crops to be raised are an exception to the general rule that title to property not in existence cannot be affected so as to vest the title when it comes into being. In the case of crops to be sown it vests potentially from the time of the executory bargain, and actually as soon as the subject arises."

Nursery stock, consisting of trees, plants and shrubs, planted by a tenant for the purpose of commerce, is personal property and may be mortgaged.

Duffus v. Bangs, 122 N. Y. 423.

A mortgage of the rights of a party and of his interests in a lease of land, together with all the oil wells, machinery and structures thereon and those to be placed thereon, if filed in the proper clerk's office, operates as between the mortgagor, or his assignee, and the mortgagee, to create a lien in equity as to the chattels purchased and placed upon the property by the mortgagor subsequent to its date, but it is not a lien upon chattels placed thereon subsequently by the assignees of the lease.

Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 519. Reversing Kribbs v. Alford, cited on page 41.

IV. AN AGREEMENT WHICH RENDERS THE MORTGAGE VOID.

An agreement that the mortgagor may remain in possession and sell the property and use the avails in substantially the same manner as before the execution of the mortgage, is void as against the creditors of the mortgagor.

Such an agreement need not appear on the face of the mortgage; it may be shown by parol; it may be inferred from circumstances.

Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424. Hangen v. Hachemeister, 114 N. Y. 566. Mandeville v. Avery, 124 N. Y. 376. Cook v. Bennett, 60 Hun, 8; 38 St. Rep. 632; 14 N. Y. Supp. 683.

V. AGREEMENTS WHICH DO NOT RENDER THE MORTGAGE VOID.

A chattel mortgage is not rendered void as to creditors of the mortgagor, by a provision authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property, and apply the proceeds of sales toward the payment of the mortgage debt; nor does an authority to the mortgagor to sell on credit, taking good business paper, which the mortgage agrees to accept and apply on the debt, affect the validity of the mortgage. So, also, permission to use a portion of the proceeds of sales to purchase other property does not vitiate the mortgage, where it is coupled with a condition that the property so purchased shall be

brought in and subjected to the mortgage lien by a renewal of the mortgage.

Ford v. Williams, 24 N. Y. 359. Conklin v. Shelley, 28 N. Y. 360. Miller v. Lockwood, 32 N. Y. 293. Brackett v. Harvey, 91 N. Y. 214. Preston v. Southwick, 115 N. Y. 150.

The mere fact that a mortgagor is insolvent at the time of the execution of a chattel mortgage, is not sufficient to vitiate it.

Manchester v. Tibbetts, 19 St. Rep. 302; affirmed in 121 N. Y. 219.
Spaulding v. Keyes, 125 N. Y. 113.

In the absence of an agreement between the mortgagor and mortgagee of the chattels that the former may deal with the property as his own, the mortgage is not rendered void as to creditors by the fact the property was so dealt with.

Vreeland v. Pratt, 42 St. Rep. 582; 17 N. Y. Supp. 307.

It is not illegal to stipulate in a chattel mortgage that on failure to pay any installment the whole shall immediately become due without demand.

Baumann v. Cornez, 29 St. Rep. 320; 8 N. Y. Supp. 480.

Where by the terms of a lease of a farm for dairy purposes, the tenant agreed to take charge of the stock, in which he and his landlord had a joint interest, and to raise enough on the place to feed it, and if enough was not raised to buy what was necessary, the title to the farm products is in the tenant, and not in the landlord.

Colville v. Miles, 127 N. Y. 159.

VI. MORTGAGES UPON FIXTURES.

The owner of machinery or other things in the nature of fixtures, which may be easily severed from the realty, may treat them as chattels, and, by the execution of a chattel mortgage on them, estops him from asserting, as against the mortgagee, that they are part of the realty.

Waits Actions and Defenses, Vol. 8, 1894 ed., 390. Sisson v. Hibbard, 75 N. Y. 542.

Whether a thing be a substantial part of the freehold, or a mere annexation thereto for the purposes of trade or manufacture, depends upon its relation to the inheritance; machinery, like a water wheel and gearing having a special relation and adaptation to the building belong to the freehold, while an independent machine, like a loom, which may be removed without losing its character or value, is personalty.

Murdock v. Gifford, 18 N. Y. 28. Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 523.

The criterion of a fixture is the union of these three requisites: First, actual annexation to the realty or something appurtenant thereto. Second, application to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is connected is appropriated. Third, the intention of the party making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold.

McRea v. Central National Bank of Troy, 66 N. Y. 489.
Dutcher v. Post, 108 N. Y. 217.
McFadden v. Allen, 134 N. Y. 489.

VII. HOW AND BY WHOM THE VALIDITY MAY BE CONTESTED.

An action to set aside a mortgage as fraudulent may be maintained by a subsequent mortgagee of the same property, and in such an action, either legal or equitable relief may be given as the proofs on the trial, and the allegations in the complaint demand.

Anderson v. Hunn, 5 Hun, 79. Button v. Sard et al., 118 N. Y. 666.

The general creditors of a mortgagor of chattels have no right to assail a mortgage, or other conveyance of property made by him, as invalid, until they have secured a lien thereon by levy under a judgment and execution, or by some other method acquired a legal or equitable interest in the property.

Southard v. Benner, 72 N. Y. 424. Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y. 123. Sullivan v. Miller, 106 N. Y. 641. Tremaine v. Mortimer, 128 N. Y. 1. Karst v. Gane, 135 N. Y. 316. Stephens v. Perrine, 143 N. Y. 481.

But that is no justification for the mortgagee to defeat these creditors by taking possession of the property under a mortgage which as to them is void.

Stephens v. Perrine, supra.

19

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE DISPOSITION AND SALE OF THE MORT-GAGED PROPERTY.

I. Under execution.

III. By the mortgagee.

II. By the mortgagor.

I. UNDER EXECUTION.

It is the settled law in this State that a mortgagor of chattels has no property in them subject to levy and sale on execution after he has made default in a payment.

> Manchester v. Tibbetts, 121 N. Y. 223. Leadbetter v. Leadbetter, 125 N. Y. 290. Tremaine v. Mortimer, 128 N. Y. 12. Kimball v. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank of Buffalo, 138 N. Y. 500.

Default in one payment is enough.

Willis v. O'Brien, 3 J. & S. 537. Leadbetter v. Leadbetter, 32 St. Rep. 893.

Where a chattel mortgage is such that the mortgagee is to have, possess, occupy and enjoy the mortgaged property, whenever he shall demand the same, and he has taken the possession thereof by virtue of the mortgage, it is not thereafter the subject of levy upon execution against the mortgagor, although the mortgage debt had not become due.

Mattison v. Baucus, 1 N. Y. 295. Hathaway v. Brayman, 42 N. Y. 322. It is well settled, that after a mortgagee has taken possession of the mortgaged property, by virtue of a power in the mortgage, the mortgagor has no remaining interest in it which can be seized and sold on execution, even before default.

Nichols v. Mead, 2 Lans. 222. Manchester v. Tibbetts, 121 N. Y. 223. Powers v. Elias, 1 St. Rep. 250.

The mortgagor may deliver the mortgaged property to the mortgagee in payment of his debt.

Tremaine v. Mortimer, 128 N. Y. I. Powers v. Elias, supra.

As between the creditors and the mortgagor, both parties to the mortgage have the right to act as if the mortgage had never existed, and before the creditors obtain a lien on the property by virtue of their executions, the mortgagor may deal with the same in any honest way; he can deliver the property to the mortgagee in payment of the debt secured by the mortgage, and the creditors will have no legal ground of complaint.

Tremaine v. Mortimer, supra.

II. BY THE MORTGAGOR.

"A person who, having theretofore executed a mortgage of personal property, or any instrument intended to operate as such, sells, assigns, exchanges, secretes or otherwise disposes of any part of the property, upon which the mortgage or other instrument is at the time a lien, with intent thereby to defraud the mortgagee, or a purchaser thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor."

§ 571 Penal Code.

While the mortgaged property remains in the possession of the mortgager and the condition of the mortgage is unbroken, he has an interest in the property which he can convey.

Hathaway v. Brayman, 42 N. Y. 325.

In that case the mortgagor was in possession of the mortgaged property which consisted, among other things, of a horse, and while in possession and before default traded it off to Brayman, who traded it to Oliver, who kept the horse until it died. Hathaway brought an action for conversion. At page 325 Foster, J., says: "The rule clearly is that prior to such default or taking possession, the mortgagor has an interest in the mortgaged property which may be levied upon by execution against him and the remedy of the mortgagee in such case is to follow the property into the hands of the purchaser and require its delivery to him, or the payment of his mortgage debt. It is equally clear that, while the mortgagor retained possession he could sell and deliver the horse and the purchaser took all the interest the mortgagor had, subject to the mortgage whether he was aware of its existence or not, and there being no default in the payment and no possession taken by the mortgagee, he had the right to dispose of it to Oliver, who also took it subject to the mortgage, and the remedy of Hathaway was to follow it and recover it from his possession."

A mortgagor of chattels has no right to pledge the property to another person, or otherwise to create a lien upon it, to the prejudice of the mortgagee's rights.

The law, in the absence of any special agreement, will not give to a farmer who pastures horses for hire a lien upon the horses for the price of keeping them.

Bissell v. Pearce, 28 N. Y. 252.

LAWS 1872, CHAP. 498.—AN ACT FOR THE PROTECTION OF LIVERY STABLE KEEPERS AND OTHER PERSONS KEEPING HORSES AT LIVERY OR PASTURE.

SECTION I. It shall be lawful for all persons keeping any animals at livery or pasture, or boarding the same for hire, under any agreement with the owner thereof, to detain such animals until all charges under such agreement for the care keep, pasture or board of such animals shall have been paid; provided, however, that notice in writing shall first be given to such owner in person or at his last known place of residence, of the amount of such charges and the intention to detain such animal or animals until such charges shall be paid; and such persons may at any time maintain an action in any of the courts of this State to enforce such lien and procure a sale of the said animals for the payment of said keeping, pasture and board, and the costs of such action.

- § 2. From the time of giving such notice, and while such animals are so detained, and no longer, such livery stable keeper or other person shall have a lien upon such animals for all charges then due and thereafter to grow due, for the purpose of satisfying any execution which may be issued upon a judgment obtained for such charges.
- § 3. For the purpose of enabling the agister, stable keeper, or other person keeping or boarding animals as set forth in section one hereof, to perfect his lien upon the same, as provided therein, a mortgagor of such animals, remaining in possession thereof, shall be deemed the owner of the same. (Thus amended by Laws of 1892, chap. 91.)

III. BY THE MORTGAGEE.

Upon default in the payment of a chattel mortgage, the title to the mortgaged property becomes absolute in the mortgagee, and thereafter the mortgagor has only an equity of redemption in such property.

Manchester v. Tibbetts, 121 N. Y. 223. Leadbetter v. Leadbetter, 125 N. Y. 290. 1'remaine v. Mortimer, 128 N. Y. 12. Kimball v. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank of Buffalo, 138 N. Y. 500. Casserly v. Witherbee, 119 N. Y. 523.

A mortgagee may purchase the mortgaged chattels at a sale under the power contained in the mortgage.

Casserly v. Witherbee, Supra. French v. Powers, 120 N. Y. 128.

An action in equity lies to foreclose a chattel mortgage.

Briggs v. Oliver, 68 N. Y. 336. Ostrander v. Weber, 114 N. Y. 101. Blake v. Corbett, 120 N. Y. 331. Section 1737 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Where the holder of a note takes possession of the debtor's property as collateral security, under a mortgage containing power of sale, presumption of payment of the debt secured thereby does not attach, after default of the mortgagor until the mortgagee refuses to sell the property.

Third National Bank v. Shields, 55 Hun, 274; 28 St. Rep. 505; 8 N. Y. Supp. 298.

Although conversion of the mortgaged property operates as a satisfaction of the mortgaged debt to the extent of the value of the property converted, yet the possession to which the mortgagee is entitled, does not so operate, and the mortgagee may sue for the debt without applying or offering to return the chattels.

Lathers v. Hunt, 30 St. Rep. 432; 9 N. Y. Supp. 494.

At common law possession of the mortgaged chattels by the mortgagee was essential to the validity of the mortgage. This is still the law of this State in the case of mortgages not filed as prescribed by statute, such filing being allowed only as a substitute for possession by the mortgagee, and there is nothing in the statute which prevents the mortgagee from filing his mortgage and having possession of the mortgaged chattels as well, so, also, at common law, which remains unchanged, the mortgagee of chattels could proceed in three distinct methods to recover the mortgage debt. He could bring an action at law for the amount, and sell the mortgaged chattels under the judgment obtained therein, or he could bring an action to foreclose the mortgage or sell the chattels under a power of sale expressly conferred by the terms of the mortgage.

Elder v. Rouse, 15 Wend. 218. Sterling v. Rogers, 25 Wend. 658.

A mortgagee does not lose his right to the mortgaged property by obtaining judgment on the mortgage note and then seizing it on execution. The property is pledged as security for the debt, and is not taken as a liquidation of it, and a judgment, while it may be a merger of the note so that no other action can be maintained on it, will not extinguish the security that remains as security for the debt, no matter what form it takes, until the debt itself is extinguished.

Lathers v. Hunt, supra.

It is a rule of the common law that where personal property is sold at public sale, either judicial or statutory, the same should be in view of the bidders, and should be sold in such separate parcels as is best calculated to bring the highest price. In *Stief* v. *Hart*, I N. Y. 20, it was said that a sale of personal property without having it within the view of the bidders, for the purpose of ascertaining and estimating its value, was an abuse of the process of the court, and was condemned by the common law, without the aid of the statute as to the manner of conducting the sale. This

rule has been uniformly enforced by the courts, and had its foundation in the plainest precepts of fairness and public policy.

Sherman v. Slayback, 12 N. Y. Supp. 291-295; 34 St. Rep. 383.

Where the mortgagee is by the instrument authorized to take possession of the mortgaged property when he deems himself unsafe, a seizure by him of the property will in the absence of proof be assumed to be made upon that ground.

Hyer v. Sutton, 59 Hun, 40.

The mortgagee must show some ground for claiming that he deems himself insecure when he assumes to take possession of the mortgaged property under the safety clause before default.

Hawver v. Bell, 46 St. Rep. 447.

When there is some evidence on that point it becomes a question of fact for the jury to determine whether he did feel insecure, or whether he made a pretense to secure payment before maturity.

Tb.

CHAPTER V.

I. Assignment.

III. Satisfaction.

II. Payment. IV. Evidence.

I. Assignment.

The possession of the collateral security alone furnishes no conclusive evidence of the ownership of the debt secured thereby, and an assignment of the mortgage without the debt is a nullity.

> Langdon v. Buel, 9 Wend. 80. Munoz v. Wilson, 111 N. Y. 301.

The mortgage is only an incident to the debt it is given to secure, and cannot be separated therefrom.

Merritt v. Bartholick, 36 N. Y. 44.

One who takes an assignment of a mortgage, takes it subject not only to any latent equitites that exist in favor of the mortgagor, but also subject to the like equities in favor of third persons.

Shafer v. Reilly, 50 N. Y. 61. Frear v. Sweet, 118 N. Y. 462.

An assignee of a note secured by mortgage, both past due at the time of the assignment, takes them subject to all the equities which any person could enforce against the assignors. There is no distinction in this regard between equities existing in favor of the debtor and those in favor of a third person.

Owen v. Evans, 134 N. Y. 514.

II. PAYMENT.

A release of property from the lien of a chattel mortgage, though given without consideration, is not void if the same is a voluntary and executed gift; and a delivery of the mortgage where it covers property other than that released, is not necessary to consummate the gift, a delivery of the release being all that is required.

Kennedy v. Stroble, 77 Hun, 96.

The presumption of payment, at least to the proved value of the mortgaged property taken possession of by the mortgagee after default, attaches when the mortgagee refuses to sell the property.

Third National Bank of Malone v. Shields, 55 Hun, 274; 28 St. Rep. 505; 8 N. Y. Supp. 298.

III. SATISFACTION.

Although conversion of the mortgaged property operates as a satisfaction of the mortgage debt to the extent of the value of the property converted, yet possession to which the mortgagee is entitled does not so operate, and the mortgagee may sue for the debt without applying or offering to return the chattels mortgaged.

Lathers v. Hunt, 30 St. Rep. 432.

IV. EVIDENCE.

In an action by a mortgagee of chattels to recover damages for their sale under execution against the mortgagor, it is competent to prove the consideration for the mortgage.

Knapp v. Gregory, 47 St. Rep. 408.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, the presumption is, that the chattel mortgage was executed and delivered at its date.

Purdy v. Coar, 109 N. Y. 448.

The certificate of the town clerk in whose office a chattel mortgage is filed, stating that a paper is a copy of the original mortgage, is no proof of the existence of the mortgage. That must be produced and proved, or its non-production accounted for, so as to authorize secondary evidence. Nor is the certificate of the town clerk any evidence that the paper purporting to be a copy of the mortgage is a copy; the mortgage and its contents must be proved by common law evidence.

Bissell v. Pearce, 28 N. Y. 252.

Parol evidence is admissible both in law and equity to show that a bill of sale, absolute on its face, was intended by the parties to operate as a chattel mortgage.

> Despard v. Walbridge, 15 N. Y. 374. Horn v. Ketelas. 46 N. Y. 605. Ensign v. Ensign, 120 N. Y. 655. Barry v. Colville, 129 N. Y. 302.

Whether the mortgagor or mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property is a question for the jury.

Galen v. Brown, 22 N. Y. 39.

Hills v. White, 54 St. Rep. 909.

Nichols v. Mead, 2 Lans. 222-226; affirmed in 47 N. Y. 653.

Seidenbach v. Riley, 111 N. Y. 567.

Stanley v. Bank, 115 N. Y. 136.

CHAPTER VI.

CONTRACTS OF CONDITIONAL SALES.

I. Statutes.

II. Nature and validity of the contract.

CONDITIONAL SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

Laws of 1883, Chap. 383.—An Act Relating to Certain Contracts for the Lease or Conditional Sale of Railroad Equipment and Rolling stock and Providing for the Record Thereof.

Conditional sale required to be evidenced in writing, recorded, etc.—SECTION 1. Whenever any railroad equipment and rolling stock shall hereafter be sold, leased or loaned on the condition that the title to the same, notwith-standing the possession and use of the same by the vendee, lessee or bailee, shall remain in the vendor, lessor or bailor, until the terms of the contract as to the payment of the installments, amounts or rentals payable, or the performance of other obligations thereunder shall have been fully complied with, but also providing that title thereto shall pass to the vendee, lessee or bailee, on full payment therefor as aforesaid, such contract shall be invalid as to any subsequent judgment-creditor or any subsequent purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, unless

- 1. The same shall be evidenced by writing, duly acknowledged before some person authorized by law to take acknowledgments of deeds.
- 2. Such writing shall be recorded in the same book as mortgages are recorded, in the office of the clerk of the county in which is located the principal office or place of business of such vendee, lessee or bailee within the State, or in the office of the register in counties where there is a register's office.

3. Each locomotive or car so sold, leased or loaned, shall have the name of the vendor, lessor or bailor, or the assignee of such vendor, lessor or bailor, plainly marked upon both sides thereof, followed by the word owner, lessor, bailor or assignee, as the case may be.

LAWS OF 1884, CHAP. 315—AN ACT REQUIRING CONTRACTS FOR THE CONDITIONAL SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY ON CREDIT TO BE FILED IN THE TOWN CLERKS' AND OTHER OFFICES.

Contracts for conditional sales to be void if not filed.— SECTION I. In every contract for the conditional sale of goods and chattels hereafter made which shall be accompanied by an immediate delivery and be followed by an actual and continued change of possession of the things contracted to be sold, all conditions and reservations which provide that the ownership of such goods and chattels is to remain in the person so contracting to sell the same or other person than the one so contracting to buy them until said goods or chattels are paid for, or until the occurring of any future event or contingency shall be absolutely void as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good faith, and as to them the sale shall be deemed absolute, unless such contract for sale with such conditions and reservations therein, or a true copy thereof shall be filed as directed in the succeeding section of this act.

Where to be filed.—§ 2. The instruments mentioned in the preceding section shall be filed in the several towns and cities of this State, where the person to whom such property is so contracted to be sold, if a resident of this State, shall reside at the time of the execution thereof; and if not a resident, then in the city or town where the property so contracted to be sold shall be at the time of the execution of such instrument. In the city of New York such instrument shall be filed in the office of the register of the city, and, in the county of Kings, in the office of the register of said county. In the several cities of this State, other than the

cities of New York and Brooklyn, and in the several towns of this State in which a county clerk's office is kept, in such office; and in each of the other towns in this State, in the office of the town clerk thereof. If the conditional vendee be a railroad corporation, the instrument mentioned in the preceding section shall be filed in the office of the clerk of each county through which its railroad is located, or, in counties where there is a register, in the office of the register, and such filing shall be deemed sufficient for all the purposes of this act. Such registers and clerks are hereby required to file all such instruments aforesaid, presented to them respectively for that purpose, and to endorse thereon the time of receiving the same, and shall deposit the same in their respective offices, to be kept there for the inspection of all persons interested. (Thus amended by Laws 1885, chap. 488).

To cease to be valid after one year, unless copy and statement is filed.— § 3. The conditions and reservations specified in the first section of this act, which may be in any instrument filed in pursuance of this act, shall cease to be valid against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees in good faith after the expiration of one year from the filing of such instrument, and as to them the sale shall then be deemed absolute, unless within thirty days next preceding the expiration of each any every term of one year after the filing of such instrument a true copy of such instrument, together with a statement exhibiting the interest of the person so contracting to sell such property, in the property thereby claimed by him by virtue thereof, shall be again filed in the office of the clerk or register aforesaid of the town or city where the person to whom such property is so contracted to be sold shall then reside, if such person shall then be a resident of this State; and if not such resident, then in the officeof the clerk or register of the town or city where the property so contracted to be sold was at the time of the execution of such instrument.

Duty of clerks; fees.—§ 4. The clerks of the several towns and counties of this State in whose offices contracts for the conditional sale of goods and chattels on credit are

by this act required to be filed shall endorse on every such instrument or copy so filed the number thereof and enter such number and the names of all parties to such instrument and the amount thereby required to be paid and the future contingency or event required to occur before the ownership of the goods and chattels described therein shall pass from the person contracting to sell the same, the time when such amount will be due and the date of the filing of such instrument or copy, in the books kept in such offices for the entry of similar matters regarding mortgages of goods and chattels and in like manner as in cases where such mortgages are so filed, except that the name of the person in such instrument contracting to sell shall be entered in the column of mortgagees and the name of the person therein contracting to buy shall be entered in the column of mortgagors. For their services under this act such clerks shall receive the same fees they are now authorized to receive for like services in regard to mortgages of goods and chattels.

How discharged of record.— § 5. A contract for the conditional sale of goods and chattels on credit filed as required by this act may be satisfied and discharged of record in the same manner, so far as is applicable, as may mortgages of goods and chatteles which may now be filed in the offices of town or county clerks.

Past transactions not affected.—§ 6. This act shall not affect any proceeding now pending nor any transaction had before the passage of this act.

Act not to apply to household goods and certain other articles; proviso: rights of purchasers of such articles after seizure; not to apply to railroad equipments, etc.—
§ 7. This act shall not apply to household goods, pianos, organs, scales, butchers' and meat market tools and fixtures, wood-cutting machines and wood-cutting machinery, engines, boilers and portable furnaces, and boilers for heating purposes, portable saw-mills and saw machines, threshing machines and horse-powers, mowing machines, reapers and harvesters, and grain-drills, with their attachments, vehicles,

coaches, hearses, carriages, buggies and phaetons, bicycles and tricycles of all kinds and any other device for locomotion by human power; provided, that the contracts for the sale of the same be executed in duplicate, and one duplicate shall be delivered to the purchaser. In case household goods, pianos, organs, scales, butchers' and meat market tools and fixtures, wood-cutting machines and wood-cutting machinery, engines, boilers and portable furnaces and boilers for heating purposes, portable saw-mills and saw machines, threshing machines and horse-powers, mowing machines, reapers and harvesters and grain-drills, with their attachments, vehicles, coaches, hearses, carriages, buggies and phaetons, bicycles, and tricycles of all kinds and any other device for locomotion by human power, are sold upon the condition that the titles shall remain in the vendor, or some other person than the purchaser, until the payment of the purchase-price, or until the occurring of any future event or contingency, and the same are retaken by the vendor, or by his successor in interest, such property so retaken shall be retained for thirty days by the person by whom or on whose behalf the same has been so taken during which time the purchaser or his successor in interest may fulfill such contract or purchase, and shall be entitled thereupon to receive such property. After the expiration of such time, the person by whom or on whose behalf the said property has been taken may proceed to sell the same at public auction, and out of the proceeds may retain the balance remaining unpaid on the purchaseprice and the expenses of storing, advertising and sale thereof; and any surplus remaining shall be paid to the person or persons from whom the property was taken. But no such sale shall be made until after the giving of a printed or written notice of such sale to the person or persons from whom the said property has been taken, requiring such person or persons to pay such unpaid balance and expenses, and that in case of default in so doing that such property will be sold to pay the same, at a time and place to be specified in the notice. Such notice shall be served personally at least fifteen days before the time of such sale upon the person or persons from whom the property was taken, providing such

service can be made with reasonable diligence within the State of New York. If the person or persons from whom the property was taken cannot with reasonable diligence be found, within the State of New York, then such notice shall be given by publication once in each week for four successive weeks, before the time of such sale in a newspaper published at or nearest the place where such sale is to take place. This act shall not apply to railroad equipment or rolling stock sold, leased or loaned, under a contract which has been or must be recorded pursuant to the provisions of chapter three hundred and eighty-three of the laws of eighteen hundred and eighty-three, entitled "An act relating to certain contracts for the lease or conditional sale of railroad equipment and rolling stock, and providing for the record thereof." (Thus amended by chapter 925, Laws of 1895.)

II. NATURE AND VALIDITY OF THE CONTRACT.

The rights of the parties to sale of personal property in the mode usually known now as sales on the installment plan, turn on the principle, established in the law of this State, that a purely executory contract of sale, which stipulates that the title shall remain in the seller, even after delivery, until the price be fully paid, does not, until full payment, give the buyer a right to sell or pledge to others; and that in the meantime even a bona fide purchaser from such buyer gains no title as against the original seller.

Such a contract must be distinguished on the one hand from a transfer of title with possession subject to the seller's right to retake on default in payment, and on the other hand from a transfer intended to put it in the power of the buyer to deal with the merchandise in question as apparent owner, clothed with the usual paper evidences of title.

Such a condition that the title shall not pass until payment, is valid (except as against bona fide purchasers for value in the case of merchandise such as is bought to be resold), and under it the buyer is a mere bailee, so far as his dominion over the chattel is concerned.

In the absence of fraud an agreement for a conditional sale payable in installments is good and valid, as well against third persons as against parties to the transaction. Therefore the original seller may recover the value of the chattel from one who purchased it from the conditional buyer.

A provision in a contract for the sale of chattels, that the title of the seller is not to be divested until the purchase price is fully paid, makes the payment of the price by the purchaser a condition precedent to the vesting of the title in him. And a transfer or mortgage of the chattels by a conditional purchaser before he has fully paid the purchase price is a conversion of the seller's property.

Rodney Hunt Machine Co. v. Stewart, 57 Hun, 545; 33 St. Rep. 189; 11 N. Y. Supp. 448.

The seller who retains the title to goods to be paid for by installments, with notes, may maintain an action for the goods upon the buyer assigning for creditors without surrendering up the notes already received.

Brewer v. Ford, 59 Hun, 17; 35 St. Rep. 967; 12 N. Y. Supp. 619; affirmed without opinion in 126 N. Y. 643.

When a sale of personal property, conditional to become absolute on the payment of the full price thereof, which falls due in installments, it is essential before an action can be maintained to recover damages for a breach of warranty that the property be paid for in full.

English v. Hanford, 75 Hun, 428; 57 St. Rep. 352; 27 N. Y. Supp. 672.

Where a horse is sold under an agreement that the parchaser may have thirty days in which to determine whether it is satisfactory, and he returns the horse within that time, the purchaser is entitled to a return of the purchase money.

Maurer v. Wolf, 50 St. Rep. 634; 21 N. Y. Supp. 202.

The fact that a written lease of a sewing machine, with a privilege to purchase, was altered, without the knowledge of the lessor, by the insertion of the number of a new machine, which was given her in lieu of the first machine, returned by her as unsatisfactory, will not prevent such lease from controlling the rights of the parties, as such alteration merely conforms the lease to the facts, goes merely to the identity of the machine, and does not in any way change the terms of the contract.

Domestic Sewing Machine Co. v. Barry, 51 St. Rep. 219; 21 N. Y. Supp. 970.

When several distinct chattels are sold upon condition that the title shall not pass from the vendor to the vendee until the agreed price is paid, and the vendor, in affirmance of the contract, seizes the chattels for the avowed purpose of selling them and collecting the amount due upon the contract, he has no right to seize and sell or seize and retain more than is sufficient to satisfy his demand and expenses.

O'Rourke v. Hadcock, 114 N. Y. 541.

When an executory contract for the sale of chattels provides that the title shall not pass until the agreed price is fully paid, which is payable in installments, and the vendor permits the vendee to retain possession and make other payments after the whole contract price is due, the vendor cannot seize the property and terminate the contract for non-payment until he has demanded payment of the vendee.

Ib.

Where the owner of property consigns it to another under an agreement that when paid for it shall become the property of the consignee, the title does not pass to the latter until the condition is complied with, and it is not liable to levy and sale upon execution against him.

> Herring v. Hoppock, 15 N. Y. 409. Cole v. Mann, 62 N. Y. 1. Prentiss Tool and Supply Co. v. Schirmer, 136 N. Y. 305.

By a contract of sale of certain machinery and material to be used in the manufacture of goods, the title was to remain in the vendor until the property was paid for; the purchaser was given the privilege of selling the goods manufactured from such material on condition that the proceeds be applied in payment of the purchase price. The goods were sold and the proceeds applied as agreed. Thereafter the purchaser of the machinery contracted a debt and, in an action to recover the same, the machinery was attached and sold. At the time of the levy, part of the purchase money remained unpaid. Such an agreement constitutes no fraud upon the creditors of the purchaser and is valid; that the permission to manufacture and sell, coupled with the condition as to application of the proceeds, did not impair the rights of the vendor.

Prentiss Tool and Supply Co. v. Schirmer, 136 N. Y. 305.

One having possession of personal property as a bailee for hire, with an executory and conditional agreement for its purchase, which conditions have not been performed, can give no title thereto to a purchaser, although the latter acts in good faith and parts with value, without notice of the want of title of his vendor.

Austin v. Dye, 46 N. Y. 500.

A bona fide purchaser of personal property, other than commercial paper, although from one who has the possession, acquires no better title than that of his vendor.

Herring v. Hoppock, 15 N. Y. 409. Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314.

Where upon a conditional sale of a chattel, it is agreed that the vendee is to have possession and to pay the price within a time fixed, if after the purchase-money has become due and remains unpaid, the vendee is still permitted to retain possession, and the vendor receives part payment, this is an assent by the latter which is a waiver of any forfeiture, and a recognition of the right of the vendee to acquire title by payment of the residue of the purchase-money, which right would continue until a request by the vendor for such payment, and a refusal of the vendee. A tender, under such circumstances, of the amount due, itself discharged all lien or claim of title to the property by the vendor.

Hutchings v. Munger, 41 N. Y. 155.

Where a party sold certain personal property upon a conditional sale by the terms of which the title was to remain in the seller until the purchase-price was paid; after making several payments, the buyer made a general assignment, the assignee took possession of the property thereunder. The seller brought replevin against the assignee for the property and judgment was entered in his favor. He then brought an action to foreclose any equities of the assignee in the property and for a sale under the direction of the court. His title was absolute, which fact had been adjudicated by the judgment in the replevin suit, and that the second action was inconsistent therewith and could not be maintained.

Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Walker, 43 Hun, 449; affirmed in 114 N. Y. 7.

Where a sale of personal property is made on condition that the stipulated price shall be paid on delivery, title does not pass until payment is made, unless the vendor waives the condition.

Under such a contract delivery and payment are simultaneous or concurrent acts, and although the articles may have been actually delivered, the delivery is not absolute unless the vendor has, by subsequent act, waived the condition of payment.

Where a contract for the sale of personal property does not provide, in express terms, that payment shall be made on delivery, of that payment and delivery shall not be concurrent the intent of the parties must control; and if from the acts of the parties and the surrounding circumstances it can be inferred that it was intended that payment and delivery should be concurrent acts, the title will be deemed to have remained in the vendor until the condition of payment is complied with.

The question of intent in such a case is one of fact.

Where a vendor of chattels is ready and offers to perform on his part and the purchaser neglects and refuses to perform, he cannot recover back the partial payments he has made.

> Empire State Type Founding Co. v. Grant, 114 N. Y. 40.

A contract of sale, providing that the buyer is to have full ownership when its conditions and stipulations are fully performed, and for payment in installments, and that the purchaser is to take possession as "tenant or bailee" and hold, use and occupy the same as such until all the conditions and stipulations are fulfilled, and that the seller may take possession for non-fulfillment of any of the stipulations, is a conditional sale, and the title of the property will not vest until the payment of the consideration; and such an agreement is lawful.

Boon v. Moss, 70 N. Y. 465.

Where a sewing machine was sold for \$85, \$30 being paid in cash and the balance to be paid in installments, the seller to retain the title until the whole price is paid, and the seller to have the right to take possession in case of default; the buyer sold the machine, default having been made in the payment of the installments, the seller made demand for payment thereof, which was refused; he thereupon took forcible possession, and was sued for trespass; it was held he was only taking his property and the only question for the jury was whether he had acted properly or not, conceding the title to the property having been in him.

Kenny v. Planer, 3 Daly, 131.

Where property is sold upon condition that the title shall not vest in the buyer unless he pays the price agreed upon by a specified time, the seller may retake the property if transferred to a third party before the condition has been performed. He will, however, lose his right to retake the property as against one who buys from the conditional buyer bona fide without notice of the condition if he is guilty of laches in asserting his right, or if his conduct has been such as to waive performance of the condition. In an action by the seller against the third person, who has acquired the property subject to his right, the measure of damages is the value of the property converted at the time and place of coversion with interest from that date.

Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 21, 661.



No. 1.

COMMON FORM OF A CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

To all to whom these presents shall come:

KNOW YE, That , of , county of , N. Y., indebted unto , of , in the sum of dollars, and cents, being for *.

Now for Securing the Payment of said debt, and the interest thereon from the date hereof, to the said , do hereby sell, transfer and assign to the said , the property described in the following schedule, viz.:

Said property now being and remaining in the possession of the said , at .**

PROVIDED ALWAYS, and this mortgage is on the express condition, that if the said , shall pay to the said , h assigns or representatives, the sum of dollars and cents, with interest thereon as follows, viz.:

Principal and interest payable at , which the said hereby agree to pay, then this transfer to be void and of no effect; *** but in case of non-payment of the said debt and interest at the time above mentioned, then the said shall have full power to enter upon the premises of the said part of the first part, or any other place or places where the goods and chattels aforesaid may be, to take possession of said property, to sell the same at public or private sale, and the avails (after deducting all expenses of the taking, and the sale, and keeping of said property) to apply in payment of the above debt; **** and in case the said shall at any time deem said property or debt unsafe, it shall be lawful for to take

possession of such property, and to sell the same at public or private sale, previous to the time above mentioned for the payment of said debt, applying the proceeds as aforesaid, after deducting all expenses for the taking, and the sale and keeping of the said property. And the said mortgagee, his representatives or assigns, may purchase at any such sale, in the same manner, and to the same effect as a person not interested herein.

If from any cause said property shall fail to satisfy said debt, interest, costs and charges, covenant and agree to pay the deficiency,

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, have hereunto set hand and seal the day of , in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and

Sealed and delivered in the presence of

STATE OF NEW YORK, County of , ss.:

On this day of in the year one thousand eight hundred and before me, the subscriber, personally appeared , to me personally known to be the same person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and he acknowledged that he executed the same.

No 2.

Another Form, Containing Insurance Clause, etc.

(As in Form 1 to the asterisk, continuing:) collateral security for the payment of a certain note made by me, the said (mortgagor)., and bearing even date herewith, and due in days from the date hereof, and payable at; and it is further agreed that this mortgage shall be as collateral security for the payment of any judgment into which said note may be merged, together with all cost and disbursements incurred in procuring said judgment. (Continue as in Form 1 to **, then add:)

And I further certify and state that I am the sole owner of the property mentioned in said schedule, and that the same is free and clear of all liens and encumbrances; this statement is made for the purpose of obtaining money on said note.

And it is further agreed that in case any attachment, levy or other legal process shall become a lien on said property before the maturity of this mortgage, that then and in that case, this mortgage shall immediately become due and payable.

And it is further agreed that in case the mortgagor herein shall remove said property from the place where it now is, without the written consent of the party of the second part, that this mortgage shall at once become due and payable, and the said mortgagee may take immediate possession of said property.

And it is further agreed that the said mortgagor will keep said property insured in a sum not less than \$, and assign the policy to the said party of the second part, and in default thereof, the said party of the second part, may effect such insurance, and the cost of said policy may be added to the amount secured by these presents, and such sum so paid shall be a lien upon the said property.

(Continue as in Form 1 to the end.)

No. 3.

MORTGAGE OF A STOCK OF GOODS.

(As in Form 1 to **, continuing:) It is agreed that said (mortgagor), may sell and dispose of said property, and apply the proceeds of such sales to the payment of the debt hereby secured; and the said (mortgagor), does hereby covenant and agree that as said stock is sold and disposed of by him, he will apply the proceeds to the payment of such debt; such sales may be made upon a credit not to exceed days, the said, taking good endorsed paper for said sales, which paper the mortgagee agrees to accept and apply upon said debt.

And it is further agreed that said , may use a part of the avails of such sales not to exceed \$, to replenish and freshen the said stock, but it is agreed that in such case, the sub-

stituted stock shall take the place, and be in stead of, the stock so sold; and that this mortgage shall be renewed every days, and which renewal mortgage shall embrace and include such substituted stock.

It is the express understanding that no part of said stock, or of the proceeds of such sales, shall be used or disposed of by the said , except as hereinbefore set forth.

(Continue as in Form 1 to the end.)

No. 4.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE FARM LEASE.

(As in ordinary lease, continuing:) The said (tenant) , agrees that all the personal property on said land or hereafter brought on, shall be, and the same hereby is bound to , for the faithful performance of all the covenants contained in this lease, and as collateral security for all the rent due and to become due for said land, and for any and all sums now or hereafter to be due, or owing from said , also hereby agrees that all said personal propand said erty, and the crops raised and to be raised on said land, and the cows and all the increase thereof, shall be bound to, and hereby , as collateral security for the faithful are bound to said performance of all the covenants contained in this lease, and for the payment of said rent due, and to become due, and for any and all sums now due or hereafter to become due and owing from , for any cause whatever, and for . to said , shall have the title to all said personal this purpose said property of whatever kind raised, made, produced, kept, put or used upon said farm, and he shall have the right of possession thereof at any time, and such title and right of possession is vested in said as collateral security for the faithful performance of all the covenants contained in this lease including the payment of rent due, and to become due, and any and all sums of money owing or to be hereafter due and owing from said said

(Continue as in ordinary lease.)

No. 5.

MORTGAGE FOR FUTURE ADVANCES.

(As in Form 1 to the asterisk, continuing:) This grant is intended as a security for the payment of any debt, demand or liability now , or which may hereafter be incurred or held by the said (mortgagee) incurred or held by the said (mortgagor) count of, or against the said , and also a security against any liability of said (mortgagee) reason of, or on account of any endorsement or undertaking which has been, or may hereafter be made or incurred by said (mortgagee) , for said (mortgagor) this mortgage is to be a continuing security for the above, and all costs and expenses to the amount \$

(Continue as in Form 1, between *** and ****, as follows:) And it is further agreed that upon default being made by said , to pay any debt or obligation held by said (mortgagee) , or on which he might be liable, when presented for payment, or at maturity said . , may take possession of the said property, and for that purpose shall have full power to enter upon the premises of the said party of the first part, or other place where the goods and chattels aforesaid may be, and may sell the same at public or private sale at such time and on such terms, and in such manner as said may deem most advantageous. (Continue as in Form 1 to the end.)

No. 6.

MORTGAGE ON MACHINERY.

(As in Form 1 to ***, continuing:) It is an express condition of this mortgage, and it is agreed that said machinery above described, shall be and remain personal property, until the notes above described are fully paid, notwithstanding the manner in which such machinery, or any part thereof, shall be affixed to the realty.

(Continue as in Form I to the end.)

No. 7.

POWER OF ATTORNEY TO FORECLOSE.

I, do hereby nominate and appoint , as and for my true and lawful attorney, for me and in my name to take possession of the goods and chattels, described in the within mortgage (or, if the power to foreclose is written on a different paper, describe the mortgage), and to foreclose the said mortgage by a sale of said goods and chattels, in conformity with the power therein contained, and I authorize my said attorney to do all acts for me and in my behalf, which I, under the said power and under said mortgage could lawfully do, and for that purpose to procure the aid or assistance of any person or persons.

And I also covenant with the said , that the sum of dollars, and interest thereon from the day of , 18 , is now justly owing to me on the said mortgage, that I am the lawful owner and holder thereof, and that I will indemnify and hold him harmless for any acts done by him in carrying out and executing the power hereinbefore granted to him.

Dated this	day of	, 18	•	
	(Signed)		
				(L. S.

No. 8.

COMPLAINT TO FORECLOSE UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

SUPREME COURT — CHEMUNG COUNTY.

Henry L. Rosenbaum

agst.

George W. Bills.

The plaintiff above named complaining of the defendant herein for a cause of action alleges.

That heretofore and on the first day of November, A. D. 1888, one George W. Bills, the owner of the chattels therein described, made, executed and delivered to one George Doane an instrument in writing of which the following is a copy:

"To all to whom these presents shall come, know ye, that I, George W. Bills, of Southport, Chemung county, State of New York, am indebted unto George Doane, of Elmira, Chemung county, New York in the sum of one hundred dollars, being for the purchase-price of one horse. Now for securing the payment of the said debt, and the interest thereon from the date hereof, to the said George Doane, I do hereby sell, assign and transfer to the said George Doane, the property described in the following schedule, viz.:

One bay horse, being the same this day purchased of George Doane, one red cow, one lumber wagon; said property now being and remaining in the possession of the said George W. Bills: Provided always, and this mortgage is on the express condition that if the said George W. Bills, shall pay to the said George Doane the sum of one hundred dollars and interest thereon as follows: In ninety days from the date hereof, which the said George W. Bills hereby agrees to pay, then this transfer to be void and of no effect; but in case of non-payment of the said debt and interest at the time above mentioned, then the said George Doane shall have full power to enter upon the premises of said party of the first part, or any other place or places where the goods and chattels aforesaid may be; to take possession of said property; to sell the same at public or private sale, and the avails (after deducting all expenses of the sale and keeping of the said property) to apply in payment of the above debt, and in case the said George Doane shall at any time deem said property or debt unsafe, it shall be lawful for him to take possession of said property, and sell the same at public or private sale, previous to the time above mentioned, for the payment of said debt, applying the proceeds as aforesaid, after deducting all expenses of the sale and keeping of the said property. And the said mortgagee, his representatives or assigns, may purchase at any such sale, in the same manner, and to the same effect, as a person not interested herein. If from any cause said property shall fail to satisfy said debt, interest and costs and charges, I covenant and agree to pay the deficiency.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the third day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-five.

GEORGE W. BILLS. (L. s.)

That said mortgage was duly filed in the town clerk's office of the town of Southport, where the defendant resided, at the time of the execution and filing thereof, on the 2d day of November, 1888, and where said chattels were situated at the time of such execution and filing; that the said instrument was duly sold, transferred and assigned to this plaintiff by the said Doane on the first day of December, 1888, and he is now the holder and owner thereof; that the sum secured by said mortgage is due and payable, and that the same remains unpaid, and there is now due and secured and owing by and on said mortgage, the sum of one hundred dollars, with interest from the first day of November, 1888. That said mortgage became due and payable on the fourth day of February, 1889, and that no part thereof has been paid, although the same has been duly demanded.*

Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment, for the foreclosure of said mortgage, and sale of the chattels therein described, by a proper person to be designated by the court, and that the proceeds be applied to the payment of the amount due plaintiff and the costs of the action, and that plaintiff have judgment against the said defendant for any costs and deficiency which cannot be satisfied out of the fund realized from the sale of said chattels, after first paying plaintiff the amount due him and secured thereby.

DIX W. SMITH, Plaintiff's Attorney. Elmira, N. Y.

(Add verification.)

(If the property is not in the possession of the mortgagor, continue from the * as follows):

That the defendant, Bills, has disposed of the property described in said mortgage, and the said property is now claimed to be owned by the defendant , who has refused to deliver the same to the possession of this plaintiff, although the possession thereof has been demanded from him.

No. 9.

BOND.

SUPREME COURT - CHEMUNG COUNTY.

Henry L. Rosenbaum agst.
George W. Bills.

Whereas, the above-named Henry L. Rosenbaum, as plaintiff, has commenced, or is about to commence, an action by summons for the foreclosure of a lien on a chattel, against the above-named defendant, and has made, or is about to make, application for a warrant to seize such chattels described in the complaint, according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Now, therefore, we, W. J. Roy, of Southport, by occupation a farmer, and Jacob Hevener, of the city of Elmira, by occupation a merchant, do hereby jointly and severally undertake, promise and agree to and with the said defendant, that if the defendant recovers judgment, or if the warrant is vacated, the plaintiff will pay all costs which may be awarded to said defendant, and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the said warrant, not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars.

W. J. ROY.
JACOB HEVENER.

Dated February 8, 18 . (Add acknowledgment, justification and approval.)

No. 10.

AFFIDAVIT FOR WARRANT.

(Title as before.)

CHEMUNG COUNTY, ss.:

Henry L. Rosenbaum of the city of Elmira, in said county, being duly sworn says, that he is the owner and holder of a chattel mortgage given by one George W. Bills to George Doane, November 1, 1888, and filed in the town clerk's office of the town of

Southport, where said mortgagor then resided, and where the chattels therein described were then located, on the first day of November, 1888, for the purpose of securing the payment of the sum of one hundred dollars with interest thereon in three months from the date thereof; that the property pledged in and by said mortgage consists of one bay horse, one red cow, one lumber wagon; that the whole of said sum is due with interest thereon, and remains unpaid, and this deponent has brought this action to foreclose the lien of said mortgage; that the property described in said mortgage is now in the possession of the defendant the said . claiming to be the owner thereof, and that said

, refuses to deliver the possession of the said property to this plaintiff, although the same has been duly demanded; that the value of said property is one hundred dollars.

That the said defendants, Bills and , reside at the town of Southport, in the county of Chemung, and said property is now at said town.

Deponent further says that no previous application has been made for a warrant to seize said chattels in this action.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, this day of , 18 .

No. 11.

WARRANT.

The People of the State of New York to the Sheriff of the County of Chemung:

Whereas, In an action brought in this court, an application has been made to the justice granting this warrant, by Henry L. Rosenbaum, plaintiff, for a warrant to seize and safely keep the chattels hereinafter described, to abide the final judgment in said action, in which said Henry L. Rosenbaum is plaintiff, George W. Bills, and , defendant; and it appearing by affidavit to the satisfaction of the justice granting this warrant, that a cause of action such as is specified in section 1737 of the Code of Civil Procedure, exists in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, to foreclose a lien for the sum of one hundred dollars, with interest thereon from November 1, 1888, upon said chattels, and

that the plaintiff is not in possession of said chattels, and the plaintiff having given the undertaking required by law:

Now, you are hereby commanded to seize the following chattels, to wit:

(Specify chattels.)

Being the chattels described in the complaint in this action, or so much thereof as may be found in your county, and to safely keep the same to abide the final judgment in the action, and that you proceed herein in the manner, and make your return within the time required of you by law.

Given under the hand of one of the justices of the Supreme Court, at the chambers in the city of Elmira, this day of , 18 .

WALTER LLOYD SMITH,

Justice of the Supreme Court.

DIX W. SMITH,

Plaintiff's Attorney, Elmira, N. Y.

No. 12.

ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE.

This instrument, made this day of , 18 , between , of the , of , of the first part, and , of of the second part;

WITNESSETH, That the part of the first part, for a good and valuable consideration to in hand paid by the part of the second part, ha sold, assigned, and transferred, and do hereby sell, assign, and transfer to the part of the second part, a certain chattel mortgage bearing date the day of , 18 , made by

And filed in the clerk's office of county, on the day of 18, at o'clock M., together with the debt thereby secured, and all sums of money due and to grow due thereon.

And the part of the first part hereby covenant that there is due on said mortgage, the sum of

In Witness Whereof, The part of the first part, ha hereunto set hand and seal the day and year first above written.

STATE OF NEW YORK, Ss...

On this day of , in the year one thousand eight hundred and , before me, the subscriber, personally appeared to me personally known to be the same person described in and who executed the within instrument, and he acknowledged that he executed the same.

No. 13.

SATISFACTION OF MORTGAGE.

Do Hereby Certify, That a certain chattel mortgage bearing date the day of , one thousand eight hundred and , made and executed by

and filed in the office of the clerk of the of , on the day of , in the year one thousand eight hundred and , at o'clock minutes M., is with the debt thereby secured, FULLY PAID AND SATISFIED.

And I hereby consent that the same be discharged of record.


Dated the day of , 18

(If mortgage is acknowledged, add acknowledgment.)

No. 14.

STATEMENT OF MORTGAGEE ON REFILING CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

I, , the mortgagee within named, do certify and state that there remains due and unpaid on the mortgage of which the



No. 16.

CONTRACT OF CONDITIONAL SALE, IN THE FORM OF A LEASE.

THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH, That I have this day leased and received of . , the personal property hereinafter described, which is valued at dollars, and it and every part thereof is in good order and condition. For the use of said personal property, I this day pay the sum of dollars, and I do hereby agree to pay rent therefor, hereafter, at the rate of dollars per month, and I agree to make such monthly , on the payments to said day of each and every month hereafter, with the understanding that when I shall have fully and promptly paid rent for said property, amounting to the sum of dollars, the said personal property, and

every part thereof, shall become and be my property, and the absolute legal title thereto shall then, and not until then, vest in me; but in case of default in any of the payments agreed to be made as aforesaid, I hereby agree to return all of said property to said ; and in such case the said have full power, and I do hereby authorize the said or his agent or agents, to enter upon my premises and to search for the said property thereon, and in and through the house and buildings occupied by me, and to remove said property therefrom with or without process of law, and to forfeit all money paid thereon; and I do hereby agree that such money paid shall be retained by as and for the rental value of said property while occupied by me, and up to the time of such default and removal of said property from my premises.

And I further agree not to remove the said property, or any part thereof, from the premises named below as my residence, without the written permission of the said . I have read this contract and understand its terms and conditions, and I have made no verbal agreement or contract contrary to any of the terms and conditions as expressed in the foregoing instrument. The following is a description of the personal property leased as aforesaid (here insert description):

This contract is executed in duplicate, and each party has one.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this , one thousand eight hundred and ninety day of

Residence, No. Street, City of Occupation,

STATE OF NEW YORK, . { ss. : City and County of

On this day of , 189 , before me, the subscriber, personally appeared , to me personally known to be the same person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and he duly acknowledged that he executed the same.

No. 17.

CONTRACT OF CONDITIONAL SALE. ANOTHER FORM.

This agreement made this day of , 189, between A. B., of the city of Albany, N. Y., party of the first part, and C. D., of the same place, party of the second part:

WITNESSETH, The said party of the first part has this day delivered to the said second party the following personal property, to-wit: (here insert description) upon the terms and conditions hereinafter agreed.

The said second party agrees to receive said property and to pay said first party therefor the sum of dollars, in installments, as follows: the sum of dollars on the day of each and every month hereafter until the whole sum of dollars is fully paid.

It is expressly understood and agreed that the absolute legal title to all of said property is to remain in said first party until the sum of dollars is paid in full, and the said second party shall have no title to said property until said sum of dollars is fully paid.

It is further agreed that in the event of the failure of said second party to pay any of said installments when the same shall become due, then the said first party may enter upon the premises and search for said property on the premises and in the house and buildings occupied by said second party, and take posseision of and remove said property therefrom, with or without any legal process, and in such case it is also expressly agreed that said first party may retain all the installments previously paid, as and for compensation for the use of said property by said second party.

It is further agreed that when said sum of dollars shall have been fully paid in the manner aforesaid the absolute legal title to all of said property shall then, and not until then, vest in the said second party.

No verbal contract or agreement contrary to any of the terms and conditions of the foregoing contract has been made. This contract is executed in duplicate and each party has one.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year first above written.

STATE OF NEW YORK, city and County of , ss.:	

On this day of , 189, before me, the subscriber, personally appeared A. B. and C. D., to me personally known to be the same persons described in and who executed the foregoing instrument, and they severally duly acknowledged that they executed the same.

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INDEX.

[Reference is to Pages.]

Acceptance and Delivery.	AGE,
delivery is question for the jury	rr8
are essential to validity of mortgage	rr8
may be by one of several mortgagees3,	1 1 8
Accessions.	
substituted articles sometimes become subject to mort-gage46,	
Acknowledgment.	
mortgage of vessel must be acknowledged	86
mortgage need not be acknowledged	4
Action.	
in equity lies to foreclose mortgage	148
may be brought to foreclose under Code75, 76,	148
Agent.	
may execute chattel mortgage6,	r 18
may make statement upon refiling	28
selling mortgaged property liable to mortgagee67,	68
Assignee.	
for benefit of creditors, cannot avoid mortgage because	
not filed	24
Assignee in Bankruptcy.	
may show mortgage fraudulent	60
Assignment.	
mortgage may be assigned	78
of the debt carries mortgage	78
of chattel mortgage, need not be filed	79

184 INDEX.

Assignment — continued.	AGE.
assignee takes subject to equities80, otherwise, when mortgage given to secure negotiable	151
instrument	79
of mortgage without debt a nullity	151
Attachment and Execution.	
mortgagor's interest subject to, when 62, 63, 64, 144,	145
mortgaged property, how sold under65,	66
mortgagor's interest may be sold under where mortgagee has immediate right of possession, prop-	62
erty cannot be sold under63, 144,	145
may be sold under, until equity of redemption is fore-	
closed	63
cannot be sold under, unless mortgagor has right of pos-	
session for definite period64,	144
Bill of Sale.	
when must be filed	132
becomes mortgage, when	3
of vessel, become mortgage when	100
of vessel, must be filed	85
Canal Boats. See STATUTES.	
Statutes concerning	124
filing of mortgages on	
preference of liens on 123,	124
Code of Civil Procedure.	
action to foreclose may be brought under	T 4 8
action to force ose may be brought under	140
Conditional Sales.	
chattle mortgage is not a, 3,	107
must be evidenced in writing	154
to be void if not filed	155
where to be filed	155
when cease to be valid	156
duty of clerks, fees	156
how discharged of record	157
nature and validity of contract159,	160

Conditional Sales — continued.	PAGE.
when purchaser entitled to return of money paid158,	160
when purchaser is not entitled to money paid	164
what alteration does not avoid	161
vendor entitled to no more than is sufficient to satisfy	
demand and expenses	
when tender will discharge claim of title162,	
Consideration.	
must be legal and valid	34
a pre-existing debt is not a sufficient.	33
Conversion.	
of property by the mortgagor66,	67
by the mortgagee73,	
Corporation.	
may make chattel mortgage	7
Creditors. See Filing and Refiling.	
Crops.	
crops not planted cannot be mortgaged	115
liens upon, with power of sale, a mortgage48, 49,	50
liens upon must be filed	50
See FUTURE PROPERTY.	
Danger Clause.	
possession of, under, may be taken by mortgagee 63,	70
when it affords no protection to	113
must show ground that he is unsafe when	113
Date.	
the true, may be shown by oral evidence	13
mortgage presumed to have been executed at its date	I I 2
Debt.	
mortgage may be for future	9
purchaser under execution may attack validity of	61
not cancelled by giving mortgage for53, 54,	137
assignment of mortgage without78,	151
statement of, on refiling	120
tainted with usury makes void	35
mortgage should contain a description of	111

Default.	AGE.
mortgagee's title becomes absolute upon	107 31
mortgagee can take possession upon	69
default in one payment makes the whole amount due.71,	144
one default in one payment enough	144
Deficiency.	
action to recover, when maintainable3,	73
Delivery. See Acceptance and Delivery.	
is essential to constitute a valid mortgage13,	118
Demand.	
mortgage payable upon63,	64
Description of property.	
oral evidence may be given to correct	10
general rule as to	116
sufficiency of 11,	116
general, when sufficient	11
general, when not sufficient 116,	117
the mortgage, not schedule, controls	117
Discharge of Mortgage. See PAVMENT AND SATISFACTION	г.
Estoppel	34
Evidence.	
may be given to correct erroneous description	10
may be given to identify the articles if mortgage is acknowledged, it becomes evidence same	10
as deed	5
of record of mortgage on vessel	106
what burden on vendee	127
parol evidence competent to show bill of sale is chattel	
mortgage	108
copy mortgage to be received in evidence; evidence of what facts	
statement to be received in evidence	120
certified copies evidence of what facts	123
mortgage presumed to have been executed at its date.112,	152

Evidence — continued.	PAGE.
competent to prove consideration ofpossession a question of fact	
certificate of town clerk no proof of existence of mor	t-
gage	. r53
Execution.	
where mortgagor has right of possession, property can be	
sold under	
must be for a definite time	•
mortgaged property, how sold under	-
when mortgaged property cannot be sold under62, 144	
execution of mortgage need not be under seal	-
need not be acknowledged	
mortgage may be executed by agent	
fees of clerk	1-122
Filing.	
where filed4, 119, 12	
object of statute, requiring 15, 12	7, 128
is not fraudulent because not filed	
where filed on canal boat	•
on vessel, where filed	
given by joint-stock company, where filed	
must be filed where mortgagor resides, if resident. 16, 12	•
if non-resident, where the property is located	
given by partners, must be filed where they severally re	
side	
delivery to clerk while absent from office, not a	-
no time prescribed for	. •
error of clerk in	,
clerk's duty as to 20, 121, 122, 125, 126	
a copy is a sufficient	
mortgage withdrawn from files	
mortgage not absolutely void for omission to file21	
as to a purchaser with notice	
valid between the parties without	
void as to creditors without22, 128	
creditor, to take advantage of omission, must have exe	
cution	
,,,,,,, _	,, ~J~

Filing — continued.	AGE.
leases for years need not be filed	23
general assignee cannot take advantage of omission	24
chattel mortgage lease must be	24
is notice to one who purchases within the year	26
due diligence must be exercised in filing	128
to constitute requires act of clerk	129
what is not sufficient	129
meaning of word "creditor"	128
when bill of sale must be filed	132
Fixtures.	
criterion of what are54,	142
tests determining what are	142
between vendor and vendee, what are55,	142
when machinery becomes a fixture55, 56,	57
between landlord and tenant, what are	57
what is covered by the term appendages	59
examples of	142
Foreclosure.	
under power in the mortgage69, 70,	
mortgagee may take possession and sell although not due.	71 69
must foreclose to extinguish equity of redemption	70
may bring either legal or equitable action to foreclose77,	148
may bring crimer regar or equitable action to receive,, mortgagee may purchase at sale under	70
no warranty of title is implied against mortgagee at sale	70
under	75
under Code of Civil Procedure	148
, , ,	-40
Forms.	
no particular form of words required3, 109,	110
may be by parol4,	110
may be in form of bill of sale5,	108
common form of chattel mortgage	167
form containing insurance clause, etc	168
mortgage of stock of goods	169
chattel mortgage farm lease	170
mortgage for future advances	171
mortgage on machinery	171
power of attorney to foreclose mortgage	172

Forms — continued.	AGE.
complaint to foreclose under Code of Civil Procedure. bond in action	172 175 176 175 177 178 178 179 179
Fraud.	
arising from permission given mortgagor to sell and dispose of mortgaged property42, 44, 110, presumption of, conclusive unless mortgage filed is a question for the jury	135 39 39 36 40
was a party of mortgagor in disposing of property	44 67
Forfeiture.	
is an incident of the relationship	73
Future Advances.	
mortgage may be given to secure	9 9 35
Future Property.	
mortgage upon, valid between the parties	115 139 139 9 116 115
1003	122

Grass.	AGE.
growing, when may be mortgaged	8
Growing Crops.	
mortgage of, when valid41, 49, 50,	5 I
Hop Poles.	
are covered by mortgage of land	47
Horses.	
lien of livery stable keeper53,	147
Insolvency.	
of mortgagor not sufficient to vitiate	45
Installments.	
mortgage may be payable in5, 112,	141
default in, makes whole amount due	
default in one payment enough	144
Insurance.	
policy of, the subject of mortgage mortgage which provides for, valid	9 46
Judgment.	
a chattel mortgage not merged by53, 54,	149
Lease.	
farm lease containing lien clause48, 49,	50
to be valid must be filed	48
Liens.	
for repairs and supplies upon vessels90,	99
for advances in foreign port	ror
State courts can enforce certain statutory provisions for foreclosure of	9 r
for pasture and livery	90 147
Married Woman.	
may make valid mortgage	6
may be mortgagee of husband6,	
Merger53, 54,	149

	AGE.
Mingling Goods	52
Mortgage.	
what is contract, not chattel mortgage136,	127
definition of chattel,	107
is a transfer of title, 107,	108
differs from real estate mortgage	2
no particular form required	
may be by parol	
need not be acknowledged4,	
	4
must express an agreement to pay need not be under seal	109
	4
bill of sale shown to be	108
may be payable in installments5,	112
married woman may give	6
married man may give to wife	137
infant may give6,	
one partner may make6,	114
differs from a pledge3,	109
how discharged of record125,	126
Mortgagee.	
when title to property becomes absolute in	147
may be joint	7
may take possession, when	69
may purchase at sale	148
safety clause in favor of	69
when possession presumed to have been taken under	- ,
safety clause by	I I 2
surely clause by:	
Mortgagor.	
right of redemption83,	84
sales by, when fraudulent	140
may sell such title as remains in him67,	146
when in default, mortgagee may take possession69,	70
cannot recover payments made when in default	71
sales made by, when not fraudulent, 51, 52, 67, 135, 136,	140
has only equity after default	64
provision that mortgagor may retain possession, valid	45
25	43

mortgagor — continuea.	AGE
agreement that mortgagor will keep property insured,	_
valid	46
fraud of, does not affect mortgagee	44
cannot charge property by second mortgage after default, sales made and money used by, render mortgage void, 43,	44
135,	140
must give possession or mortgage must be filed39,	119
may be non-resident	17
may be joint-stock company	7
an infant may be6,	114
may deliver property to mortgagee in payment of debt	145
Nursery.	
stock of, when personal property, and may be mortgaged,	139
Parcels.	
sale of property in, by sheriff, unlawful 65,	66
Partners.	
one partner may make mortgage of partnership prop-	
erty	
without consent of partners6,	114
Parol Evidence.	
may be given to identify articles	10
competent to fix quality	10
may be given to correct erroneous description	10
may be given to show bill of sale a mortgage	108
Parties.	
all persons who are legally competent5,	113
married woman6, 114,	137
husband	137
agent	6
infant	114
partner	114
tenant in common	7
joint-stock company	7
corporation	7
joint mortgagees	7

193

Payment.	AGE.
instrument should specify time of	5 141 80 80 81 152 152
Place of Contract. See Conflict of Laws.	
Pledge.	
distinguished from mortgage3,	107
Possession.	
must be change of, when mortgage not filed	39 138
fraudulent	40
whether there is change of, is question for jury39, right of, under danger clause	138 69
does not require family to be broken up	138
	139
Power of Sale.	
in mortgage does not preclude action	72 60
mortgagee may purchase at sale	69 148
Priority.	
between mortgages simultaneously made	23
between mortgages and liens for repairs	101
Purchaser.	
mortgage void as to, unless filed14, 15, 21,	-
who is a purchaser in good faith	33
filing is constructive notice to	21
an assignee for benefit of creditors is not	24 26
subsequent purchaser means after expiration of year	33
from mortgagor takes title subject to mortgage 67,	146

Recording. See FILING.	PAGE.
Redemption.	
equity of, in mortgagor, until default	64
mortgagor has equity of, until foreclosure	69
to bar equity of, must be sale69,	
action for, need not be brought in equity	83
mortgagor cannot debar himself of, by agreement measure of damages in action for83,	83 84
who may redeem	
•	05
Refiling.	
statement on27,	
where refiled if mortgagor is a resident27,	
if non-resident, where refiled	
object of statute requiring	27
statement on, by whom made28,	
sufficiency of statement on	
the original mortgage with statement is a sufficient may not be made after expiration of the year	29
must be made each successive year	133
unless there is a, void against creditors	31 32
not necessary against receiver, or purchaser with knowl-	
edge32, effect of omission to refile33,	
effect of omission to refile33,	134
Remedies for Enforcing Mortgage.	
mortgagee may bring equity action	72
may sell under power in mortgage	69
may recover for deficiency	73
See Foreclosure.	
Removal.	
of mortgagor, effect of	17
of property, by mortgagor	66
Repairs. See Liens.	
lien for, on vessels, see Ships and Vessels.	
Residence.	
of mortgagor determines place of filing 14, 119, 127,	128
fact of and not statement in instrument controls	
of partners governs filing on partnership property17,	18

Sale.	PAGE.
of property, by mortgagor	146 72 44 46 149
Satisfaction.	
statutory provisions as to	82 83
Schedule.	
is a part of the mortgage	12 12 12 117
Seal.	
not necessary to chattel mortgage	4 82
Second Mortgage.	
mortgagor cannot give, after default in first mortgage when not entitled to priority over first on same property between same parties does not satisfy the first one	44 23 137
Ships and Vessels.	
bill of sale or mortgage of, must be filed	85 85 86 87 87 87
where mortgage of vessel must be filed	89
mortgage on canal boat not filed, void	89

Ships and Vessels — continued.	PAGE.
Statutes of the State of New York90, 91, 92	
New York Statute of 1862 unconstitutional	
no lien upon, for work done in home port	
agreement for building and construction of, not maritime	
what is the home port of	
supplies furnished in the home port, duration of lien for	
depends upon State statute	
no lien for services in raising sunken canal boats	
extent of admiralty jurisdiction	
bill of sale of, may be shown to be mortgage	
legal title to, becomes absolute, when	
mortgagor not personally liable unless mortgage contain	
covenant to pay	
object of requiring chattel mortgage to be acknowledged	
mortgage of, not affected by assignment in bankruptcy.	
liens for advances made to, have priority over mortgages	
when101	
definition of bottomry	
bottomry bond, when valid	
respondentia, what is	
record of mortgage of, when evidence	. 106
Statement. See Refiling.	
Statutes.	
mortgage void unless filed	. 119
how and where filed	
when cease to be valid, renewal	
copy to be received in evidence	
mortgages to be numbered	
fees12	
mortgages to be registered	
to be numbered	
on canal boats to be registered where	
preference of liens on canal boats12	2-124
statement to be received in evidence	• I23
not filed to be void	• 123 • 123
certified copies evidence	· 123 · 124
change of names of boats and hailing places	. 124

197

Statutes — continued.	PAGE.
what chattel mortgages not necessary to file	126
statutes of fraud	127
what burden it puts on vendee	
statutes concerning conditional sales 154	-158
Stock of Merchandise.	
mortgage upon44, 46, 47,	52
Subject Matter, 8, 9, 114,	115
Subsequent Mortgagee.	
if mortgage taken after default, cannot redeem	44
Subsequent Purchaser. See Purchaser.	
Subsequent Judgment Debtor.	
is entitled to accounting	52
Substituting of Other Property.	
when valid52, 140,	
when invalid	4
Surplus.	
belongs to mortgagor	71
reservation of, may be valid	51
Tax Warrant.	
property in possession of mortgagor may be sold under,	65
Tenant in Common.	
may mortgage his interest	7
Title.	
upon default title becomes absolute in mortgagee2,	
is extinguished by payment	
failure to file confers no title to creditors	129
Trees.	
being part of nursery stock, may be mortgaged9,	139
Usury.	1
mortgage tainted with, void	35

validity.	AGE.
given under duress is voidif tainted with usury is void	34 35
may be given to secure present and future indebtedness,	35
what law controls as to	37
is invalid unless filed or possession is changed39, 40,	128
property must be in existence40,	139
crops are an exception to the rule, when41, 42, agreement that mortgagor may sell and use moneys,	139
void42, 43, 135,	140
validity of, on stock of merchandise	46
mere fact of mortgagor's insolvency does not vitiate. 45,	ì 37
	141
agreement to keep property insured, valid	46
mortgage on after-acquired property may be valid46,	139
chattel mortgage farm lease valid48, 49, 50, 136,	137
permission given mortgagor to sell, when valid52,	135
136, by whom may be contested59, 60, 61, 136, 142,	140
of, on ships and vessels	143
verbal agreement valid between parties, when	
Vessels. See Ships and Vessels.	
Wages. See Ships and Vessels.	
Waiver.	
of forfeiture by payment	2
Yacht.	
not within the recording acts of United States	87.

